Best Practices in European Policing

A Selection of Case Studies

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Contents

Preface *v*

Acknowledgements *vii*

1 **Nodal Orientation at West-Coast Police** 1
WEST-COAST POLICE, BELGIUM
Ad van den Oord and Nathalie Vallet
(University of Antwerp)

2 **Safe Location – Safe Housing**
THE MUNICIPAL POLICE OF BRNO, THE CZECH REPUBLIC 23
Zdenko Reguli and Michal Vit
(Masaryk University)

3 **Project ZENTRAB - Central Criminal Case Processing** 39
A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE CRIMINAL POLICE OF THE LAND BRANDENBURG, GERMANY
Susanne Stein-Müller, Mario Gruschinske and Nathalie Hirschmann
(FHPol Brandenburg, Oranienburg)

4 **Institutional Cooperation with Examples of Skill Sharing and Optimisation** 53
ARMA DEI CARABINIERI AND
CORPO FORESTALE DELLO STATO, ITALY
Fabio Bisogni and Pietro Costanzo
(Fondazione FORMIT)

5 **Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan** 67
BIRO CENTRAL POLICE SERVICES, PUBLIC SECURITY
NATIONAL POLICE, THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Rade Rajkovcevski, Trpe Stojanovski, Stojanka Mirceva and Katerina Krstevska
(University St.Kliment Ohridski)

6 **United Under One Roof - Safety Houses in the Netherlands** 77
THE NETHERLANDS
Theo Jochoms and Hani Quint
(Police Academy of the Netherlands, Apeldoorn)
Kate Horton, Gabriele Jacobs and P. Saskia Bayerl,
(Erasmus University Rotterdam)

7 **The Electronic Eye at the Door of the European Union** 93
BORDER POLICE, ROMANIA
Claudia Rus, Gabriel Vonas, Lucia Ratiu, Catalina Otoiu,
Daniela Andrei, Sofia Chirica and Adriana Baban
(Babes-Bolyai University)

8 **Tutoring Programme for Minors - Servicio de Agentes Tutores** 119
POLICÍA MUNICIPAL DE MADRID, SPAIN
Mila Gascó
(Institute of Public Governance and Management, ESADE)

9 **Project Gulf - Fighting Organised Crime through Effective Partnership and Disruption Strategies** 133
SALFORD DIVISION, GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE,
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Kathryn A. Betteridge, Leslie N. Graham and Rebecca Casey
(Durham University)

Discussion and Conclusions 149

Preface

In this book, we present best practice case studies of successful improvement projects implemented by police organisations in nine European countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Republic of Macedonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom). A key factor for selection of each of the cases for study and inclusion in this book was the level of recognition received from key external stakeholders and the level of benefit achieved for citizens. The best practice cases presented are diverse in terms of their relative sizes and scope and in the levels of complexity and resources involved.

The examination and documentation of each of the case studies is based on work completed as part of the COMPOSITE research project (see http://www.composite-project.eu). Data was collected through desk research of documents, reports and other available written materials and through follow up meetings and interviews with key individuals, who had been or are currently involved with the best practice project or operation, by the COMPOSITE consortium country research team members.

A case study approach is a common research method in social sciences and is the preferred research method for answering '*how'* or '*why'* questions (Yin, 2009[1]). It is frequently used for in-depth investigation of contemporary phenomena within a real-life context and is the suggested methodology for the study of strategy formation, decision making within organisations, resource allocation processes, and the management of organisational and strategic changes (Siggelkow, 2001[2]).

Within the analysis of the case studies, factors such as (a) resources and capabilities required to achieve the best practice, (b) the frequency, difficulty and cost involved in acquiring or transferring knowledge and capabilities from

[1]Yin, R. K. (2009).*Case Study Research Design and Methods*, Sage, London.
[2]Siggelkow, N. (2001) Change in the presence of fit: The rise, the fall and the renaissance of Liz Clairborne, *Academy of Management Journal*, 44 (4):838-857.

one organisation to another, (c) the enablers important to achieve success, (d) the barriers that created difficulties and (e) the levels of adoption and future development of each best practice are examined.

While the nine cases presented only represent a small number of the best practice achievements in policing, we believe they provide interesting and useful insights that are worth sharing across the police in different countries. We hope this book will be of interest to police officers across Europe as they address change issues and implement projects to improve performance and enhance citizens' lives.

Leslie N. Graham, Kathryn, A. Betteridge, Rebecca Casey
and Arjen van Witteloostuijn
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We also thank the individual officers and other personnel within these and other organisations who provided their opinions and views and additional information to generate the case studies.

1

Nodal Orientation at West-Coast Police

WEST-COAST POLICE, BELGIUM

Ad van den Oord and Nathalie Vallet
(University of Antwerp)

Introduction

In this case study, we will describe the adoption of a nodal orientation by the West-Coast Police in Belgium. This nodal orientation complements the narrow interpretation of the community-policing model prescribed in Belgium during the police reforms of 1998-2001, and enables the West-Coast police to tackle specific safety and security issues more effectively.

General Trends and Developments

To fully understand the context of the problem, we have to take into account the general trends of globalisation, which refers to the increasingly global relationships of culture, people, and economic activity through the reduction and removal of barriers between national borders in order to facilitate the flow of goods, capital, services, and labour. As a result of the dissolution of national borders, local, national, and international boundaries are blurring. This implies an increased mobility of people, goods, and capital. Within Europe, this has resulted in the Schengen Agreement, which effectively created a borderless Schengen Area with only external and no internal border controls. The Schengen Area currently consists of 26 European countries, covering a population of over 400 million people and an area of 4,312,099 square kilometres (Wikipedia, 2011). This means that criminals are also increasingly mobile and not hampered by international, national, and/or local borders.

To summarise:

- Dissolving national borders;
- Increased flow of people, goods, and capital across borders in Europe;
- Increased mobility of criminals.

The Organisation of Police in Europe

While national borders are dissolving for criminals, national borders still form a major impediment for European police. European police are organised nationally and national police forces have no or extremely limited authority across national borders. Consequently, several nation states have formed bilateral or multilateral agreements (e.g., the Benelux agreement and the agreement of Enschede) or signed treaties (e.g., the Treaty of Prüm) to foster cooperation across national borders to tackle safety issues. Furthermore, Europol has been created to tackle safety and security issues across national borders. However, this does not mean that all safety and security issues are tackled efficiently throughout Europe, for two reasons. First of all, while Europol handles cross-border safety and security issues, it only focuses on the major priorities, such as terrorism and large organized crime. Second, the agreements and treaties are not signed or formed between all nation states, and also tend to concentrate on the major safety and security issues. As a result, most police forces are severely hampered by national borders.

To summarise:

- National borders remain an extreme impediment for most police forces.

The Structure of the Belgian Police Force

The Belgian police are structured at two levels, Local and Federal police, which are autonomous and subordinate to different authorities. The Local Police operate locally in so-called police zones, of which there are a total of 195 (see Figure 1). The police zones are composed of single or multiple municipalities and/or cities, and are run by the police chief who operate under the authority of the mayor[3] or the police council[4]. The Federal Police operate across police zones

[3]For single municipality/city police zones.

[4]Multiple municipality/city police zones; police councils are composed of the mayors of the different municipalities/cities, the chair of which is being seated by the mayor of the largest municipality/city

on issues that transcend single police zones such as inter-zone safety and security issues. Federal Police forces are run by the commissioner-general, and consist of several centralised directorates for example, The Directorate Operational Police Information, The Directorate of International Police Cooperation, The Directorate of Relations with the Local Police, The Directorate of Special Units and decentralised Directorates of Coordination and Support (CSD). The decentralised directorates are managed by a coordinating director who, together with the judicial director, plays a key role in the integrated functioning of the police, more particularly in the approach to security problems, the organisation of the information flow at the judicial district level (in the so-called District Information Crossroads), the co-operation between the different police zones and the functioning of the Provincial Information and Communication Centre (CIC). The integrated police, the combination of local and federal police, operate under the authority of the Minister of Interior Affairs (administrative or uniformed police) and the Minister of Justice (judicial or investigative police).

To summarise:

- Belgian police structured at two levels: (1) federal police, and (2) local police.

The Belgian Policing Model

Regarding the Belgian model of policing, during the reforms of 1998-2001, the Belgian government decided to follow the UK and the Netherlands by adopting a community model of policing. A community policing model takes the view that the police and citizens are co-producers of police services, jointly responsible for reducing crime and improving the quality of life in local neighbourhoods (Law Library, 2011). This stresses the need for the police to be integrated in the community, and to be fully aware of the safety and security issues that characterise the community. This is accomplished through the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to crime, social disorder, and fear of crime (COPS, 2011). To complement this model, the Belgian police also adopted a model of intelligence-led policing (ILP). Intelligence-led policing basically consists of:

- information driven local orientation that uses information from the community to combat local phenomena

- a technology driven nodal orientation that uses information about flows in the community to combat global phenomena.

For the local police in Belgium, the information driven local orientation of intelligence-led policing is adopted, and the technology driven nodal orientation is largely ignored (Paelinck, 2011).

With respect to the global safety and security issues that transcend local police zones, there is a distinction between the two different kinds. The appropriate centralised unit of the federal police, for example the federal judicial police or anti-terrorist unit, tackles the safety and security issues that are of national importance. Whilst the remaining safety and security issues are resolved through partnerships between local police forces, either with or without the support of the decentralised directorate of coordination and support of the federal police. For these 'low-profile' global issues, the underlying assumption is that by combining their knowledge and information about their local communities, local police forces can jointly combat these phenomena effectively.

To summarise:

- Local safety and security issues can be tackled with a community model and with local intelligence;
- Global safety and security issues of national importance are tackled by the appropriate centralised unit of the federal police;
- All remaining global safety and security issues are tackled through partnerships between local and (decentralised units of the) federal police.

Financing the Local Police in Belgium

In Belgium, the local police are financed partly by the federal government, and partly by the local government such as the government of the municipalities that make up the police zone. During the reforms, for each police zone the minimum number of staff required to provide basic police care in the police zone was determined, the so-called KUL norm. The federal contribution is not sufficient to provide the basic police care, and local governments are legally obliged to finance the gap. If local government fails to do so, the governor of the province has the authority to explicitly include this 'expense' on the budget of the municipality.

To summarise:

- Police zones dependent on local governments for funding.

The West-Coast Police Zone

The police zone of the West-Coast police spans three municipalities located at the Belgian coast in the judicial district of Veurne in the province of West-Flanders (see Figure 1.1). The municipalities are Koksijde (population of about 22.000), De Panne (population of about 11.000) and Nieuwpoort (population of about 11.000). This part of Belgium is very popular for older people, who come here to enjoy their retirement. As a result, about 60% of the population is older than 55 years. For this residential community, the community model works properly, as the majority of the population is looking to enjoy the final years of their life in a nice and tranquil environment. The local safety and security issues related to the residential community can therefore be tackled effectively through partnerships with and integration in this stable part of the community.

Figure 1.1 Police Zones, Judicial Districts, and Provinces in Belgium
(Police Zone West-Coast is indicated in green)



However, because the police zone is located at the Belgian coast, during the summer months, hundreds of thousands of tourists visit the police zone daily to

enjoy the beaches and sea. The municipality of de Panne is also located against the border with France, about 20 kilometers from the city of Dunkirk (population of about 72.000 and 270.000 in the greater metropolitan area). This means that many tourists visiting the police zone are French foreigners. Furthermore, the police zone is also an important transit zone, as freeway A18/E40 crosses the police zone that physically connects Northern Europe with the United Kingdom, via the tunnel in Calais (France). In this context, a mere focus on the local or stable part of the community is insufficient, as the community can also be characterised by a large 'fluid' part.

The West-Coast is a rather small police force, with a total capacity of a mere 171 police officers. During the police reforms, the government established the so-called KUL-norm, on the basis of which the staff size and budget of local police zones is determined. The main criterion of the KUL-norm is the size of the municipalities that the police zone is composed of, without regard to tourism, transit zones, or locations at the border. As a result, the KUL-norm for West-Coast police was set to 131. At the time, there were actually 171 police officers active in the police zone, 131 municipal police officers, and 40 gendarmerie police officers. Fortunately, the police council, the mayors of the respective municipalities, decided to also keep the gendarmerie police officers on board.

To summarise:

- The West-Coast police zone can be characterized by a stable and a fluid part;
- The stable part of the community is represented by a small residential community;
- The fluid part of the community is represented by a large number of tourists, a transit zone, and the location at the French border;
- The police force is rather small, with only 171 police officers.

Safety and Security Issues in West-Coast Police Zone

The characteristics of the police zone provide significant challenges to the rather small police force. First of all, the fact that the livelihood of the community is dependent upon tourism makes it extremely important to effectively combat safety and security issues in the community. Tourists come to enjoy their free time to unwind, relax, and want to avoid being confronted with crime, social disorder, or fear of crime in any form, shape, or colour. Otherwise, they will take

their business elsewhere, and the community as a whole suffers. Second, as mentioned previously, the community can be characterised by a large fluid part that limits the appropriateness of the community model considerably. Especially if the criminals and victims are only visiting the police zone for a couple of hours as tourists, it becomes extremely difficult to pro-actively address safety and security issues effectively. For example, consider the theft of a purse of a tourist by a hit-and-run criminal from the north of France. If both the perpetrator and the criminal do not linger at the crime scene, it becomes extremely difficult to prevent or even solve this crime.

According to the chief of police, the biggest challenge is to effectively combat global safety and security caused by inter-zone mobility, and in particular international mobility. After all, the advantage that non-local criminals or criminals from outside the local police zone have is that they are anonymous and not known by local people or the local police. This makes it easier for them to avoid getting caught and extremely difficult for the police to tackle the related safety and security issues effectively. Many criminals originate from the North of France (Warlop, 2011), especially from the poorer regions surrounding Dunkirk. A narrow interpretation of the community model, a community model without a nodal orientation to tackle global issues, does not provide any modalities to combat this phenomenon effectively. What is needed is information and knowledge about the movements (or flows) of potential criminals. During the summer months, with several hundred thousands of tourists visiting daily, this is impossible with a staff of only 171 police officers.

Hence, the police chief realising early on that a nodal orientation was the way forward to combat specific inter-zone safety and security issues.

To summarise:

- Tourism makes safety and security extremely important;
- Traditional community model inappropriate for fluid part of the community, especially the border provides significant challenges;
- Nodal orientation needed to effectively combat global or inter-zone safety and security issues.

A Nodal Orientation

The traditional orientation of police work is reactive, after the crime has taken place or has been executed. However, in times of overloaded justice departments, it might be more efficient to battle crime in the earlier stages of a

crime (Paelinck, 2011). This can be explained on the basis of Patricia Brantingham stages of a crime, which are: (1) the decision-making stage, where the perpetrator decides to commit a crime, either consciously planned or impulsive and irrational, (2) the search stage, where the perpetrator searches for a potential victim or crime scene, and finally, (3) the execution stage, where the crime is actually committed. A nodal orientation can be defined as the acquisition, analyses, and evaluation of information related to safety and security issues to take the appropriate action to combat them effectively. Practically, this entails monitoring the flow of people, goods, information, and money so that potential criminals can be identified before they actually commit a crime. As such, it is a more proactive approach that combats crime before it actually occurs. Instead of an exclusive focus on the crime, there is also a focus on the criminal as they go from the stage of decision-making to the execution of a particular crime.

To summarise:

- Three stages of a crime: (1) decision-making stage, (2) search stage, and (3) execution stage;
- A proactive approach to combating crime before stage of execution requires a nodal orientation, that is, the monitoring of flow of people, goods, information, and/or money.

The Nodal Orientation of West-Coast Police

The Chief of Police initiated the nodal orientation of West-Coast police after becoming aware of this in the UK and the Netherlands. However, the technology needed for such an approach does not come cheap, and as local police forces are dependent upon local governments for funding, it was necessary to get the local government on board for this project. The Chief of Police then decided to prepare the case thoroughly and planned a number of work visits to foreign police forces that had already adopted a nodal orientation. This would enable studying this approach in real time, as it is used by police forces to combat the safety and security issues at hand. For these work visits, the police chief decided to invite the stakeholders of this project, as they needed to be on board to provide funding and support. He also invited the members of the police council such as the mayors of the three municipalities and the attorney general of the judicial district of Veurne. There were two work visits to the UK, one to Kent, England and one to Edinburgh, Scotland. There was also one work visit to

Amsterdam, the Netherlands. During these work visits, the stakeholders could observe how such a project contributed to police work in practice, and decide for themselves whether this is the way forward in their own police zone. It did not take long for them to realise that this was indeed the way forward, as it provided an effective solution to the problems faced at home. Hence, the work visits clearly aligned stakeholder needs, which effectively paved the way for the implementation of the project. Basically, the nodal orientation at West-Coast police consists of the following steps:

- Monitor flow of vehicles
- Identify vehicles of potential criminals
- Evaluate information
- Take appropriate action
    - Do not take action
    - Intercept
    - Monitor

For the first part, cameras with Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) software are used to monitor the vehicles that are entering the police zone. In the second part, the number plates are matched against databases containing number plates of criminal and suspicious vehicles to identify potential criminals.

Basically, the system provides a signal or hit of the entry of a suspicious vehicle into the police zone, and in the third leg the police evaluate this information on the basis of the priorities at that time. In the fourth and final leg, appropriate action is taken on the basis of the evaluation. This revolves around the following basic options: do not take action, intercept, and monitor.

No action will be undertaken if it does not match with the priorities at that time. Of course, at a later stage, follow up remains possible. This can occur when there are more pressing matters at hand and no capacity, for example an intervention unit, is available to take the appropriate action at that time. The second alternative is the vehicle is intercepted, which implies that an intervention unit pulls over the vehicle, identifies the potential criminals, and gathers additional information through the use of telecom equipment such as mobile telephones, SIM-cards and GPS systems. This has two effects. It gives the police information advantage, in the sense that when a potential criminal offends, the police already have a great deal of information about them. It also

raises the criminal's awareness of being explicitly identified by the police and significantly decreases the likelihood of them actually committing the felony. From the perspective of a potential criminal, this is likely to be highly irritating, and this approach is therefore labelled Very Irritating Police (VIP). This method combines various backgrounds, skills, and experiences, as whole interconnecting systems and routines had to developed that facilitate such an approach for example CCTV, ANPR, telecom equipment, fast intervention, et cetera. The third and final alternative is to monitor the suspicious vehicle by following them to gather additional information. Obviously, which approach is taken depends upon the priorities at the time and the specific case at hand.

This approach helps the battle against safety and security issues proactively and reactively. Proactively, when potential perpetrators are intercepted and identified, this significantly decreases the likelihood that they will actually commit a crime in the first place. According to the police chief, we take potential perpetrators out of the anonymity by identifying them. This serves two objectives. The identity of a potential criminal is available so if they decide to commit a crime, this greatly facilitates any investigation. Also the potential criminals are aware of the fact they are being monitored, and by removing anonymity, it increases the likelihood of them being caught if they do commit a crime.
Reactively, detailed information about the flows of vehicles in the police zone increases the information that can be used to solve crimes. This is best illustrated by a concrete example from the chief of police:

> *'We recently had a series of burglaries in the police zone. These burglaries were committed on different days, and we only had fragmented testimonies from a number of witnesses. For example, one witness noticed a black car and another witness remembered a car with a foreign number plate. These fragments were combined in a query of the system to identify a list of potential matches of cars that entered the police zone around the time that the burglaries were committed. The next step entailed deleting the vehicles that do not belong on this list, such as, for example, a bakery delivery service that takes place every morning from France. The number plates of the vehicles on the short list are put back in the system, so that we are notified when the vehicle enters the zone. This vehicle is then intercepted and checked thoroughly, the people are identified, and*

telephones, sim cards, and gps systems are read. Telecom data is then used to do a mast-investigation, to see where the telephone was during these burglaries. If this additional investigation provides a match than the next time the vehicle enters the police zone the people are arrested, or they are arrested immediately if they reside in Belgium and the police knows where precisely. Finally, a trace evidence investigation is conducted; houses are searched and fingerprints taken. This approach focuses much more on the criminal, and less on the individual crime. We were able to actually catch the criminals because of our nodal orientation. Without it, we can only catch them in the act.'

Resources and Capabilities

In this section, we will shortly describe some of the resources and capabilities required for the implementation of a nodal orientation. With respect to resources, the three most important ones are: (1) capital, (2) technology, (3) information, and (4) formal and informal relations. First and foremost, capital is needed to acquire the technology that provides the backbone of a nodal orientation. As mentioned, local police forces are dependent upon local governments for this particular resource. The second resource is the actual technology that is needed to monitor the particular flow of people, goods, and/or money in the context of the safety and security issue at hand. Obviously, different safety and security issues require different technologies. Consider, for example, the different technological requirements to battle cybercrime versus burglaries. To combat inter-zone mobility of perpetrators, the West-Coast police chief decided to acquire the following technology:

- CCTV with ANPR: this technology was 'bought' from the UK.
- Technology to read out telecom equipment (e.g., mobile phones, SIM-cards, and GPS systems) was acquired from Israel.

The third main resource required for the implementation of a nodal orientation is information. The system needs to be fed with information about suspicious vehicles, so that the system can provide a hit when this vehicle enters the police zone. Obviously, a great deal of information is already available within the police zone, on the basis of previous and current investigations. However, to effectively tackle inter-zone issues, information from outside the police zone is also needed. To access this information, formal and informal relations are needed, the fourth and final resource. The inter-zone information has two

components, national and international. Regarding the national information, the District Information Crossroad is responsible for the exchange of information between police zones, and can thus provide information about suspicious vehicles from outside the local police zone. Regarding the international component, we have already explained that many safety and security issues are related to France. This means that effective channels of communication with France are of the utmost importance. Formally, this is arranged through the Centre for Cooperation for Police and Customs (CCPD) located in Tournai (Belgium), which is a shared commissariat of France and Belgium police. However, according the police chief, the information received from the CCPD is often outdated, because formal channels often take too much time. What is needed is a direct communication link with the Dunkirk police, which is only possible through informal relations. Fortunately, the police chief recognized the importance of the link with France early on, and by now the relationships with Dunkirk police are well established. The police chief explains*:*

> *'It often takes a couple of hours before a car is formally reported stolen in France. We have intercepted many cars that were not even reported stolen in France. For example, recently, there was a carjacking in Dunkirk and we received the number plate from our French colleagues in real time. Ten minutes later, the car was spotted in Nieuwpoort.'*

The police chief further comments that they do have a good working relationship with the CCPD and do check the information with them extensively.
The most important capabilities are technological literacy, analysis and investigation, dispatching, and intervention. Technological literacy refers to the fact that the staff must be able to effectively work with the technology, and keep the system running and up-to-date. Police officers were trained internally to manage data and write queries and a systems analysis has been appointed. Obviously, the effectiveness of a nodal orientation depends to a large extent on the capability to analyse the information that is generated by the technology. On the basis of this analysis, suspicious flows such as vehicle movements in this particular case can be identified, which can then be fed back into the system to monitor when they enter the police zone. In addition, when an intervention takes place, telecom information is gathered that can be combined with the ANPR data and two crime analysts are currently working on this task. Because the information can also be used in criminal investigations, the investigation units

also need to be oriented more towards the use of this technology. What is also needed is your own dispatching, with people that are fully acquainted with the methodology and the workings of a nodal orientation. Initially, West-Coast police was using a central provincial dispatching service located in Bruges. However, this did not work, and the police chief soon realised they needed their own dispatching service (with a staff of eight people), so that all components of the system could work together as a well-oiled machine.

The final capability that is needed is a strong intervention unit, with low arrival times. The reason is that the hits generated by the system need to be followed up directly and in a prompt manner. Because cameras are placed on the entry roads into the police zone only (and not throughout the police zone), there is a limited time frame to intercept the suspicious vehicle before it is off the radar. Fortunately, the intervention capacity has always been rather strong due to the capacity requirements during the busy summer months.

To summarise:

- Required resources are capital, technology, information, and relationships.
- The required capabilities are technological literacy, analysis and investigation, dispatching, and a strong intervention unit.

Obstacles

There are also a number of obstacles that can be identified. The first obstacle was capital, as the technology does not come cheap. We have already indicated that local government funds more than the law obliges it to. The nodal orientation entailed an additional cost of approximately 5% of the total police budget, which is a significant amount. This money had to be financed by the three municipalities that make up the West-Coast police zone such as Koksijde, De Panne, and Nieuwpoort). Hence, local government needed to be on board with the project, as they provide the financing for this project. As mentioned, the work visits helped significantly in this respect.

The second obstacle was technology due to a number of initial difficulties (or bugs) in applying the UK technology in Belgium. The reason is that Belgian number plates have red letters and numbers against a white background, which is extremely difficult to read in the dark. Furthermore, number plates are not tied

to the vehicle but to the individual, and every time you buy a new vehicle you have to change your own personal plates. This means that over time, many plates have screw holes at different places. As a result, in the early phases of the project, there were a lot of errors that produced faulty hits or no hits at all. This automatically brings us to the third obstacle, staff participation/attitude.

The third obstacle was the initial resistance of staff towards the new system. The main reason for this is twofold. First, due to the large number of errors in the early stages, staff were often disappointed as they searched for a vehicle that was not there (due to the false hit). The second reason is related to the first. Staff need to be convinced of the advantages of a system before they adopt it wholeheartedly. Because of the great deal of errors in the initial stages, this was impossible. Hence, the bugs had to be fixed, after which positive feedback would convince staff of the effectiveness of the new system. According to the chief of police:

> *'...it takes at least three years to change routines, and success is necessary to convince people'.*

The fourth and obstacle for this project is privacy. According to the police chief, there never has been a real political debate in Belgium about a nodal orientation and the privacy issues involved. Therefore, politicians, media, and academics concerned with privacy in and of itself or as part of their political or personal agenda, express their concern with respect to privacy. For example, in the beginning of this year, information was leaked to the press about the VIP project. The project was completely misinterpreted, which resulted in a significant amount of negative media attention. According to the police chief*:*

> *'Recording all flows assumes that everybody is a potential criminal, which cannot be said as it goes against the assumption that everybody is innocent until proven guilty'.*

According to Prof. de Hert, who specialises in issues relating to privacy and technology, human rights and criminal law, this is only part of the problem. The question of who has access to this wealth of information is also of a major concern, and his main fear is that of a police state, in which the police have

access to information/knowledge about all movements of people. However, according to the police chief:

> '*The police do not need to know everything. The police needs to know what they need to know in the context of fighting crime, and the rest is of no concern to the police."* It is basically a matter of trust. *"You also trust your physician. If you go to your physician to get a medical check you trust that your health condition will be kept confidential. With us, you also have to have trust"* (Panorama, 2011).

The mayor of Koksijde explains it as follows:

> *'People often have the wrong idea about this project. There is nobody who is looking at these images to use them for his or her advantage. I used to be a notary, and in this function I often handled divorce cases, where the property had to be divided between parties. During these cases, you have little attention for the personal details. You do your job, and that's it.'*

To summarise:
The main obstacles for the project were:

- Capital requirements;
- Technological difficulties;
- Staff attitude;
- Privacy concerns.

Enablers
We can also identify a number of enablers, which have contributed positively to the implementation and success of this nodal orientation. First, the alignment of needs has contributed significantly to the successful implementation of this project. This is illustrated by a simple overview of the needs of the stakeholders directly or indirectly involved in the project:

- Administration/government (positive): less crime, increased feeling of safety and security, no privacy concerns;
- Public prosecutor/justice department (positive): crimes are solved more efficiently, and higher conviction rates due to better case files;

- Federal Judicial Police (positive): better information about movements of criminals in police zone West-Coast;
- Foreign police (positive): more information of the movements of potential perpetrators in West-Coast police zone (Belgium)
- Other local police (positive): better informed partner to tackle inter zone safety and security issues;
- Federal police (CSD, CCPD, AIK) (positive): rich information that can be used for strategic analysis of patterns of crime and exchanged with partners;
- Media (negative and positive): negative: privacy concerns, positive: tackle high profile safety and security issues;
- Citizens (positive): increased (perception of) safety and security;
- Criminals (negative): increased convictions, greater likelihood of being caught.

The alignment of needs between local government and police is extremely important in this respect, as the local government is responsible for the budget of the police. The fact that the three municipalities are all touristic coastal municipalities probably contributes significantly in this respect, as this implies that they all face similar safety and security issues.

Second, the track record of the police chief has also contributed significantly to the successful implementation of the project. According to the Mayor of Koksijde:

> *'We are extremely satisfied with the working of the police and the police chief and this has certainly contributed to the decision to go ahead with the project.'*

Objective data reveal that police zone West-Coast has decreasing crime rates as compared to the national figures, see Figure 1.2

Third, success stories were also a strong enabler for the success of the project, both for internal staff and external stakeholders. Regarding internal staff, the police chief explains that to overcome the resistance of staff to changing routines, success stories are needed that demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach for example cases that only get solved because of the system or cases that only get opened because of the system.

Figure 1.2 Reported Crimes in West-Coast Police Zone as a ratio of Belgium as a whole



Source: infozone.be

The same applies to the external stakeholders. As mentioned, the VIP project received a great deal of initial negative media attention. This all changed when a high profile case was solved using the VIP approach. The police chief explains:

> *'This summer, we had a problem with French Skinheads on the Coastal tram (the coastal tram runs along the Belgian coast between De Panne and Knokke), who were traveling from Duinkirk to Oostende every Friday to visit some party. About 15-30 skinheads took the bus to Adinkerke, to take the tram to Oostende from there. The police watched the video from the tram to get an idea of what they were up against. The skinheads were terrorizing the whole tram. They intimidated people, and chased them from their seats. Then they formed a group around a black kid, and started to call names while also making the Hitler-sign. Hence, we decided to conduct systematic controls to intercept them, identify them and take pictures of them to take them out of the anonymity. After four weeks, they did not show up any more, because we knew them, and they wanted to prevent problems. Most likely, they were still going to Oostende, by via alternative means, perhaps by car.'*

Fourth and finally, the personal relationships of the police chief are also of extreme importance for the success of this project. As explained previously, the

success of this project depends not only on the inner workings of the local police force, but also on the external stakeholders.

To summarise:
The main enablers of this project are:

- Alignment of needs;
- Track record of the police chief;
- Quick wins or success stories;
- Strong personal relationships.

Evaluation of Project Performance
Given the fact that the project contributes to all stakeholders, it should come as no surprise that the project is perceived to be highly successful by the main stakeholders. The Mayor of Koksijde explains*:*

> *'We have already had good results with the project by solving crimes. We are very satisfied with the working of the police, and the feeling of safety and security is really good among both residents and tourists'.*

According to the Public Prosecutor:

> *'Cameras are useful because we have a better picture of who enters the police zone, and we have a better picture of repeat offenders and criminals. Without cameras certain facts would remain hidden and other cases would not be solved so easily. This leads to better trials and more convictions'.*

The police chief makes clear that the nodal orientation has enabled them to solve cases that would not have been solved otherwise, as demonstrated by the following examples:

> *'We received complaints about a gypsy couple who were scamming people and stealing their personal belongings. This was all the information we had from them, which is not much. We decided to contact our French colleagues to find out whether they know gypsies. They did, and provided us with the make of the car and the number plate. This allowed us to observe, follow, and catch them in the act. This would have not been possible without our nodal orientation.'*

> *'Many youngster from the North of France cross the border to go out, mainly because bars and clubs close much later here in Belgium. They often drink a lot and take drugs, and start causing problems. As a result, bars and clubs start rejecting them, which even aggravates the problem. Then the problems really start, as they start fights and start stealing things. At about 04.00-05.00 they are gone again. By taking these youth out of the anonymity by identifying them before the problems start they are less likely to cause problems, because they know they have been identified and are monitored by the police.'*

Next, we take a closer look on more objective data in our effort to determine the effectiveness of the nodal orientation as West-Coast police. In the following figures, we plot the ratio of official crime rates in the West-Coast police zone as compared to different levels of aggregation (see Figures 1.3 to 1.5). Regarding the categories, the pure coastal police zones refer to those police zones where all municipalities are coastal municipalities. We include this category because coastal figures might be influenced by conditions like the weather. According to these statistics, from 2000 to 2005, police zone West-Coast was highly effective compared to all other levels of aggregation, as becomes apparent by the drop in the ratio of crimes conducted in the West-Coast police zone.

Figure 1.3 The Ratio of Official Crimes in West-Coast Compared to Coastal Police Zones[5]



Source: infozone.be

[5]These are the following police zones: PZ Westkust, PZ Oostende, PZ Bredene de Haan, and PZ Middelkerke.

From 2005 to 2006, we see a small increase in the crime rate at West-Coast police compared to the different levels of aggregation. From 2006 onwards, we again witness a drop in most of the figures. Given the previous declining trend in crime rates at West-Coast police, it is difficult to tease out the precise effect of

Figure 1.4 The Ratio of Official Crimes in West-Coast Compared to Coastal Police Zones[6]



Source: infozone.be

Figure 1.5 The Ratio of Official Crimes in West-Coast Compared to the Province of West-Flanders



Source: infozone.be

[6]In addition to the pure coastal police zones, these also include the following police zones: PZ Brugge, PZ Blankenberge- Zuienkerke, and PZ Damme-Knokke Heist.

this orientation. However, we can also consider make the following observations that hint toward the success of this project:

- The Governor of the province of West-Flanders has introduced the VIP project in the provincial Security Council, and distributed it to all police zones in West-Flanders as a best practice.
- Many other police zones in Belgium are also adopting the use of cameras with ANPR to combat safety and security issues. According to Polinfo.be (an online library for police officers), currently about 30 police zones have implemented cameras with ANPR, a number that is expected to increase in the future.[7]
- While initially badly received by the media in April 2011, newspapers have proclaimed the VIP methodology as a major success in the fight against crime and nuisance. Especially the story about the French skinheads was received very positive by the media.

To summarise:

- The nodal orientation at West-Coast police is highly successful;
- A sharp increase can be witnessed in the usage of cameras with ANPR by local police zones.

Conclusion

In this report, we have briefly documented an organisational change project at West-Coast Police in Belgium. This change project entailed the transformation from a narrow community model to a broader community model, by adopting a nodal orientation to monitor and control the flow of movement within parts of the community. Lessons were learned regarding the process of organisational change. A successful approach to combat crime is unthinkable without the coupling of local action (signalling in the community), with relevant (inter)nationally known movements/traffic of offender groups, money, information, and goods (Annual report West-Coast police, 2009). Communities are not bound by borders and are not geographically limited. Therefore, what is needed is a community model of policing combined with a nodal orientation that can be applied at different levels within any community, irrespective of its size and/or location.

[7]Source: http://www.polinfo.be/NewsView.aspx?contentdomains=POLICEB&id=VS201338620

This case study describes the adoption of a nodal orientation by a local police zone in Belgium to combat specific safety and security issues. Obviously, the system would be much more efficient if it could be implemented nationally or internationally in the EU, as this would allow the movement of offenders to be tracked over the whole of Belgium or the EU. Although we fully subscribe to this opinion, we have to also consider the possibilities of misuse of such a system, to minimise the possibility of evolving into a police state (in line with the reservations of Prof. de Hert). Misuse can never be fully prevented. However, if it is closely monitored, it can be detected at an early stage, so that corrective action can be taken. One solution would be to store access logs of the system within the Justice Department (or at committee P in Belgium, as this is the Permanent Oversight Committee on the Police Services, which exercises external oversight over the Belgian police and all civil servants with police authority). After all, the department of justice has the role of judge in society.

This means they have the capability to judge whether the intended use of the data by police (and government) is moral.

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2

Safe Location – Safe Housing

THE MUNICIPAL POLICE OF BRNO, THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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Acknowledgements
This case study was written with help from the Municipal Police of Brno.

Background Information
Safe Location - Safe Housing[8] is a project implemented by the Municipal Police of Brno to increase the safety of citizens living in an apartment block in the district of Nový Lískovec on the outskirts of Brno. The project was initiated by the Crime Prevention Department of the Municipal Police of Brno. The Municipal Police of Brno - Nový Lískovec office, implemented it with financial support from the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic and the Statutory City of Brno.

The Brno Metropolitan Police (MP) was established by the City of Brno in 1992. MP is a body of the municipality tasked to secure local public order, as well as those tasks according to the Act No. 553/1991 of Collection on Metropolitan Police.

[8] Information about the project is available (in Czech) on the website: http://www.mpb.cz/pro-verejnost/bezpecna-lokalita-bezpecne-bydleni/

Brno MP´s main tasks include:

- contributing to personal and property security
- watching over adherence to the rules of community peaceful co-existence
- ensuring traffic safety
- identifying offences against the law and other administrative civil wrongdoings
- notifying individuals and corporations about the violation of the law and taking remedial measures

The project, based in No. 470/5 Koniklecová Street, is primarily focused on security, peace and risks inside the apartment house (see maps in Appendix 2.2). It is hoped, nevertheless, that the minimisation or even total elimination of the risks will positively influence the security and peace situation in the immediate vicinity. The safety, peace and social risks as well as the levels of danger felt by the residents was defined in the early part of the project.

Table 2.1 Basic Information Summary

Name	Safe Location – Safe Housing
Police Force	Brno Metropolitan Police
Date of Realisation	2009 - 2010
Budget (in CZK)	Phase I – 75,000 Phase II – 1, 000,000 Phase III – 100,000

Implementation Group and Tasks

Implementation of the project included a range of technical, legal and social issues that were necessary to chart, consult and finally resolve. Due to this an implementation group was established in 2009, which represented all the institutions and expertise (see Project Partners in Appendix 2.1).

The implementation group worked as a unit; however, the project manager used personal and professional consultations as well as operational meetings to deal with individual technical and legal issues. The project manager was also liaising and working closely with Advisory Situational Crime Prevention MV ČR0, who with the Department of Crime Prevention, were the main provider of grants as

well as the technical and operational guarantor of the whole project. Consultations and information from colleagues within the Regional Directorate of Police, Fire and Rescue Service, as well as the Probation and Mediation Service were also essential. Substantial cooperation with the Association of Technical Security Services in searching optimal technical solutions undoubtedly led to the optimal setting of the system. The second important provider and operational partner was the Statutory City of Brno, who was represented on the implementation group by the Coordinating Centre of Prevention.

Project Objectives

There were seven objectives within the project that related to community policing:

- The actual and perceptual increase in the security of the residents and the surrounding buildings
- The reduction of anonymity in the buildings and a reinforcement of a sense of personal responsibility
- The reduction of unknown and unauthorised people in the building
- The reduction of damaging the building's facilities (vandalism)
- The prevention of crime and offences on the premises and in surrounding buildings
- A heightened presence of social services in the building or in the immediate vicinity
- Improved cooperation, commitment and communication between the public, the police and local government

The main drivers for planning and implementing the project were crime rates, police performance, and subjective perception of public safety within the City of Brno. Key findings from a sociological survey '*Perception of safety of the inhabitants of the city of Brno'*[9] show that:

- Fear of theft within the home is one of the four greatest risks perceived by the public within the City
- 86% did not allow a 'stranger' access to their homes and more than 50% of respondents have invested in a safer entrance door

[9] Source: Sociological survey from 2005 done by Metropolitan Police

- 70% of respondents did not feel completely safe in their own home (both at night and during the day)
- Respondents felt most threatened in the entrance halls, stairs and lift
- The majority of respondents felt safe during the day in their own flats
- In the building, especially in the entrance area in the afternoon and evening, strangers can be present which causes concern to more than two thirds of the residents as these strangers tend to congregate within the common areas, they may be under the influence of alcohol and are liable to disturb the peace
- Despite this the residents do not attempt to help the situation by locking the front door

This survey helped confirm the need to introduce security technology and safe behaviour techniques and the willingness by the public to consider them. The project when it was piloted developed within the existing security risks.

Project Implementation

Phase I

A wide choice of residential buildings was proposed by representatives of the Municipal Police Brno, Preventive Information Department of the Czech State Police and the Crime Prevention Co-ordination Centre at the Brno Municipality. These buildings were located within different city and police districts, each with different problems and issues. The building at No 5 Koniklecová was chosen. This apartment house is a 13-floor concrete building with 156 small-area flats that will accommodate over 500 people. The tenants comprise those who are socially, ethnically or nationally excluded minorities. In the main area of the house there is the illegal abuse of addictive substances, people are attacked, the house facilities are damaged, aggressive and intoxicated strangers are present and finally there is the threat to the safety of the tenants and immediate neighbourhood. Before the project, the house did not have any security system in place. Frequently used areas of the house had doors equipped with standard mechanical locks and cylindrical inserts. Ground floor windows to basements were not secured by any barriers systems (grids, foils, lockable handles, etc.). Hydrants and dry standpipes were damaged or incomplete. The house did not have an effective monitoring mechanism in place and social work with the tenants was minimal (with the exception of an area for mothers with children).

Phase II

Technical measures were systematically introduced:

- Clarifying the use of space.
- Development and installation of authorized entry.
- Design and installation of supporting surveillance and reporting systems.
- Preparation and implementation of social prevention.

The role of the police was considered:[10]

- Regular meetings between local police constables/police representatives and residents' councils.
- Attendance of constables/police officers in house meetings.
- Allowing the police to access the building.
- Support and assistance when dealing with crime and criminal activities.
- Designation of houses that are under increased police surveillance.

Phase III

Phase III is long-term and will continue after the formal end of the project:

- A social assistant for recreational activities will be employed who will mediate between the City, the Municipal and the State Police and the tenants of the house. Their role will include supervision, consulting and raising awareness to help resolve the issues within the house and the low-threshold clubhouse.
- Activity within the low-threshold clubhouse in the apartment house will continue. These activities, with the Centre of Leisure Time Lužánky, will provide recreational programmes for children.
- An Education and Information Campaign run by the Brno Department of Municipal Police will commence for the tenants of the apartment house and will focus on the prevention of crime and social pathologies.
- The close cooperation of the Municipal and the State Police with the care taker and the City in solving current and on-going issues and problems will continue.
- Within the immediate neighbourhood there will be increased police patrol activity (Municipal and State Police), which should help to

[10]Source: Department of Crime Prevention, Czech Ministry of the Interior

minimize the potential shift of public disorder from the apartment building to the surrounding neighbourhood vicinity.

- If required, co-operation with the Probation and Mediation Service[11] in dealing with potential conflicts will continue.

Target Group

The project was developed with the tenants as the target group and the outcomes subsequently defined:

- Creation of a functional model such as an apartment house using social, organisational, and technical processes to maintain public order and civil coexistence whilst raising the standard of safety of individuals and of the property.
- A tangible increase in the safety of the tenants within the apartment house.
- A tangible increase in the safety of the tenants within the neighbouring houses.
- Reduction of anonymity in the houses and a strengthening of personal responsibility.
- Reduction of the risk of movement of 'strange' (unknown, unauthorized) persons within the premises of the apartment house.
- Reduction of the risk of damage to the property through vandalism.
- Avoidance of committing crime and offenses on the premises and the surrounding neighbourhood.
- The improvement of social services offered within the house and/or in the immediate vicinity.
- Improved communication and cooperation by the public with the police and local government.

It is evident that the Brno District local government within Nový Lískovec plays an important role in the public's perception of safety. Measures adopted by the Brno City District within Nový Lískovec include:

- The position of a full-time caretaker has been established in the house together with a lady who provides house cleaning; both are tenants of the apartment house. As well as cleaning and minor repairs, they

[11]Ministry of Justice

oversee the house order and compliance of rules laid down by the owner of the house.

- With the support of the City of Brno the property was adjusted for the tenants and as well as the creation of a clubhouse for the children of the tenants.
- The clubhouse was also furnished and equipment purchased for leisure activities.
- The Centre of Leisure Time Lužánky was established with the support from the City of Brno and two people were employed to work with the children.
- During the 2010 the apartment house was refurbished. It was thermally insulated, plastic windows and balcony doors were fitted, new balconies were installed and the lifts were replaced in accordance with European Safety Standards.

Procedures Adopted within the Project

Prior to the implementation of specific procedures, extensive and thorough preparation took place. The steps taken to achieve these procedures were:

Step One

Defining the purpose of the house together with the rules relating to the use of the common areas. Defining the levels of access to the common areas, determining the expected levels of security, which required identification processes and adoption of shared responsibility.

Step Two

Developing safe and secure access points. Developing safety standards and evacuation procedures.

Step Three

Achieving optimal levels of safety for the tenants of the apartment house with the implementation of surveillance and premier support systems.

Step Four

Achieving optimal levels of safety for the tenants of the apartment house with the implementation of crime-prevention and social development programmes.

These programmes were aimed at specific tenant target groups within the apartment house as well as residents within the neighbourhood.
These steps contributed toward the final goal of the apartment house having clear organisational and technical support systems in place. The security strategy and technical support systems were based on the following activities:

- Understanding and knowing the movement of people in the house and minimising anonymity
- Restricting the movement and access to 'strangers' within the house
- Fire prevention and early detection of fire risk
- Ensuring tenants are aware of their own personal responsibility at all times

The City of Brno and the City District of Nový Lískovec worked in partnership to create the most appropriate conditions for implementing the project. A full-time caretaker position has been established as well as building and reconstruction work carried out and a clubhouse created for the children living within the house. The work of the Centrum volného času Lužánky (Lužánky Leisure time centre) has been launched in the clubhouse, with two professionals being employed to work with the children. During 2010 a total refurbishment of the residential building took place.

A clear guide to the organisational policies and system processes has been written and is known to the police and the City District as the '*Principles of Good and Safe Use of the Flat and Building'*. These principles include:

- House Rules – describes what is acceptable behaviour and sets out clearly the rules (rights and duties) for those using the flat and the building.
- Provides information on the surveillance of the building and how activities are monitored throughout the building. This includes information about the existence and functioning of auxiliary access, surveillance and alarm systems.
- Provides information on contacts - informs about contacts for people and institutions that ensure the operation and management of the building and hostel

Principles of good and safe practice within the flat and building can be applied in certain areas of the apartment house:

Mailbox Area behind the Main Entrance Door

Guidelines for use: Upon arrival and on departure lock the door; discourage unauthorised entry. After opening the first front door using the electronic gateway. Meet and collect a visitor personally in the mailbox.

Proposed procedures: First and second entrance door - Dallas key[12] and panic handle. Reception - support access system, fire-reporting point, surveillance online. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation).

Comments: In the reception there will also be support systems for the caretaker/crime prevention assistant. The reception will also be the main point of contact for the police, the post, the clubhouse, et cetera. The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

Area behind the Second Entrance Doors - in front of the lifts and cellar

Guidelines for use: Lock the door, discourage unauthorised entry. Activities with children within the clubhouse require supervision and entrance must be authorised.

Proposed procedures: Door to the stairwell – Dallas key from the stairwell where there is a standard handle. Door to the cellars - Dallas key (according to the location of the cellar), inside there is a standard handle. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation).

Staircase Area (Stair Hallway)

Guidelines for use: Close the doors on the ground floor (entrance to the staircase) and on the residential floors (entrance to the residential halls). Discourage unauthorized entry to the residential halls and stairways.

Proposed procedures: Door to the main exit - standard handle (alt. panic handle). Door to the residential halls - Dallas key, inside there is a standard handle. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation). The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

Comments: Support systems for the concierge and caretaker/crime prevention assistant.

[12]A Dallas key (or iButton) is able to provide high levels of security at low cost. Using computer chip technology attached to a key fob access to a building, a PC, a piece of equipment, or a vehicle can be restricted dependent on the level of access granted to an individual.

Area of Emergency Exit from the Stairway

Guidelines for use: Currently, the rules set by fire regulations are valid. Access is good with no restrictions and unauthorized access impossible. The use of the emergency exit by the tenants is forbidden.

Proposed procedures: Emergency exit from the inside use the panic handle. Emergency exit from the outside, there are no hardware handles. Lights with motion-sensitive switching.

Comments: Supporting system through surveillance.

Lift Cabin Spaces

Guidelines for use: No support for unauthorized use.

Proposed procedures: The use of lifts - Dallas key. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation). The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

Comments: Support systems used by the caretaker.

Area of Residential Corridors

Guidelines for use: Close the entrance door from the stairs into the drying room, discourage unauthorized entry from the stairwell to the residential corridors and unauthorized use of lifts.

Proposed procedures: Door to the stairwell – use a standard handle. Door to the drying room - Dallas key, inside there is a standard handle. The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

Comments: Support systems for the concierge and caretaker/crime prevention assistant.

Evaluation

The Safe Location – Safe Housing Project was awarded the "Urban Security Award" 2011 bySafe City EURO - MED.[13] The "Urban Security Award" is organised within a framework, whoseaims are identifying and sharing excellence in the urban security sector. At the end of the project, a survey was conducted. Information sessions between the Brno Municipal Police, the Czech State Police and the apartment house tenants were held. Focus groups identified the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the project and the main outcomes. The survey analysis highlighted that the feeling of safety within the apartment house

[13]Information about the award is available on the website:http://www.safecityeuromed.org/

significantly increased. However within the surrounding neighbourhood residents felt there was still the possibility of meeting strangers and inappropriate people. Respondents expressed a high degree of willingness to accept almost all of the technical support systems. The introduction of CCTV cameras at the entrance to the house and the trusteeship of the system to the Municipal Police and regular visits by the local beat officer in the building were evaluated positively.

The development of the technical support system and recommendations for future use within similar projects were identified. These are divided into three separate groups:

Authorised Entry System

- Criteria established for permission to access the residential building. Fast and reliable identification and enabling of authorized entry to the tenants of the residential building.
- Minimization or complete elimination of unauthorized access to the residential building.
- Introduction of guidelines for authorized access to the residential building and the consequences of non-compliance.
- Introduction of guidelines for removing current authorized access systems and creating alternative or new systems.
- Introduction of guidelines for the use of the authorized access database, together with guidelines explaining the handling, storage and disposal of data.

Supporting Surveillance and Warning Systems

- Identifying the security, law and order risks in each of the common areas in the building.
- Identifying the tenants' sense of threat and fear of safety in each of the common areas of the residential building.
- Application of general definitions of privacy levels[14] in the common areas of the building, compared with the personal attitudes of the tenants (direct approval or disapproval).

[14]According to Office of Personal Data Protection

- Identifying the location of CCTV surveillance points, a system administrator and rules for handling, management, storage, and archiving of data (video recording).
- Identifying clear guidelines and processes for fire risks and the location of the fire alarm system.
- Identifying clear guidelines and processes for the interception of alarm signals, which will include evaluation and response.

Crime Prevention, Social Interaction and Engagement with the Tenants of the Apartment House

- Use of the clubhouse for the tenants' children.
- An employed member of staff to work with the children in the clubhouse.
- Linking the position of caretaker to the position of the social assistant for leisure activities.
- Partnership work between the Czech Probation and Mediation Service and the tenants living in the residential building to deal with conflict management.
- Partnership work between the local constables and police officers using the existing crime prevention programmes.
- Partnership work with representatives of the Bílý kruh bezpečí Organisation[15] in addressing specific problems in the target group of single mothers with children (50 housing units).

Table 2.2 shows data taken from the Information System of the Municipal Police Brno during 2009 and 2010 and highlights the change in records and interventions by police officers to events at Koniklecová Street.

The statistical information shows that the apartment house, its tenants and those who visit it adversely affect the security and disruption of peace within the house and the surrounding neighbourhood. The three levels of perception of the situation in Koniklecová Street taken from the public forum on the web site of the City District, police statistics, and the survey among tenants of the house, are complementary and reflect the real situation. Long-term disturbance of public peace and civil cohabitation increases the fears of the tenants, decreases the level

[15]White Circle of Safety, nongovernmental organisation aimed to help to victims of crimes (www.bbk.cz)

of housing in the area and subsequently increases racial and xenophobic emotions.

Table 2.2 Records and Interventions at Koniklecová Street

Year	Number of Interventions	Number of Interventions in the Apartment House	Rate of Interventions in the Apartment House
2009	438	233	53%
2010	288	118	41%

The residents from neighbouring houses[16] were asked their opinion on the situation in the apartment house and whether it affected the safety and order in the neighbourhood. Some of their responses are below:

'This means that in the Project of Safe Location the council solves the problem that was caused by them for our money.'

'The only possible solution how to prevent the prevailing of Gypsy culture in our housing estate is to work to make our housing estate beautiful and cosy. Our houses should be insulated, should have new windows and a brick core, new balconies, green areas should be best kept so that flowers were blooming everywhere and everywhere was clean.'

'There are many people who are interested in solving the situation in the house and that are not indifferent to the behaviour in the house and around it; these are the findings of the regular meetings which I of course also participate in. The described project moves the situation much more forward, of course, but most depends on the citizens themselves. It is necessary that in this case most of the "peace-loving" got together and made it clear that they want the house to be peaceful. Everyone who belongs to this group will certainly be interested to come to meetings that

[16]Discussion forum on the website of the city district of Nový Lískovec about the house in Koniklecová Street no. 5. Grammar and the content – unchanged

are held regularly now in the clubhouse at Koniklecová no. 5, where you are of course welcomed, too, and where the project is presented to the tenants.'

'The situation in Koniklecová Street is disastrous…… it greatly reduces the quality of life to us as working people.'

The Future

The knowledge and experience gained from preparing, implementing and analysing the Safe Location – Safe Housing Project, can be used to address similar problems and issues in other residential buildings operating under different ownership models (municipal, cooperative, personal). It will help address the issue of security and public order related to the ownership or use of flats, which affects over 170,000 apartments in apartment houses within the housing development sector.[17] Phase III of the project is still operating and takes into account a detailed analysis of accepted procedures, which will enable the owners and administrators of apartment houses to adopt them in order to gain the best agreements in terms of scope, content and legal compliance. Phase III will also present the methods and responsible approach taken by the tenants to ensure their own safety. The Safe Location – Safe Housing Project can be seen as an alternative approach to the current practice of repeated intervention by the police, which although may address a specific problem or crime does not address the causes or prevent its reoccurrence.

[17] According to the data of the Czech Statistical Office on 31st December 2006 the city of Brno has nearly 370,000 inhabitants. About 65,000 citizens commute for work to the city. The data of city of Brno on 31st of December 2007 show that the total number of 165,366 apartments owned by the city is 39,331 apartments, which make up 24% of the housing stock. Another 22,069 flats (13%) are owned by cooperatives and 103,966 (63%) flats are owned by other owners. Up to the 31st of December 2007 another 5,868 flat units have been under construction.

Appendix 2.1

Project Partners

Department of Crime Prevention MV ČR

Probation and Mediation Service

Police of the CR- KŘP JmK Prevention Information Department of the South Moravian Region

City district of Nový Lískovec

Grémium Alarm Association

Statutory City of Brno - Prevention Coordinating Centre MMB

Statutory City of Brno – Prevention Department

Fire Rescue of Southern Moravia Region

Beta Control s.r.o.

Appendix 2.2

Project Location



3

Project ZENTRAB

Central Criminal Case Processing

A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE CRIMINAL POLICE OF THE LAND BRANDENBURG, GERMANY

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(FHPol Brandenburg, Oranienburg)

Acknowledgements
We acknowledge the positive support for this case study provided by the Ministry of the Interior of the Land of Brandenburg and by the project manager of ZENTRAB. This case study was composed through document analyses, data analyses and an interview with project manager Criminal Police Superintendent Dingelstadt. We acknowledge the contribution of the ZENTRAB project manager Criminal Police Superintendent Dingelstadt. We thank him for the interview and the data provided to write this report. We also thank the head of the 4th department of the Ministry of the Interior and his staff for their support and comments.

Background
ZENTRAB stands for "Zentrale Anzeigenbearbeitung" which means central complaints processing. It can be seen as an effort related to differentiation in offence management. All offences that have little investigative work get outsourced to this centralised complaints processing unit (ZENTRAB). Before ZENTRAB every criminal investigation department had to process all kinds of cases in their field of competence regardless of the investigative work involved.

This less organised and structured approach led to high individual workload and caused a reduction in time for fieldwork. A new and better organisation was crucial. As a result, the ZENTRAB department was developed. It was established in November 2009 in the Barnim district as a pilot project for the criminal police of the Land Brandenburg. The successful ZENTRAB department of the Cologne police district served as a model for the Barnim police district, and was adapted. To consider and fully understand the model, the district leader of Barnim, staff council and project management went to Cologne to look at the ZENTRAB department. Telephone conference calls were also carried out.

The model was adopted successfully in Barnim and included different kinds of offences as well as a new software system. The special stacking system proved particularly useful and this was applied in Barnim as well. There is a box for each day of the month, which keeps the system simple and clear particularly when colleagues are sick, or on vacation.

> *'We transferred the filing system from Cologne. There is a box for each day with case files. At the end of the month the first box will be emptied and the case files will be sent to the public prosecutor. In this way ZENTRAB can meet the deadlines.'* [18]

The resources needed for the implementation of the project included the installation and move into a multi-person office and the costs of headsets. Thus the resource costs were minor.

ZENTRAB is characterised by:

- a multi-person office,
- no customer contact / no "real" investigative work,
- stringent implementation of a simplified procedure,
- daily completed processing based on precast standards,
- ascription of non-individual related processing.[19]

[18]Interview conducted on December 19, 2011 with the ZENTRAB project manager Criminal Police Superintendent Dingelstadt. All following quotes without footnotes come from the same interview.

[19]Due to the standardised procedure and the widespread investigative experience each employee can manage all kinds of criminal cases within ZENTRAB. Thus the management of the criminal cases is not bound to individual case mangers.

Within the Cologne model, the positive outcomes were:

- the concentration of responsibilities and definition of standards improved the accuracy and quality of data
- the motivation and performance of employees improved
- having a system of office duty without person contact and field work saved resources
- efficiency was gained by synergy effects and by simplifying controlling processes.

'The more particular offences get prioritised the stronger the positive effects.'

While ZENTRAB has proved to work in an urban area like Cologne, the pilot project in Barnim put an emphasis on analysing the implementation in more rural areas, typical of the Land Brandenburg. To raise the number of cases in ZENTRAB the pilot project in Barnim included a higher variety of kinds of offences. The project group was formed initially for one year. The aim was to ensure the transferability into a rural area and to assess the effects. Furthermore, the investigative work needed to be adapted to come in line with the investigation closing practice of the public prosecutor. Due to ZENTRAB the investigative departments would be able to spend more resources on processing offences with greater emphasise on investigative work.

'Police must set priorities. They do not need to investigate everything.'

ZENTRAB staff was chosen using certain criteria. First of all, participation was voluntary. Second, employees who wanted to work for ZENTRAB had to be willing and able to work in a multi-person office. They had to have experience of different offence types ranging from burglary to assault and they had to be able to cope with the processing of many cases. Similarly, Executives should have experience in operating with mass proceedings and most of all sensitivity towards their staff. The computer-based work within ZENTRAB would be ideal for employees who could not do field work due to physical restrictions such as back complaints or physical disabilities. Hence up to 50 per cent of the ZENTRAB employees would be those limited in their capabilities of service. Diverse kinds of restrictions were taken into consideration when setting up the

workplaces. One anticipated incentive for employees to switch to ZENTRAB was the more flexible working time. This would not only attract staff but also reduce work related stress for staff.

Project Goals

An evaluation of the Criminal Investigation Departments showed a reduction in the number of case officer roles. With Reunification for example, the number of case officer positions had either reduced or officers got displaced regarding their competencies. The re-staffing of a case officer was very often not performance related too. The reduction in case officer positions as well as the mismatches involved a high workload in the departments. ZENTRAB was expected to relocate personnel resources to ensure a better use of knowledge and improve the performance of employees. The competencies and skills of officers were to be the initial consideration when positioning in ZENTRAB. It was anticipated that this together with the centralised responsibility for minor crime, crime with no investigative approach as well as having no investigative responsibility would lead to better employee satisfaction, efficiency and effectiveness. Moving the workload within the criminal investigation department by transferring minor crime and crime with no investigative approach to ZENTRAB was one of the main goals.

Effectiveness

The centralised responsibility for minor crime with no investigative duty was intended to reduce processing in the individual departments and increase effectiveness of processing within major and mid crime situations.

Efficiency/Profitability

The focused and extensive use of the standardised questionnaire and procedure together with the precise instructions would increase efficiency. The staff relocation within the Criminal Investigation Department would also contribute to more efficiency and better outcomes.

Employee Satisfaction

Moving minor crimes to ZENTRAB was expected to have a positive effect on staff within the different work areas. It would lead to a decline in administration work and data collection in the Criminal Investigation Department and thus, give

the case officers time to do their actual job as criminal investigators. Additionally, this would decrease the workload and raise job satisfaction levels. Within the ZENTRAB team, a reduced workload, an increase in motivation, a decline in absenteeism and reduction in sick days were expected as a result of recruiting staff according to skills, competencies and merits that had previously gone unrecognised. Cases were evenly distributed between all ZENTRAB team members. Due to the multi-person office an individual's performance would be more transparent and would lead to better motivation.

> *'Very often in the civil service performance ratings are not really motivating for officers. There is no transparency. You don't know where you stand and how your performance is compared to others'.*

Achievements of Project ZENTRAB

ZENTRAB has been highly accepted among the employees and fulfilled most expectations, although some of the goals have not been met. The limiting factors and barriers are mentioned below. The standardised questionnaire procedure is extensively used.

Effectiveness

Figure 3.1 shows how ZENTRAB has increased performance even with a reduction of staff. Although this increase was below expectations it can still be seen as a success. ZENTRAB has taken over about 50 per cent of cases from the former KK I-III (Investigative Departments I-III; formerly responsible for minor, petty offences, cases without investigative approach). This has meant that an officer in the KK I-III has more time to deal with other cases as well as taking care of ad-hoc situations.

Employee Satisfaction

The new multi-person office in ZENTRAB promotes teambuilding and commitment. There is mutual motivation and controlling. All colleagues perceive the performance of ZENTRAB as a team performance. Returns are perceived as team failure. High motivation by employees and significant reduction of sick days has been noticeable as can be seen in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.1 Performance Outcome, Relationship of Staff-Number to Investigative Success[20]



Figure 3.2 Sick Days of Staff of Barnim District/ZENTRAB 2008 - 2010[21]



Achievements Résumé:

- One of the main achievements is the saving of time for both ZENTRAB and the Criminal Investigation Department. As officers within ZENTRAB do not have to be involved in hearings any longer their time

[20]This figure is taken from the final project report of the Criminal Police of the Barnim Police District. It has been translated into English.
[21]See 3

is not wasted in preparation and waiting for summoned people to attend hearings who do not appear at the police station.

- The use of a standardised data management form to communicate with citizens via phone has saved time.

- The management of the investigative cases has been distributed equally within the ZENTRAB team. It is a transparent work process. Everybody knows the workload of his/her colleagues. They have lunch and smoking breaks collectively.

- The sickness absence rate has been reduced significantly.

- The case managers within ZENTRAB can work more flexibly and the work process is more manageable and structured.

- The efficiency of the investigative police departments can be controlled better. It is not possible to count cases that have not been completed as an investigative success any longer.

- Before ZENTRAB was installed, the workload of the departments corresponded to the number of criminal cases per department and per case manager. Now the departments have more time for other investigative tasks.

- One investigator completes 1300 case files a year.

Key Success Factors and Enablers, External Stakeholders

Key success factors and enablers identified that contributed to the success of the project are the following:

- Support by the staff council

  'The support by the staff council was essential to start and to realise the project.'

- Project management was led by a senior criminal superintendent with police external juridical education

> *'I do not come from the police. That was an advantage. I considered the workflow from another perspective. I let the departments give 10 case files to me and checked them.'*

- Good preparation

> *'We visited the colleagues in Cologne who successfully introduced ZENTRAB. The number of criminal cases in Cologne corresponds to the number of crime cases in Brandenburg.'*

- Support by public prosecution

> *'Sometimes the case files were sent back from the prosecutor and we could not assess why. I spoke with the chief prosecutor and we agreed that all case files have to be checked by him before they go back to ZENTRAB. Now there is a control point so that the ZENTRAB colleagues do not use more resources managing the case files than necessary.'*

Limiting Factors and Barriers

There are different possible explanations why ZENTRAB has not met all its goals. The standardised questionnaire for example has its benefits but also its limitations. Problems can occur if the questionnaire is not fully or wrongly completed, if a citizen prefers face-to-face questioning or if the offence does not adequately fit the questionnaire.

Other barriers or limiting factors could be:

- An investigator in the Criminal Investigation Department now deals only with more severe cases and some find this new work arrangement difficult. One way to address this may be for these police officers to receive special training to deal with more severe cases.

- Some officers refuse to accept the role of ZENTRAB due to their specialised role and culture of investigators. In particular older officers who want to hold onto the investigation of all criminal cases. They want to retain the ability to influence the crime clearance rate by their investigative work.

- ZENTRAB has reduced the crime clearance rate within Criminal Investigation Agencies. Some of them perceive this as a reduction of their own performance and therefore want to continue to have responsibility for minor crime cases with known offenders.

- Not all Crime Investigation Agencies are well staffed. ZENTRAB only works if there is enough staff in the agencies. If there is a lack of staff in a ZENTRAB unit, staff from other units will help manage their case files.

- There is a lack of statistical knowledge among employees to understand the rationale of the change. Thus the implementation of ZENTRAB has not been fully accepted by all officers in the departments.

Further Developments

ZENTRAB II

The findings of ZENTRAB have led to the implementation of ZENTRAB II in September 2010 as an addition to ZENTRAB. While ZENTRAB deals with minor crime and such with no investigative approach using an established questionnaire procedure, ZENTRAB II has been developed to deal with *all* minor crime offences. This includes returns as well as requests. ZENTRAB II has 4 interrogators who carry out questioning only. ZENTRAB and ZENTRAB II can therefore be regarded as a closed complementary system. ZENTRAB II has also developed offence-customised questionnaires. Due to the competences of investigative officers and the reorganisation of workflow, an officer could become more specialised with regard to hearings and find they do this work all day. The hearings can also be carried out via telephone, especially if the summoned person does not or cannot appear at the police station. In this way, ZENTRAB II is closing the gap where personal hearings are needed.

To establish ZENTRAB II, data was collected and analysed for over a year. A computer programme was developed to help predict how many summoned people would appear. This has contributed to developing a more effective process. On average 3 out of 6 summoned people will actually appear. As a result, it has become general practice to send out several invitations each day. Since every hearing requires preparation time this process will become further advanced in the future. Therefore the computer system will become more

enhanced. A statistical system that will estimate the probability of how many people will appear and what kind of people are likely to appear will be developed. To achieve this, different data of summoned people will be collected and analysed for any consistencies. In the future, hearing preparation will take place only for those cases with a high chance of the summoned person appearing. This will lead to a saving of resources.

As an incentive, interrogators are now allowed to use 20 per cent of their weekly working time as telework for the preparation of cases.

Reflections

ZENTRAB can be seen as best practise for different reasons:

- It was successfully implemented.
- It has accomplished most of its goals and expectations.
- Employee's motivation, commitment and satisfaction along with performance have improved.
- A higher number of cases are completed and closed with ZENTRAB and ZENTRAB II.
- To continue to meet expectations and improve performance, ZENTRAB will continue its intense training.

Based on the success of the pilot project in the Barnim district, the implementation of ZENTRAB will be expanded throughout Brandenburg. The commission in charge of the structural reform of the police of Brandenburg called "Brandenburg 2020" considers ZENTRAB as a valuable instrument increasing the efficiency and quality of case management in the field of crimes with little investigative work.[22]

The fact that ZENTRAB has been successfully established in the police forces of other German *Länder* indicates that it can be considered as a best practice within the police. For the cities Bremen, Cologne, Aachen, Dortmund, Essen, Mönchengladbach, Recklinghausen and others, ZENTRAB became an essential and necessary instrument of the Criminal Police Departments. In May 2005 the

[22]Commission "Police of Brandenburg 2020" (2010). *Report.* Document for internal use only.

former Senator of the Interior of the Land Bremen visited the ZENTRAB department of the Bremen police force and stated:

> *'The central criminal case processing… slims down and accelerates procedures and leads to an increasing quality of case management which is profitable for the public prosecutor, for the police and for the citizens. The criminal police departments are relieved … and are enabled to manage a greater number of severe crimes more promptly.'*[23]

Besides the positive results of ZENTRAB one aspect regarding the role of criminal police officers needs to be mentioned. Criminal police officers regard themselves as investigators, rather than administrators. The Federation of German Criminal Police Officers (BDK)[24] and the GdP[25], which is the largest German Police Union, comment that the quality and the investigative requirements of crime case processing must not get lost due to a standardised and form based procedure. Both Federations understand and welcome ZENTRAB on the condition that it keeps the balance between investigation and administration. With regard to future developments there is still a need for improved statistical knowledge and systems together with data to support the requirements of police officers.

[23]See the press statement of the Senator of the Interior of the Land Bremen for more details. Available at http://www.senatspressestelle.bremen.de/detail.php?id=14267.
[24]See the press statement of the BDK for more details. Available at: http://www.bdk.de/lv/brandenburg/aktuelles/zu-besuch-in-der-zentrab
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Appendix 3.1

Partners Involved in Project ZENTRAB

District Attorney's Office Frankfurt / Oder
Police Force Cologne
Former Police District Barnim
Main Staff Council
Local Staff Council of former Police District Barnim
Ministry of the Interior of the Land Brandenburg

4

Institutional Cooperation with Examples of Skill Sharing and Optimisation

ARMA DEI CARABINIERI AND
CORPO FORESTALE DELLO STATO, ITALY

Fabio Bisogni and Pietro Costanzo
(Fondazione FORMIT)

Acknowledgements
We acknowledge the active support provided by the police forces of Arma dei Carabinieri and Corpo Forestale dello Stato and, in particular, our sincere thanks go to the Members of the Strategic Advisory Board and of the End User board, for their contribution and valued advice.

Introduction
This case study has been developed on the basis of the information provided directly by representatives from Italian police forces, Arma dei Carabinieri and Corpo Forestale dello Stato, who have direct experience in the reported activities. The selection of the two activities was made on the basis of mutual agreement and proposed by the aforenamed police forces.

Abstract
The proposed cases aim to show how specific, skills-oriented cooperation is produced and will generate direct benefits for the involved police forces and public administrations, allowing for different activities and synergies at a national and international level. In relation to Arma dei Carabinieri, international cooperation activities and, in particular, policing joint exercises demonstrated that a common approach can contribute to the alignment of operational

procedures, not only enhancing technical skills, safety and security of operators, but also to the overall benefit of the local populations and authorities served by the Civil Crisis Management Missions. Such alignment in the use of the techniques and procedures, corresponding to international policing best practices and standards, may enable the involved countries to contribute more effectively to international stabilisation efforts in countries emerging from a situation of crisis, thus promoting peace and security.

With regard to Corpo Forestale dello Stato, the development of operational and organisational synergies with regions and other local public administrations has been recognized as an effective practice, thanks to the creation, implementation and improvement of special operational protocols to prevent and fight forest fires and for territory monitoring. Such protocols, involving specific technical assets (helicopters) in cooperation schemes, have proved to be very effective in terms of resources optimisation, number of controls and sanctions against environmental law violations, reduction of forest fires and other environmental threats within the territory.

Overview

In Italy[26] there are five police forces having national competence, three civilian - namely Polizia di Stato (the National Police), Polizia Penitenziaria (the Prison Police) and Corpo Forestale dello
Stato - and two military: Arma dei Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza Corps. All the afore-mentioned forces are centralised[27], and they all act at a national level. Arma dei Carabinieri and Corpo Forestale dello Stato are involved in the COMPOSITE Project.

For the purposes of this case study, Arma dei Carabinieri's focus is devoted to their international cooperation activities and, in particular, to policing joint exercises promoted by the European Commission and led by Arma dei Carabinieri. This paper focuses on the analysis of the "European Union Police

[26] Source: The Public Security System in Italy, Polizia di Stato official website, http://poliziadistato.it/articolo/964-The_Public_Security_System_in_Italy

[27] Definition: as "centralised police force" is intended a police force organised under one central command, under the direction of a specific Ministry, and with competence on the whole national territory, without status differences between the structures distributed on the territory.

Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009), and its planned developments within the "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013" (EUPST 2011-2013).
As for Corpo Forestale dello Stato, the development of operational and organisational synergies with regions and other Public administrations has been highlighted by the central command. Therefore, analysis is related to the creation, implementation and improvement of special operational protocols to prevent and counter forest fires and for territory monitoring. The two police forces directly provided information and documentation on the proposed cases.
The proposed cases aim to show how specific, skills-oriented operational and organisational cooperation have produced and will generate direct benefits for the involved police forces, presenting different activities and synergies at a national and international level.

International Synergies

Within the framework that generated the Instrument of Stability[28], Arma dei Carabinieri obtained funding and leadership for two relevant joint training initiatives: the "European Union Police Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009) and the following "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013" (EUPST 2011-2013).
With the aim of comparing best practices at the European level, and also taking advantage of lessons learned during previous initiatives[29], Arma dei Carabinieri developed a modular training project, aimed at training about six hundred European police experts in the field of international crisis management. Such a programme has been proposed and funded under the European Union 2007-2009

[28] The European Union's growing willingness to assert itself as a key player in the management of international crises, has led the European Commission to undertake a series of initiatives relating to the Peace Building Partnership policy aimed, firstly, at the prevention of conflicts. In this context, one of the main financial instruments made available by the European Commission is the "Instrument for Stability" (IfS), established by EC Regulation No. 1717/2006 of 15 November 2006 – European Parliament. Such instrument is focused on "capacity building" and it is aimed, in particular, to achieve four objectives:

- development of the operational capacity of non-state actors;
- improvement of the mechanisms of the "early warning" and access to political research on the field;
- adoption of common tools by the United Nations, World Bank and other international organizations, as well as by the EU Member States;
- identification of European training standards, compatible with those in use at the United Nations and other international organizations, to strengthen and widen the number of trained experts available for deployment in international missions.

[29] See, e.g., the Training sessions organized in 2008 by the French National Gendarmerie at the National Training Center of the Gendarmerie of Saint Astier. The 2010 programme has been developed under the lead of the German Bundespolizei in Brandenburg.

Instrument for Stability. In order to further improve the successfully tested EUPFT 2008-10 training modules, Arma dei Carabinieri submitted a new proposal to the EC and obtained agreement to manage the EUPST 2011-2013 programme.

Specific Activities

The "European Union Police Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009) was developed and delivered in three training sessions, each lasting two weeks. The first week of theoretical and practical learning, was aimed at comparing best practices and procedures. The second week was devoted to completing a role-playing exercise, for command posts and operational units, simulating the deployment of a multinational police coordination, responsible for replacing and strengthening of local police, in a fictional destabilised Country (State of "Ambria," self-proclaimed independent on the island of "Centria"). Simulation of investigations was also included, as well as counter-organised crime actions, forensic procedures and high-risk arrest procedures with hostage liberation.

As for the "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013, the specific objective was to enhance the international policing skills of around 2,400 police officers from the EU, non-EU countries contributing to Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, and African Union countries, for participation in EU, UN and/or African Union and other international civilian missions as well as to draw lessons from this undertaking in order to contribute to wider international efforts in this field. The programme, including practical exercises, is positioned to develop a rapid deployment capability of police elements in crisis management operations. The training programme is based on 7 training sessions, focused on substitution or monitoring, mentoring and advising functions for crisis management and stabilisation[30]. The training programme, including public security aspects and the wider rule of law sector simulating interactions with the criminal justice system and the Civil Society, will pay particular attention to the sharing of know-how and best practices.

[30]For example, HQ's activities, crowd control, public order, criminal investigations such as war crimes, organised crime, trans-national crime, scientific investigations, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), close protection, Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD), and protection of Human Rights in policing.

National Synergies

The Corpo Forestale dello Stato has always played a central role in the defence of forests against fires, both in terms of preventing and combating the phenomenon, also from the point of view of fire extinguishing activities, suppression of crime and investigation across the whole national territory. Since 2001, due to several reforms of the Italian Constitution, competencies on environmental and forestry policies have been transferred from the central state to the regions; also some responsibilities for forest protection have been decentralized. Within this framework, recognizing the value of Corpo Forestale dello Stato's experience and know how, and taking advantage of the traditional presence of the force within forest and mountain areas, many regions drafted agreements and conventions to cooperate and to entrust to Corpo Forestale several core activities in the protection of forest heritage and territory. From 2010, within the boundaries of these extensive agreements, specific operational protocols have been set up, with three main purposes:

- ***Prevention and Fighting*** against forest fires and related crimes[31];
- ***Environmental Monitoring*** against pollution and various environmental crimes;
- ***Mathematical Modelling*** and ***Technology Development*** for territory monitoring and protection (also in cooperation with universities and research centres).

In order to achieve the above objectives, operational protocols have been specifically drafted in relation to the use of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato helicopter fleet within the regions' territories, for the purpose of prevention and fighting forest fires and to develop an effective and accurate monitoring of the territory, in terms of environmental protection and integrity.

Specific Activities

Within the functional structure of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato, preventive services, control of territory and investigations are performed by local commands, by the Nucleo Investigativo Antincendio Boschivo (NIAB) - the

[31]The responsibility and operations coordination rely to a Region and to Corpo Forestale dello Stato if the scale of the fire is manageable with resources and instruments available locally, otherwise the coordination of the operations is transferred to national Civil Protection.

Forest Fires Investigation Unit and by the Nuclei Investigativi di Polizia Ambientale e Forestale (NIPAF) - the Environmental and Forestry Police Investigative Teams. A key strength in this situation is the Centro Operativo Aereo (COA) the Air Operational Centre with a fleet of 37 helicopters[32], 80 pilots and 120 specialists. The helicopters are used for the prevention of forest fires and for extinguishing operations, to transport personnel and equipment, for the coordination of other aircraft and to support the teams on the ground. The fleet is also engaged for civil protection services, police activities and environmental monitoring. The three main types of activities in relation to the afore mentioned objectives include the following:

- The use of helicopters for forest fires early recognition and for extinguishing activities, as well as for air patrolling and crime prevention;
- The monitoring of specific areas, to identify illegal activities against the environment, e.g. illegal discharge of pollutants in the soil or rivers, use of illegal pesticides, etc.; also monitoring for different environmental risks (e.g. hydro geologic risks) is performed;
- The pilot testing of territorial mathematical modelling, due to the application of new technologies on-board aimed at capturing territory features in order to replicate digital models of specific areas for monitoring and control purposes.

Key Factors

International Synergies

The performance of police duties in destabilised contexts by multinational units requires a high degree of interaction that combines the assets deployed and the typical emergency setting, and also calls for common operational procedures and shared tactics. Arma dei Carabinieri is involved in several international operations for example, NTM-I - NATO Training Mission in Iraq, ISAF - International Security and Assistance Force and EUPOL - European Union Police in Afghanistan, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

[32]See Corpo Forestale dello Stato for a detailed overview on the fleet.
http://www3.corpoforestale.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/343

MINUSTAH, deploying the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) and the Integrated Police Unit (IPU)[33].

Specific problems and barriers in destabilised situations are the different:

- legal frameworks/backgrounds
- operating procedures
- threat patterns characterizing the domestic environments, for example diffused crime, organised crime, terrorism, piracy, white collar crime)
- approaches to the victims
- operating tools (weapons, uniforms, cars, communication and Information Technologies).

The most significant barriers and constraints for the target groups are the lack of interaction due to the fact that most police activities are still considered to be strict domestic issues, and also the fact that international training is very expensive.
The requirements to overcome these barriers are:

- the opportunities to directly experience the integration of 'police-identities' in a joint mission
- to increase the effectiveness, sharing and comparing capabilities and procedures.

An innovative approach has been adopted since the EUPFT 2009 sessions. This approach placed the emphasis on a specialist police component, for the first time exercised in a wide multinational context, in synergy with the traditional police components of public order maintenance and general prevention. Particularly helpful was the formula based on training modules, which has managed to combine the theoretical aspects with practical skills.

Those involved from participating countries were encouraged to present and compare their operating procedures within a simulated exercise that highlighted a specific situation. For example, the British 'bobby' working in close cooperation with investigators from Estonia, Spain and French Gendarmerie. In addition experts in forensics from Portugal, Poland and Greece had the

[33]See Arma dei Carabinieri website for further details:
http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Arma/Oggi/Missioni/Oggi/

opportunity to compare their practices and methods. Every level of the hierarchy have been involved. This common approach provided and will provide an alignment of all participants in the use of the techniques and procedures corresponding to international policing best practices and standards. It is interesting to note that a dedicated steering committee will be set up to identify the best practices of each contingent, which will be collated in a common summary document at the end of the EUPST 2011-2013, allowing formal recognition of best practices.

Resources

The detailed programme has been designed by a dedicated planning workgroup, comprising staff from the Interregional Command "Vittorio Veneto", the Centre of Excellence for the Stability Police Units (CoESPU) – Centro di Eccellenza per le Unità di Polizia di Stabilità, the special operational unit ROS, the 2nd Mobile Brigade and the Raggruppamento Carabinieri Investigazioni Scientifiche (RACIS) - Forensic Unit as well as departments within Headquarters such as Plans and Military Police and International Cooperation.

639 police officers have been trained within EUPFT 2009, from 19 European countries[34] and from 25 police forces, with both military and civil status.

Representatives of the Peacekeeping Operations Department of the United Nations and the European Gendarmerie Force have also attended activities. As well as officers of the Gendarmerie of Argentina and Turkey, representatives from the Organisation of African Gendarmerie, and officers from the Gendarmerie of Algeria, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Senegal have observed.

2400 participants will be trained during EUPST 2011-2013, with the participation of Guardia Civil – Spain, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs / Directorate of Security and Defence Cooperation (DCSD) – France, Ministry of Interior / National Gendarmerie Directorate / International Cooperation Directorate (DCI) – France, The Royal Maréchausée – The Netherlands, Romanian Jandarmeria, European Police College – CEPOL, Egypt and Cameroun police and security forces.

A model of the typical unit of stabilisation was outlined, which consisted of a multinational specialized unit, integrated police units and a single police unit. This was communicated to staff members who were dedicated to prevention and

[34]Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Romania, Slovenia and Spain.

public order (FPU / IPU), and to the specialised police element. This consisted of teams for criminal investigations, forensic analysis, protection of witnesses and individuals who cooperate with the judicial process, the high-risk operations unit (SWAT) and anti-sabotage skills.
Moreover, a Human Rights Special Unit has been established, to monitor and oversee activities conducted during the exercise, to detect possible violations of international standards on the preservation and protection of human rights.

Results

In the EUPFT 2008-2010 exercises, evaluation showed that:

- Appropriate established operating procedures, indicating relevant administrative, sectors tasks, and daily procedures should be produced and applied, thus facilitating interaction among trained participants. Lack of established operating procedures still represents the main problem
- Commanders in charge should be given a dedicated period of time to sort out all necessary administrative matters, work out structures and chains of communications, assign tasks and responsibilities, and create a 'to-do list'
- Radio communication networks should be provided at a national level for the smaller units and in a common working language for the staff and main units
- Language skills should be improved, as sometimes communication was slow and chaotic due to hesitation and embarrassment to speak a foreign language.

In the EUPST 2011-2013 exercises:

- the presence of 'Rule of Law' will be anticipated, with a view to widen the scope of the exercise
- there is the potential to establish a systematic approach of command and control routine using a standard model for sufficient information and work- flow and work division
- the exercise documentation should include the main CSDP police guidelines as well as booklets on human rights, humanitarian law, vulnerable groups and radio communication procedures so that all the officers will be prepared in advance of the exercise

- the selection of personnel in relation to language skills should be improved
- from an early stage all units and components should have a dedicated period of time to make contact with commanders, sub commanders and other key positions in order to organise vital elements of performance, communications and responsibilities.

These recommendations from the assessment of the exercise sessions[35], contribute to the alignment of operational procedures, enhance technical skills, safety and security of operators, as well as benefiting the local populations and authorities served by the civil crisis management missions.

National Synergies

There are two main reasons behind the implementation of operational protocols:

- the need to streamline economic and instrumental resources by regions and Corpo Forestale;
- the need to enhance the effectiveness of prevention and response activities against increasingly serious phenomena, such as forest fires.

From the regions perspective, they would not have to rent helicopters and related services from private companies, at very expensive rates. Corpo Forestale dello Stato can optimize the use of their helicopters, for example maximising the obligatory flying hours, performing different activities and receiving logistic support such as offices or small hangars for recovery and maintenance at a local level, as well as financial contributions for the performed activities.
To enhance effectiveness, by having ready-to-fly helicopters, deployed in the regional territory, will provide the advantage of real proximity and speed in the intervention, as well as diminishing travel expenses and maximising fuel and means consumption.

With regards prevention activities, the deployment and constant presence of helicopters in well-known and visible areas has been recognised as an effective deterrent, according to statistics and to the assessment of the officers involved.

[35]Part of European Union Police Forces Training (EUPFT) 2009 notes on Arma dei Carabinieri website available at: http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Coespu/Events/20091130.htm

Operational protocols have been signed between Corpo Forestale dello Stato and several regions in the centre and south of Italy, in particular the regions with high fire related risks. In particular agreements have been setup with Lazio, Emilia Romagna, Marche, Abruzzo, Umbria, Basilicata and Calabria. Also agreements with Puglia and Campania are under evaluation. Within these agreements protocols, tasks, responsibilities and resources are allocated on the basis of the specific local needs and constraints. The agreements were for a limited period such as the summer season and with a specific focus on forest fires, however extra periods and new monitoring activities have been quickly added. This process has been straightforward and very easily received by different administrations. No major issues have been raised and there has been a rapid increase in signed agreements (from the 3 initial regions involved in 2010 to the current 7, plus 2 under evaluation).

Resources

As already mentioned, the core asset for this kind of cooperation is the Corpo Forestale dello Stato helicopters fleet, currently consisting of 37 helicopters. For the purposes of operational protocols, the means deployed locally, due to their technical characteristics (dimensions, capacity, equipment), are mainly the NH500D and the AB412EP[36]. The personnel engaged in these activities, are highly specialised and experienced pilots, as well as a technical support team. This is a highly specialised team within the Corpo Forestale dello Stato, i.e. a EASA PART 145 certified team[37].

In addition in order to cover all maintenance needs and to optimise the repair and control activities, a specific team has been set up, equipped with a fully independent '*mobile repair workshop'*, comprising a small truck equipped with all the tools and instruments needed for the maintenance of helicopters. As already mentioned, 7 regions are currently involved in these operational protocols, providing logistics support, mainly offices, hangars, helidecks and financial contributions to cover part of the expenses such as travel, overtime,

[36]See Corpo Forestale dello Stato website for technical specifications:
http://www3.corpoforestale.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/523 and

[37]EASA PART 145 is the Implementing Regulation issued by European Aviation Safety Agency for the aircraft maintenance sector (Maintenance Organisation Approval) establishing the requirements to be met by an organisation to qualify for the issue or continuation of an approval for the maintenance of aircraft and components. Further details:
EASA website: http://easa.europa.eu/home.php; ENAC website:
http://www.enac.gov.it/La_Regolazione_per_la_Sicurezza/EASA_Implementation_Rules/index.html;

fuel and maintenance. Also other public organisations are involved, such as local agencies for environmental protection.
Another relevant aspect is the technologies adopted for monitoring activities. Helicopters have been equipped with low cost but effective thermal infrared imaging cameras, able to capture well-defined images and video whilst flying. Such cameras enable teams to locate areas of pollution with aerial infrared thermography. Pollutants such as oils, chemicals, and waste radiate heat differently than the soil or water around them. Thermal imagers can aid investigators to spot and then track such pollutants back to their sources.
Experiments aimed at using this kind of technology to deal with illegal pesticides are also on going.

Results

The involvement of Corpo Forestale dello Stato's specific technical assets in cooperation schemes has proved to be very effective in terms of resource optimisation. Operators and those responsible at Corpo Forestale dello Stato and at a regional level have highlighted this. Also at a political level, the statistics for the number of controls and sanctions and for the reduction of forest fire and the effects on the territory have been appreciated. The widespread and continued development of the present operational protocols is a clear acknowledgement of the success of this initiative. The implemented protocols, exploiting the opportunities of real proximity to the identified territory, have gained relevant successes in terms of prevention and response capacity.

Discussion and Conclusion

International Synergies

The Arma dei Carabinieri EUPFT 2009 has met with unanimous approval, and received surplus applications. Senior officers who have covered the role of 'Head of Mission', a position held by the French and Romanian Gendarmerie and the German Federal Police respectively, have made flattering statements.
The Ambassador of the European Commission at the Political and Security Committee of the EU also mentioned it, during a closing speech. The Council of the European Union, in the framework of the 2974th External Relations Council meeting, held in Brussels on 17 November 2009, acknowledged the relevance

for civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions of the Instrument for Stability project EUPFT 2009[38].

The Future

Following the experience of EUPFT 2009, Arma dei Carabinieri submitted their proposal for the European Union Police Services Training (EUPST) 2011 – 2013, with the aim to increase and develop understanding and to spread practices and lessons learned. The global objective is to strengthen the civilian crisis management capacities of the participating countries. This will enable countries participating to contribute more effectively to international stabilisation efforts within countries emerging from a situation of crisis, thus promoting peace and security. For these purposes the main issues for the future are:

- Focusing on the disparities in courses of action and procedures among participating police services in order to achieve real synergy and unity of action in a crisis situation, for EU Member States, non-EU countries contributing to CSDP missions, and African Union countries.
- Enhancing the flexibility and the interaction of police activities when deployed in the framework of civilian crisis management and stabilisation missions either by the EU, the AU, the UN or other organisations such as the OSCE.
- Advancing towards 'harmonised' approaches in the delivery of training and promoting a common approach, both at EU level, and as a contribution to wider international harmonisation in collaboration with partners such as the UN, OSCE and other international/regional organisations. To this end, the training sessions can provide knowledge transfer at two levels. At a theoretical level on different police issues, and a practical level with training for trainers.
- Mainstreaming human rights, including women's rights and children's rights and the protection of minorities, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups in civilian police missions, in line with relevant EU policy.

[38]The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions Press Release, 2974th External Relations Council meeting. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111265.pdf

The development and implementation of joint training will standardise the level of skills of EU Police forces and their activities, in accordance with the European standards and the objectives of the guidelines.

National Synergies

The Future

The fast development of the analysed protocols has enabled further developments in particular with regard to territorial monitoring activities. The territorial mathematic modelling pilot, involving Academics and researchers, has been an important attempt to take advantage of already existing skills and synergies to introduce technological and organisational innovation in typical policing activities and frameworks. This has meant the initial time period for the duration of the protocols has been resolved and an extension to include a full year is under evaluation in different regions. With regards to forest fires prevention and response activities, new requests for the implementation of operational protocols are on-going, but the lack of sufficient resources must be faced. There is a need to increase the helicopter fleet and to train new technicians in order to cover additional territories. Therefore, while innovative and effective territorial monitoring practices are planned for the future, the implementation of new protocols with other regions will be achieved by adopting inter-regional agreements, at the risk of part sacrificing close proximity with the beneficiary territory.

Finally, the model proved to be easily replicable within the national context, being based on already existing wider framework agreements between Corpo Forestale dello Stato and regions.

5

Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan

BIRO CENTRAL POLICE SERVICES, PUBLIC SECURITY

NATIONAL POLICE, THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Introduction
The Republic of Macedonia has been a European Union (EU) candidate country since 2005. In 2009 the country was granted visa liberalisation (together with Montenegro and Serbia). Recognising the progress of the country in the areas of rule of law, democracy, and especially in integrated border management, the Minister of Interior on that occasion stated that Macedonia would continue with further proactive measures to meet and to develop EU standards in this field as soon as possible. The first priority was developing the Schengen Action Plan.

One of the most visible components of the EU's Justice and Home Affairs policies is the Schengen Acquis. The Schengen Action Plan analyses many police and police related issues, such as: border control, visas, migration, asylum[39], police cooperation, juridical cooperation, dealing with narcotic drugs, arms and ammunition, the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the protection of personal data. The importance of meeting the Schengen Acquis is the lifting of internal border controls among member states within the Schengen Area. Each of the aforementioned includes: relevant measures of Schengen Acquis, analysis of current situations and measures that should be taken by a particular institution with a timetable for their implementation and fiscal implications. However, the lifting of border controls between old and new member states is not an unconditional outcome of accession to the EU. To become part of the Schengen Area, it is necessary to meet certain criteria. It depends upon the Council's decision and careful examination of the legal and practical readiness of the new member state.

In order to give opportunity for each candidate country to demonstrate its readiness to be a part of the Schengen area, the EU introduced a specific instrument called the Schengen Action Plan. This contains all the requirements that represent the conditions for entry into the Schengen zone. The main purpose of the Schengen Action Plan is to demonstrate full awareness of the implications of the Schengen Acquis, and to present a credible schedule for meeting the requirements, most of them ahead of accession.

Background and Key Points

Macedonia's accession to the Schengen Area, as a strategic objective within European integration processes, presupposes the fulfilment of a series of conditions in the field of justice and home affairs, which are an integral part of the Action Plan to join the Schengen area. The adoption of the Schengen Action Plan is the responsibility of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. The Schengen Action Plan of the Republic of Macedonia (together with the National Program for the adoption of the EU law) is a complex and long-term document which defines the dynamics of adopting the EU laws, the strategic direction, policies, reforms, resources and deadlines that need to be implemented and met in order for the Republic of Macedonia to meet the requirements for membership in the EU. The document should be reviewed annually. The review should not

[39]Within next revision asylum will not be part of Schengen Action Plan because it is not considered in the Schengen Acquis.

only cover the implementation of identified measures, but also the relevant Schengen measures. It is especially important that this document contains fiscal information for the implementation of these measures. In this respect it is an efficient tool for planning budgetary resources.

The application of the Schengen Action Plan includes the activities of two Government bodies: the National Commission for Integrated Border Management and Ministry of Interior (mainly through the Department of Border Affairs and Department for International Police Cooperation). The adoption of the Schengen Action Plan was preceded by:

- activities associated with the establishment of a National Commission for Integrated Border Management (29.12.2005)
- border police taking full responsibility for border security as part of the Ministry of Interior (08.29.2005)
- categorisation of border crossings (07.06.2006)
- establishment of a National Coordination Centre for Border Management (13.03.2007)
- the creation of the information system for Integrated Border Management (26.03.2009) which provided a platform for the exchange of information and monitoring at border crossings. It also provides the basis for the development of a database for border management purposed for coordinated access and exchange of information between national authorities that have jurisdiction in border management and other acts related to border management.

In the period before the adoption of the Schengen Action Plan, the National Commission of Integrated Border Management and the Ministry of Interior launched a project related to IBM[40] (started 2007 and lasted until 2009). This project addressed the priorities defined in the National Programme for the adoption of the Schengen Acquis.

[40]Contracting Authority (EC): European Commission, EC Delegation, on behalf of the beneficiary; Implementing Agency: European Commission, EC Delegation, on behalf of the beneficiary, Beneficiary (including details of project manager): The primary beneficiary is the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the second beneficiary is the National Commission of Integrated Border Management.**Overall costs (VAT excluded):**EUR 7.600.000 [EU contribution: EUR 5.950.000]

The IBM project achieved a number of requirements relating to the Schengen Action Plan. It improved the infrastructure, construction and reconstruction of the border crossing points by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. It organised the continued training of the border police staff on the use of the law on State Border Surveillance, the law on immigrants, the law on police and other related by-laws. At the same time, on a tactical level, a decentralised practical training with local instructors was carried out, relating to the aforementioned issues. Telecommunication links have been provided between the border crossing points and the Ministry of Interior, facilitating the transfer of data from the border crossing points to the Central Database and vice versa. Upon a proposal by the National Commission for Integrated Border Management, the Government approved a pilot study on information systems for IBM with guidelines and recommendations. At the same time the activities relating to establishing the TETRA System commenced and are currently (in 2011) in the third phase of implementation. This system provides complete (optimal) coverage in the Republic of Macedonia with a digital radio signal, as well as reliable and secure communication between the police services in the country and is designed to be compatible with similar systems already used in several EU member states.

Two weeks after the EU Ministerial Forum, the Western Balkans communicated to the Justice and Home Affairs (16-17.11.2009, held in Brussels), on 30.11.2009 that the EU Council supported a final decision to abolish the visa regime of the EU towards the Republic of Macedonia. This decision would take affect from 19.12.2009. The same day, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia approved the detailed Schengen Action Plan. The plan was prepared in 2008 with consultation and support from representatives of other Ministries nationwide.

On 29.12.2009 the Government of the Republic of Macedonia agreed the National Programme for the Adoption of the EU in 2010, the National Development Strategy that had established a system for integrated border management and an action plan for the development and implementation of the system.

National Legislation and Border Protection issues

Law on Border Control

The commitment of the Republic of Macedonia to build a system of border control, compatible with standards of the Schengen legal system, which incorporates the democratic gains of the EU countries, imposed the need for Law on Border Control[41]. The aim of the law is to coordinate national legislation that regulates the field of control, surveillance and movement of people across borders with the Schengen Border Code; it incorporates new terms, compatible with the directives of the European legislation. Law on Border Control (previously titled the Law on Control over State Borders) was adopted in 2006 and subsequently amended in 2007 and 2009. The law was partially co-ordinated with the Convention for implementing the Schengen Agreement (from July 14, 1985), during the period when the Republic of Macedonia was not yet a full member of the EU. The law coordinated with:

- Regulative No.562 (from 2006) of the European Parliament,
- The Council of Europe's rules governing the manner of movement of persons across borders (from 15.03.2006),
- Partially with Regulative No.1931 (from 2006) of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe (from 20.12.2006),
- The rules of local border traffic at external frontiers on land between Member States
- It amended the provisions of the Schengen Convention.

The need for coordination of the law with directives (or instruments) was set out in the Schengen Action Plan. In drafting the law on border control, practices and ideas were transferred from the Republic of Slovenia, Croatia, and other European countries, according to the directives of the European Parliament or the Council of Europe. The law was carried out fully in compliance with the Schengen Code that required the submission of the list of passengers by airlines.

An important part of the Law on border control is Chapter VI that states:

> *'Border Surveillance which regulates the issues related to the purpose of conducting the border surveillance (contained in Article 42), and with the way of performing the border surveillance (Article 43), methods for carrying out the border surveillance (Article 44), police units and the*

[41]Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, no.171 from 30.12.2010

means seconded to carry out the border surveillance (Article 45) and providing the border surveillance.'

In the previous Law on State Border Surveillance, the Commission for Integrated Border Management was established. Its work and competences were only partially regulated and did not specify the rights and obligations of all parties involved in the National Commission for Integrated Border Management. The law gives details of all the parties' powers within the Commission and established the National Coordination Centre for border management.

Other Acts

The start of the Schengen Action Plan (30.11.2009) had recommendations and criteria for visa liberalization of Macedonian citizens. During the implementation process of these recommendations, the Ministry of Interior achieved the activities grouped in four areas:[42]

- Security of Documents
- Border Management, asylum and migration
- Public Order and Safety
- External Relations and fundamental rights

Within these areas further structural and legal changes were approved in addition to those within the Schengen Action Plan. Most important was a Risk Analysis. Risk Analysis[43] is a mandatory obligation of all States of the European Union. In order to comply with the acts of the EU, the Republic of Macedonia was obliged to incorporate a Risk Analysis and any additional elements arising from that issue. Risk analysis is a recommendation in the "Schengen Catalogue for External borders control, removal and readmission", which is also an obligation for the Republic of Macedonia to fulfil on its road to the EU. Acceptance and incorporation of recommendations and best practices provided in the catalogue is an important precondition for Macedonia's accession to the Schengen zone.[44]

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[42]Information on the roadmap for visa liberalization (in Macedonian), Web site of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, from 18.07.2009, http://www.moi.gov.mk/ShowAnnouncements.aspx?ItemID=7367&mid=710&tabId=96&tabindex=0 (Accessed on 02.12.2011).

[43]In the formof "Modelof integratedrisk analysis" is prepared by the EuropeanAgency "Frontex".

[44]National strategy for development of the established system for integrated border management, Document accepted at 130 session of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, held on 29.12.2009. Source:

From today's perspective, the activities provided within the Schengen Action Plan are an integral part of the Strategic plan of the Ministry of Interior. Thus, within the Strategic Plan for the period 2009-2011 the Department for Border Affairs and Migration as well as the Regional Centres for Border Affairs aims to implement the already adopted best practice and common standards in the field of integrated border management. This is in accordance with Schengen regulations, the directives and common handbook, the material-technical equipment and modernization of police stations, and improving the cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries.[45] In order to further comply with the provisions of the Schengen Border Code and within the Schengen Action Plan, the Republic of Macedonia proposes to continue to upgrade the legal framework in the area of border management.

Schengen Action Plan – Insight from the Interview of a Senior Level Police Officer

The interviewee had read about the concept of the Schengen Action Plan as a best practice model, and had previous experiences acquired from working in the given field. For example working on projects that highlighted positive and negative experiences of meeting goals, so as to apply the positive experiences and avoid similar mistakes.

The Schengen Action Plan as a document is very important as it can regulate the relations of the International Police Cooperation in the Ministry of Interior through the evaluation of international documents. It is a fine example of best practice in international police cooperation and it presents a basis for implementing the objectives of the Schengen Action Plan on a national as well as an international level. The idea of forming the working group of the Schengen Action Plan was an idea of the Government of the Republic Macedonia in order to facilitate and pave the way for the integration of the Republic Macedonia in the EU, Schengen and the Euro Zone. The group consisted of members from 10 Ministries, representatives from the Delegation of EU in the Republic of Macedonia and representatives from the CIVIPOL

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http://www.igu.gov.mk/files/pdf/nacionalna_komisija/23022010_strategija_igu.pdf (Accessed on 02.12.2011), p.39

[45]National strategy for development of the established system for integrated border management, Document accepted at 130 session of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, held on 29.12.2009. Source: http://www.igu.gov.mk/files/pdf/nacionalna_komisija/23022010_strategija_igu.pdf (Accessed on 02.12.2011), p.8

mission responsible for the implementation of police reforms in the period 2006-2008.

The Government of the Republic Macedonia, who instigated the initiative, asked the working group to begin the preparations for European integration. The Department for European Affairs within the MOI chaired the project and facilitated the communication between the involved institutions. The Department helped the working team to establish the initiative and become operational, by providing people, experts, training, and following the changes that occurred in the European Union whilst referring to the documents, initiatives, regulations and the European Commission's Regulations and forwarding to the working group updates of developments. The working group used the experiences and the Schengen Action Plans from Croatia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. In fact, everyone was involved in this initiative, and among other things, is the most beautiful example of a best practice in which all have benefitted.

The initiative was quite large and complex, and it required a huge commitment from the people that were involved as team members, authorities and institutions. Good organisation and coordination were required long term. After implementation, the processes became easier and the outcomes were generally positive. It proved to be a very good foundation for later requirements and conditions needed to fulfil the purposes of the national strategy. The application of this practice was primarily seen as an internal need, in that the State and the MOI were already preparing to meet the challenges relating to the European integration processes and to successfully avoid threats for national security. Police officers in the MOI also had expectations about the European integration process, from police cooperation meetings where there were positive and negative examples from other countries who had gone through the same process. Experience of implementing the changes and to adapting national capacities came from other EU countries. They helped the Republic of Macedonia to adjust their laws and legislation in line with those of the EU member states in order to establish and improve bilateral and international cooperation with other countries. Initially there were no major problems, but barriers from external factors became apparent, for example the signing of bilateral agreements within international cooperation.

Financial resources for activities relating to the Macedonian Schengen Action Plan are mainly from internal resources. External as well as internal resources were used for the following:

- training and education of the national working teams
- exchanging experiences
- exploring best practices
- contracts with the foreign expert working teams for evaluation of the documents and other papers. The applied techniques (routines) were of particular importance in allowing for new ways of working and thinking of police officers. The national team, in the form of the working group, had already acquired good training, experience and skills to work in this area, but the experience and training obtained from foreign experts and accessibility to materials from other countries strengthened the capacity of national staff to face the challenges. Some of the challenges were easily tackled and some of them were difficult and complex to resolve. Sometimes the experience available was insufficient and the team had to analyse the data and materials themselves.

The interviewee believes that best practice has a dual effect although its primary purpose is to improve the transfer of knowledge and experience. This is particularly evident when cooperation is strengthened within the working group at a national level, and also at a bilateral and international level. When the Schengen Acquis is initially analysed it looks straightforward, but there are many obligations that are imposed by the EU and the EC. The Republic of Macedonia, by fulfilling the Acquis has applied the best practices.

Conclusion

The Republic of Macedonia adopted the Schengen Action Plan in late 2011, immediately after receiving the visa liberalization for its citizens. The approval of the Schengen Action Plan, as a result of cooperation between representatives from several Ministries, the EU delegation in Macedonia and Police mission CIVIPOL, is one of the more complex accomplishments in which the Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Interior was involved in as a leading party, with other relevant Ministries and state agencies. The collective experiences from police within several EU states and within the region, together with the support given by the EU authorities during the development of the Schengen Action plan, has given this document strategic value.

The State, by the competent authorities involved in the preparation of the Action plan, worked very hard during the implementation stage. However for political reasons, including the result of events associated with the interruption of Macedonia's EU integration processes from 2009 until now, the dynamics changed and in relation to the implementation of the Schengen Action Plan has slowed down.

Today (December, 2011), many of the measures of the Schengen Action Plan have been implemented, but a considerable number of measures have undergone modifications. One reason is because the document was not revised in 2010 with the acceptance of the Visa Code, which defines the new rules for issuing visas. During 2011, the relevant departments within the MOI made a detailed analysis of the Visa Code. This analysis has not been about the coordination of legislation only, but has focused also on the fulfilment of material and technical prerequisites for the implementation of the Schengen Plan in the Republic of Macedonia. In 2012 when the detailed analysis is completed, a review of the Schengen Action Plan will take place.

6

United Under One Roof

Safety Houses in the Netherlands

THE NETHERLANDS

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Safety Houses in the Netherlands

The Dutch practice of 'integrative Safety Houses' found its origin in the 1990s when concerns for neighbourhood safety heralded the need for a cooperative, community-based response. Safety Houses have since garnered widespread praise and support, resulting in their extension across Dutch cities and principalities. This case study outlines the development of the Safety House initiative, from its origin until now (2011). Safety Houses started around 1997 with an initiative labelled as *Justitie in de Buurt* (Neighbourhood Justice) in 4 police regions. There are 45 Safety Houses in operation today. The main aim of Safety Houses is to form a close cooperative network surrounding targeted risk groups. The police have, from the very beginning, played a pivotal role in these networks. After all, the aim of Safety Houses is to deliver safety, which is an intrinsic part of the police's role. The police are supported in this activity by multiple external partners, which each contribute to this overall goal. This case

study provides evidence testifying to the success of this important Dutch initiative, while also drawing attention to the difficulties and complexities inherent in this approach.

Methods

This best practice description primarily draws upon open source reports. Safety houses have been intensively researched and publicly debated by several stakeholders. In addition, there is a dedicated webpage (http://www.veiligheidshuis.nl) which provides an overview of all safety houses in the Netherlands, also offering regular updates based on new research or media reports on safety houses. We used this website as the basis for our description of safety houses. Next to this we conducted a literature review drawing upon Dutch publications and master theses focusing on safety houses[46]. In the appendix we provide some selected examples of these sources, for the interested reader.

What are Safety Houses?

Safety Houses reflect the Dutch approach of integrated solutions in the field of safety. In the last two years Safety Houses have been introduced (but not implemented yet) into all Dutch cities. They constitute a unique approach, involving very close cooperation between multiple stakeholders on various processes. In a Safety House several processes are investigated simultaneously. Every process (e.g. juvenile crime, domestic violence, et cetera) has its own covenant, its own knowledge sharing process, and its own partners. The concept of Safety Houses aims at preventative as well as repressive and localized policing. It is also integrative, offender-oriented and problem-oriented. Safety Houses are actual locations (houses) where several public organisations gather to discuss local or neighbourhood problems. Thus Safety Houses represent central collaborative hubs where multiple stakeholders may meet, with the aim of tackling problems of community safety and high volume crime. Safety Houses further endorse an individualized and offender-oriented approach, including close consultation with individual offenders to combat on-going and repeat offending and (typically) youth crime. Safety Houses are thus action oriented

[46]Many Dutch scholars worked on evaluation studies with regards to safety houses – Google Scholar provides 176 hits for "veiligheidshuis" (retrieved November 2012).

(inductive policing) rather than policy oriented (deductive policing). Problems of serious and organised crime are referred to other agencies.

The overall objective of the Safety House is to create a comprehensive network around at-risk youth (such as those in the care system), citizens affected by domestic violence, and prolific offenders to prevent them dropping out of care processes or sliding into criminality. Alternative penalties are prescribed for at-risk youth: ensuring that they are not immediately labelled as 'criminals'. More specifically, the activities focus on an individualised approach in:

- preventing crime (and aggression / violence)
- reducing recidivism
- reducing and preventing nuisance
- providing appropriate care to the victim
- being a reliable information hub for safety partners
- providing after-care
- strengthening coordination between network partners

In sum, Safety Houses are an integral approach that combines prevention, repressiveness, and aftercare, within administrative *and* criminal justice. A natural side effect of this approach is that it is possible to focus upon local or neighbourhood problems and emphasise the local administrative and neighbourhood cultures in which these problems are embedded.

A Brief History

Although it is difficult to identify the exact origin of the Safety House initiative, it appears this idea arose on a national level as a response to fears surrounding neighbourhood safety. In the 1980s youth criminality and addiction were acknowledged to be widespread and difficult to tackle. The Netherlands had seen increases in high volume and violent crime causing this issue to rise up the political and policy agenda. At the same time law enforcement and community providers increasingly acknowledged a need for greater cooperation and coordination in response to these issues. It thus became clear that innovative and integrative solutions were needed to combat youth crime and to reduce rates of re-offense and proliferation of crimes.

Against this backdrop, four pilots were started in 1997 in some neighbourhoods within Amsterdam, Arnhem, Maastricht and Rotterdam where social problems

and crime were high. This initiative reflected a significant change in law enforcement from a repressive model to a more localised and (also) preventative and immediate approach by summary jurisdiction. The pilots were labelled *Justitie in de Buurt* (Neighbourhood Justice), demonstrating the Ministry of Justice's interest in adopting a neighbourhood approach. As this initiative was new, the earliest instances of Neighbourhood Justice had no protocol to build upon. However the programme took some inspiration from France's 'Maison de la Justice' initiative following the visit of two Dutch civil servants at the French ministry. In France this policy had aimed to improve cooperation between local and national government, as well as to enhance coordination between lateral and vertical (hierarchical or centralised) policy initiatives.

In these early years the only cooperation was between the police and the prosecution service (chain) and was based on the original, judicial initiative. In the years after the Millennium, in Tilburg (also in some other cities, but Tilburg is the one most often mentioned) there arose the idea to extend the early initiative to incorporate more partner-organisations. In 2003, The Minister of Justice announced a change in policy with regards to Neighbourhood Justice. In the intervening period a new (Christian right-wing) Cabinet had been installed; a Cabinet that placed safety and security at the heart of its policy. Outlining the new approach in the government policy statement entitled, 'Towards a safer society' (*Naar een veiliger samenleving*) the new Cabinet highlighted the need to:

- promote a safe living and dwelling neighbourhood
- organise and develop policy on safety and security at a local level (subsidiarity principle)
- emphasise the principle that community policing is (still) important
- ensure local authorities are responsible for the police (and become local directors)

On the basis of such principles, a new style of Neighbourhood Justice was initiated, going under the label of *Veiligheidshuis* (Safety House), which was more purposeful, more cooperative and much broader in scope than the previous pilots. The Cabinet started the local and bottom up initiative in Tilburg, in 2002, as an example of good policy and declared it 'national'. Following Tilburg's example, the first Safety Houses were introduced in 2003.

In 2007, the decision was taken to implement a nation-wide network of Safety Houses and by 2008 there were 29 Safety Houses in existence. After several evaluation studies on precursor Safety House initiatives the former Minister of Justice (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008 – 2009, 28684, nr. 213), wrote a letter to parliament on April 20, 2009, in which he declared that the success of Safety Houses in some cities, should be extended throughout the country.[47] According to the Minister, the Safety Houses had contributed to the overall goal of reducing criminality and harassment by 25% and the number of re-offenses by 10% (from the figures reported in 2002). In that way Safety Houses – originally a bottom up initiative – became a part of the overall country-wide policies 'towards a safer society' (since 2002) and the government statement 'work together, live together' (since 2007 Samen leven, samen werken) and national policy programs, such as 'safety starts with prevention' (since 2007 *Veiligheid begint bij voorkomen*). The plan to extend Safety Houses has now been realized and there are currently 45 Safety Houses up and running throughout the Netherlands.

It should be taken into consideration that many Safety Houses are still in construction. Therefore, research is primarily focused on processes and not on outputs or performance. Real scientific research on the outcomes is hardly done. However the qualitative output is satisfying; cases are settled and individual clients are being served on welfare, health, housing and safety as a direct result. However whether the approach delivers value for money is not yet known, and is hard to measure.

Future

The new Cabinet (installed October 14, 2010) plans to spread the Safety House initiative into new regions throughout the country. In addition they aim to further develop and extend the approach. The State Secretary of Justice has launched a knowledge network – a nation wide website – around Safety Houses, and research is currently exploring the possibility of introducing a nation-wide system of client registration. An audit system (control) has also been set up to assist the Safety Houses by reformulating and measuring their goals in a SMART way (Hirsch Ballin, 2009; Ministerie van Justitie, 2009).

[47]Many Dutch scholars worked on evaluation studies with regard to Safety Houses - Google Scholar provides 119 hits for "veiligheidshuis".

Evidence of Best Practice

Evaluations of Safety Houses suggest that they have a positive impact in the areas of domestic violence, juvenile crime and persistent offending (Van Vianen et.al, 2008). Members and partners in the Safety Houses also report greater knowledge sharing in relation to prolific offenders, while benefits are also seen in cooperation between justice and care partners, and in reports of greater respect and trust between professionals from different sectors. On an operational level, processes and procedures are often found to improve through the implementation of this approach (Rovers, 2011). Interventions are more effectively coordinated, including a more comprehensive, targeted and coherent approach across different organisations and sectors. On the input-side the knowledge of possible criminal offences and offenders is also found to be signalled at an earlier stage, leading to pre-emptive actions to stem further (and more serious) crime.

The success of the Safety House model is also evidenced by the decision to extend this model throughout the country. Indeed in his letter to parliament, the former Minister of Justice outlined the expected benefits of the programme's extension in terms of crime reduction and recidivism (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008 – 2009, 28684, nr. 213). Of course these success stories cannot be found in every Safety House. Indeed a fundamental aspect of this localised and problem-oriented approach is the need for neighbourhood action in response to specific community-oriented issues, suggesting that the direct replication of a particular Safety House in a different part of the country would be neither appropriate nor effective. However, in general, critiques of this initiative have been aimed at the 'organisation' and 'administration' of Safety Houses rather than the 'approach' (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002), implying that the general aims of Safety Houses are widely accepted and endorsed, even though the benefits of this initiative are not always capitalised upon in practice. In a recent newspaper article (NRC-NEXT, October 13, 2011, 3), criminologist Ferwerda, stated that, with regards to the youth-approach:

> *'…there is a kind of consensus about the Safety Houses, they work well: decisions on individualised cases on youngsters are made quicker'.* (Authors' translation)

The success of Safety Houses can be inferred from several factors:

- First and most importantly, Safety Houses provide a critical basis for direct interaction between different actors and institutions (multi-disciplinary). As such, they provide an important forum for knowledge sharing and the exchange of ideas and expertise, around a common topic or problem. This, in turn, allows for a holistic and integrated approach to matters of community safety and for instance domestic violence.
- Safety Houses focus on addressing multi-issue problems, which often has a structural character and requires an integrated or comprehensive approach. The underlying idea is that while repression may be effective in the short term, intensive supervision by a customised care programme provides the best long-term results. Not to say that repression is unnecessary. The approach includes the family of (youth) offenders too.
- Safety Houses are problem-oriented and encourage direct action aimed at managing or combating targeted cases. At the same time, intervention and supervision of clients is individualised and managed on a case-by-case basis.
- Safety Houses involve cross-stakeholder cooperation encouraging greater coherence and integration in the delivery of safety across different sectors and enhancing the cross-domain expertise of safety professionals and partners.
- Interventions and supervision of clients is local, in the neighbourhood, so successes are also visible in the immediate community
- Safety Houses are becoming knowledge and expert centres, providing enhanced sources of knowledge on matters of local law enforcement.

Partners and Processes

External stakeholders and partners who are actively involved in current Safety Houses include the following:

Justice-chain partners:

- Police
- Parquet Public Prosecution
- Council for child protection
- Probation Netherlands

- Addiction Rehabilitation Foundation
- Salvation Army Probation
- Service Establishments Justice / Penitentiary (PI)
- Institute for Forensic Investigation
- Victim Care Netherlands
- Halt Netherlands

Other partners / participants:

- Municipalities
- Municipal departments Public order and safety
- Municipal Department of Social Development
- Youth Care Agency
- Public Health care agencies
- School attendance officers
- Schools
- Public Housing agencies
- Mental health partners

The standard operating procedures for Safety Houses are complex. First there will be a meeting on screening, where i) investigation takes place in several databases and ii) history of a specific case is investigated. This means that not every report will end in a 'case' in the Safety House. Only a few partners participate and decide on whether or not this will be a case. The second step involves a meeting on the care-process with regard to the reported case. The third step might be a judicial meeting on the reported case. In every step the possibility of participation of new partner-organisations is possible.

Safety Houses are meant to be a network and they function as a network. Conditional upon the process at stake, participants 'wander in and out of the decision processes'. Safety Houses are made up of several processes. Partners of each process may meet once a week or sometimes once a fortnight. So, partners do not gather at specific daily or weekly intervals, but are instead, available on demand. Generally, the director is not a manager of a Safety House, but a manager of a process, and generally he is employed at the local government offices.

Agreements are laid down in a covenant between the partners. Because a covenant does not have the status of a law, compliance cannot be enforced. It is an agreement with rules of instruction based on trust. For every process (e.g. prolific offenders, domestic violence, juvenile criminality, et cetera) a separate covenant is needed. A covenant sets down the partners that are invited with regard to that particular process of working, what information can be shared, and what kind of Standard Operating Procedures have to be implemented and in what ways. Some partner-organisations – and the police itself as well – are bound to strict rules with regards to for instance privacy and confidentiality. Sometimes an agreement is based on a vow of secrecy.

Enablers

The realisation and success of Safety Houses is dependent on a number of factors, the most important of which are summarised here.

Human and Organisational Resources

- It is clear that the original intention to adopt a Safety House model (in the 1990s) required a fundamental change in thinking in regards to the treatment of criminality and public safety. Safety Houses thus required innovative thinking and strategic vision both at the outset and in their continued implementation, in order to become and remain a success.
- Several researchers (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002; Vianen et al, 2008; Dammen et al, 2008; Rovers, 2011) stress the fact that connectedness and cooperation between partners is important. Safety Houses provide an important geographical location in which these exchanges may occur.
- The Safety House employees are selected for their problem solving and cooperative / open attitude. They are thus key players in ensuring the success of Safety House ventures. The personal drive of these professionals is a very important factor for the success.
- The nature of the Safety House environment, which houses multiple institutions and partners in a common space allows for short lines of (face-to-face) and immediate communication, facilitating collaborative exchange.
- Knowledge, including the storing, accessing, and the sharing of knowledge, is important. Knowledge has to be factual and to the point.

Knowledge sharing processes must be laid down in protocols (Snippe et al., 2006a; Rovers, 2011).

- Also a tough direction (supervision) and control on the follow up processes, such as aftercare is important (Snippe et al., 2006b).
- Institutional support from Ministers and Cabinet and the main offices of separate partner-organisations is important too, for subsidies and for the affirmation and legitimacy of the initiative.

Financial Resources

- Of course Safety Houses are also dependent on sufficient financial backing with estimates indicating that annual budgets are in the region of 200.000 – 400.000 Euros per Safety House (Rovers, 2011). Originally, subsidies came from different agencies: (e.g., The Ministry of Justice, Prosecution Service, Police, Provinces, and Local Authorities) as well as additional subsidies that were raised under the banner of a war on the degeneration of cities: 'Montfrans-gelden'). Subsidies of the Ministry (earlier of Justice, since 2010 of Security and Justice) were fixed until 2004. It was then agreed that the subsidy would remain in place for three additional years. This system lasted until 2007.
- Since 2007, the Ministry and the Prosecution Service have paid for the Justice-parts of the Safety House, an amount totalling to around 200.000 Euros a year. Despite the retrenchment politics of the new Cabinet (in 2010), it is envisaged that there will be no budget cuts in Safety Houses in the coming years. In fact 7.7 million Euros has been made available in 2011 for further development of the Houses. However given current climes it is noteworthy that the G32 (the 32 largest cities and towns) have recently criticised the retrenchments and budget cuts, claiming that they are afraid that cuts to Safety House budgets are forthcoming, despite the promise of the Minister (Bruls, 2011).

The basis of Safety Houses derived from a combination of an external threat, an external opportunity, an internal opportunity and other preconditions (money, politics, enthusiastic people, et cetera). As demonstrated in the long list of enablers above, many of the financial, human and organisational resources required to make the Safety Houses a success are still important to the effective initiation and continuance of this initiative.

Similarly environmental enablers have an important role to play in dictating the success of the Safety House initiative in specific locations. Given the localised and problem-oriented nature of the initiative it is unsurprising that variations in Safety Houses became evident (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002) causing a tendency for decentralisation and devolution in policy (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002; Vianen et al, 2008; Dammen et al, 2008; Rovers, 2011). Indeed this is an inherent characteristic of a localised approach in which the needs of the immediate community are of paramount concern. However at the same time this implies that the success of Safety Houses is likely to be variable and largely dependent on the environmental conditions in which a particular house is operating.

Difficulties and Complexities

Despite the cited benefits, evaluations of Safety Houses are not without criticism. As may be expected, cooperation between partners can still be improved. Differences in the approaches, attitudes, regulations and cultures of disparate professional groups continue to represent a challenge to the effectiveness of Safety Houses, while issues of power and jurisdiction sometimes remain unclear. In addition critics suggest that the effectiveness of Safety Houses is not readily measurable and that the narrow, localized nature of such initiatives make Safety Houses vulnerable. The effectiveness of Safety Houses would also be placed in jeopardy, in the event of budget cuts and subsidy losses.

Safety Houses are also extremely complex ventures, involving partners from many different domains that adhere to many different goals, values and ways of performing. In addition Safety Houses are based on reciprocal relations and dialogue between the offenders or service recipients and the network partners, adding additional complexity to the process. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to deal with an individualised approach is similarly intricate and sometimes ambiguous. Coordination of the chain for a particular issue (e.g., domestic violence) involves multiple partners and procedural steps. Add to this the fact that there can be many 'chains', for instance on youth and on prolific offenders, each with different directors / managers and police officers, and the level of complexity becomes even more apparent. The success of Safety Houses thus hinges on good coordination and the ability to reconcile the complex array of processes and procedures that Safety Houses entail.

A Case in Point: Knowledge Exchange and Complexity – Difficulties and Developments

It is important to note that the complexity of Safety Houses is inherent in the ambition for cooperative working, decision making and the transfer of ideas across multiple and diverse disciplines working in a network. In addition to case specific knowledge sharing this initiative provides the opportunity for cross-domain collaboration that facilitates new and innovative ways of thinking. In that sense new knowledge creation routines rise to the surface. New possibilities and solutions emerge through 'coffee machine' moments, in which informal discussions around a coffee machine allow for new insights and developments. Different partners contribute unique areas of specialist knowledge and expertise to collective solutions and problem solving. In addition Safety Houses provide an important forum for cooperation and joint decision making that enhances mutual trust and respect between partners working in separate domains. Thus Safety Houses draw upon the broad resources and capabilities of multiple stakeholders, to offer an integrative approach to law enforcement.

However paradoxically, the advantages of such a multi-disciplinary, integrated form of working are also the source of its greatest challenges. Professionals of several organisations, with their own perspectives, sense making, values, organisational histories and cultures, disciplinary backgrounds, laws, rules and instructions represent a highly complex collective. Managing these different partners is inherently difficult and can result in misunderstandings and inefficiencies. In addition the potential for diffusion of responsibility is high in an environment in which no organisation has the definitive power of decision. Professionals have their own relationship, mandate, and instructions from the main office of their parent organisation. The expectations placed on police representatives (by both themselves and external partners) are particularly high given their (action oriented) status and standing in the group. This can lead to additional burdens on the police, which are not matched by other partners. In addition it leads to a blurring of role definitions as Safety House partners (especially the police) are forced to taken on responsibilities that go beyond their formal roles and jurisdictions. Similarly the issue of privacy is a continual challenge, including questions regarding what information can and cannot be shared with different partners. Research (Tweede Kamer, 2009; Winter, 2009) highlights the ambiguity surrounding data protection and the difficulties associated with reconciling data protection and privacy concerns with the need

to speak honestly and openly to external Safety House partners. The sharing of knowledge by the police, for instance, is bound to the *Wet Persoonsgegevens* (WPG) en *Besluit Politiegegevens* (Law and Resolution on personal particulars). An additional complexity arises from the clients themselves, who are often affected by a complex range of problems that cut through housing, family, work and financial domains. Information is similarly fragmented across the many organisations with which such individuals come into contact. Thus information comes from multiple sources. If systems are not compatible then the comparison, exchange, and coordination of data is a significant challenge.

Summary

Although there seem to be some bottlenecks with regard to Safety Houses, they are generally regarded as widely successful. However as many Safety Houses are still under construction, quantitative (performance) evaluations are often not possible. Instead, (qualitative) assessments point to the cited process benefits and informal measures of performance rather than to any objective or definitive outcomes. In this regard, the anecdotal evaluations of clients and partners are satisfying; indicating that cases are effectively settled and that individual clients are served effectively on welfare, health, housing and safety. The on-going success of the Safety House initiative appears dependent on the ability to juggle the diverse requirements, cultures and expectations of multiple stakeholders, and to provide the right internal conditions and external resources to support and develop this unique initiative. Given the widespread success of the Safety House initiative in the last 20 years it appears this endeavour is worth the effort.

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7

The Electronic Eye at the Door of the European Union

BORDER POLICE, ROMANIA

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Motto: 'We are a different kind of ambassador'

Romania's adherence to the European Union led to the increase of responsibility in the field of surveillance and control, which aimed to enhance security on the external border of the European Community. The biggest challenge was to perform these activities with the same efficiency in the Black Sea area, which is considered an open door of entrance in the united European space. In this context, some drastic measures of border surveillance were considered. They involved the implementation of technological solutions without any precedent in

Eastern Europe and they included the implementation of complex surveillance systems based on advanced electronic equipment.

The aim of this case study is to investigate the best practices of the Romanian Border Police (RBP) in using a component of the integrated system that ensures the surveillance of the Romanian and European Border. This component is represented by the SCOMAR system (a complex system for the observation, surveillance and control of the traffic in the Black Sea area;

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsS8Xbr0K2w).

SCOMAR has been used for the surveillance of the maritime border of Romania and the European Union since 2007 and aims to ensure public safety within the region both at sea and in the coastal area of the Black Sea.

(http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=465),

Analysis of this advanced surveillance system will provide knowledge in relation to:

- The process of consolidation of the system and the Romanian Border Polices' efficiency in the border surveillance through the elaboration of a complete solution that provides real time information about the operative situation.
- The process of tracing migration, prevention of illegal migration and reduction of the illegal traffic of goods and smuggling.
- The process of communication (hard data and verbal) using specific internal networks.
- The process of alignment to the European Union standards in terms of border security and cooperation.

The data collection methods we used for this case study were: documentation, archival records, and interviews. This case study can be used to inform police forces with responsibilities involving blue borders surveillance and the use of similar advanced equipment to ensure public safety.

The SCOMAR blue border surveillance system is seen as best practice because it shows how in a few years a country can move from having no integrated maritime surveillance system to having one of the best systems in operation in the European Union (EU). The SCOMAR system can still be improved and it

may not be the best on the market at this point, but this case study aims to highlight the best practice for implementing, managing and operating a blue border surveillance system for EU member countries that do not currently have such a system. It will also help future EU members who will need to integrate their system or implement a new system that meets the EU standards and requirements.

Project Overview

SCOMAR was considered a project of best practice having been evaluated by external and internal stakeholders. From an external point of view the Schengen evaluation commission experts reviewed the system in terms of the technical capabilities and the appropriate legislative package. For both aspects they evaluated positively and in the final report stated that Romania complies with the Schengen Aquis. The report mentioned in particular the high level of training by the RBP who work in the Command and Control Centre, at border crossing points, at the surveillance points and on the ships that are part of the SCOMAR system. The management structure and the rules to adopt new procedures were seen as being slim and flexible, making it possible to adapt to new threats as they appear in the future. The ITC component of the system is designed to be modular in order to facilitate further development and can easily be interconnected with new systems if required. Besides the review of the Schengen experts, the SCOMAR system received positive feedback from partner countries that interacted with it in joint operations conducted through the FRONTEX Agency or in cooperation with neighbouring countries at the Black Sea. The professionalism of the RBP and the high levels of technical equipment used were particularly noted.

Internally the SCOMAR system is seen at all levels as being state of the art technology used in securing the Romanian maritime borders. By being open to collaborations and eager to use all the capabilities of the SCOMAR system, even beyond its primary role as surveillance and control system at the border, the local community and the scientific community also benefit from its existence. As an example the Institute for Marine Research and Development "Grigore Antipa" from Constanta is working together with the SCOMAR system to track and monitor dolphin migration in the Black Sea.

Background Information

The need to implement the SCOMAR system was twofold. By joining the EU, part of the Romanian border became an external EU border and as such Romania had to comply with specific requirements regarding the security of these borders. Alongside this, Romania is in the process of joining the Schengen, which carries a new set of requirements introduced by the Schengen Acquis. Since joining the EU Romania became more attractive to immigrants who have seen it as an open door to enter the EU. Once Romania has joined the Schengen area it is anticipated this will increase further. Finance for this new system SCOMAR has been through PHARE Funding Memorandums.

The main internal factors that influenced the development of this project were the lack of an appropriate integrated surveillance system for the maritime border and the need to cut operational costs. The fact that SCOMAR would, in addition, be used for traffic monitoring by the Romanian Naval Authority strengthened the argument to invest in this project. These external and internal factors highlighted the need for appropriate management of the maritime border at the Black Sea and the subsequent development and implementation of SCOMAR.

What were the resources initially considered as important to achieving the changes required?

Initially the most valuable resource for the successful implementation of the project was the knowledge for building, implementing, managing and using the system. This knowledge initially came from a Polish firm who wrote the first draft of the requirements. At the same time Romanian experts visited the systems used in Spain by the Guardia Civil and in France by the French Gendarmerie. Collaboration with the Spanish and French colleagues was essential as, later on, they helped in training the SCOMAR personnel. Knowledge and expertise was also received from the companies that provided the equipment for the system. Their experience in building similar systems was very useful. The knowledge and experience of all these stakeholders was vital to the successful implementation of the project.

As previously mentioned, the technology was essential in the implementation of the project. Acquiring appropriate radars, cameras, computers, communication equipment etc. was very important. State of the art technology used in every

component of the system created the premise to use SCOMAR at its full potential.

What were the funding sources and other levels of resources allocated to achieve the changes required?

The budget allocated for this project was Ъ24.6 million. The funding was secured through PHARE funding and co-funding from the state budget, as the Romanian Border Police is a public police force. The funding included several contracts within the PHARE Funding Memorandums (2003, 2004, and 2005) (see Appendix 7.2). In general, the budgeting and the financial resources were considered adequate and did not generate any problems for the implementation of the system. Due to the intense activity of the specialists within the Romanian Border Police and the Ministry of Administration and Interior, to ensure adequate technical assistance for the SCOMAR implementation, there was a saving of Ъ500,000. After the implementation phase, three ships were acquired through contracts financed from the Schengen Facilities, RO FSCH 18.1.1. – Marine Surveillance Vessel (the Stefan cel Mare vessel) and RO FSCH 18.1.2. – Patrol and Intervention vessels (MAI 2110 and MAI 2111; Appendix 7.3 and Appendix 7.4).

These were acquired as part of the "Control reinforcement at the external borders through the increase of naval and terrestrial mobility - RO-FSCH 18" project. These three vessels cost over Ъ54 million. Although acquisition of these vessels reduced the difficulties and errors associated with human surveillance, it did involve high costs that cannot be fully supported by the state budget due to the current economic crisis. Given the responsibilities of the Romanian Border Police must be performed in spite of these external factors, human resources sometimes supplement their use.

Were knowledge creation routines, alliance routines and /or acquisition routines important?

From the start of the implementation phase, there was great interest in establishing knowledge sharing routines. To effectively use the SCOMAR system, the Romanian Border Police formalised the activities conducted by the Command and Control Centre enabling an operator to understand the procedures required to use the system. They also developed procedures relating to the

organisation of work activities. These procedures were evaluated and with approval at a senior level, updated a year after implementation. Some of the procedures related to information exchange between the RBP and other authorities at Territorial, Central, Regional and European levels. Others referred to activities within the Command and Control Centre, for example with regard to levels of access and the programme of work. A set of procedures relating to specific critical situations was also developed, for example, system breakdown.

If ideas and knowledge were transferred, where was this from and was it easy or difficult to do?

As the implementation of SCOMAR was a recommendation by the EU with regard to the Integrated System of Border Security, it was important to consult with partner countries, for example France and Spain that already had similar systems. The knowledge and expertise within these countries was fully used in the implementation of SCOMAR. The main knowledge transfer was from the Spanish SCOMAR system, used by the Guardia Civil (Spanish Border Police) for several years mainly on the African border, which is considered to be one of the most dangerous European borders.

At the beginning of the project, the Romanian Border Police went to Spain to examine the SCOMAR system and in particular the camera system. The experience was considered invaluable as commented:

> *'Spanish colleagues have experience in this field and they shared it with us'* (Balan, 2007).

Interviewees highlighted that after the implementation of the system several methods were used and this knowledge was shared at organisational levels, for example:

- Common platforms that include the Romanian Border Police.
- The annual Cooperation Forum at the Black Sea where groups work on specific topics to improve data and information/experience sharing. Each country is allocated a topic for consideration, for example risk analysis in the Black Sea area.
- Common exercises designed to ensure that partners have the same operational 'language' and use the same procedures for different

activities such as search, control and vessel approach, common practices, data and information exchange.

- Involvement in different bilateral projects or partnerships between Romania and another country to combat criminality and terrorist acts (Appendix 7.5).
- Involvement in the European Community European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) project. This relates to the centralisation of information in the management of the European terrestrial, air, and maritime and fluvial borders.
- Knowledge and experience exchange under the auspices of FRONTEX Agency[48]. To date this has involved interactions with police forces from Cyprus, France and Spain through the Maritime Focal Points Action on surveillance and control responsibilities. In terms of naval expertise, an international mission conducted in the waters belonging to Greece and Turkey contributed to the RBP gaining knowledge and experience in the field of illegal migration at sea (Appendix 7.6).
- Other exchanges involve working together with neighbouring countries in the Black Sea area, such as Russia and Bulgaria, and will include personnel training on data and information exchange (Appendix 7.7). It is important to note there is a commitment to improve the training in this field. These external operations contributed, as stated by one interviewee, to change the '*thinking style'* of the police because they facilitated exposure to '*another type of knowledge, another type of execution*' and '*dialogue that leads to accentuating the differences in adopting the same actions*'. These operations have enabled flexibility and have given the opportunity to reflect on the different problems and issues. Having this ability to reflect and adapt has been considered an extremely effective learning method. These exchanges have been essential in the development of the work procedures for SCOMAR.

[48]European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Started in 2009 and they involve the participation of the Romanian Border Police personnel and naval equipment in different operations.

From an internal perspective, the RBP found the knowledge and experience exchange was not difficult as colleagues from the General Inspectorate were aware of the situation and the particular needs. Another important factor that enabled this was the low staff turnover, and subsequent retention of knowledge and expertise. Interviewees commented that to work on the SCOMAR system was considered an interesting role and the selection and recruitment process conducted by an internal HR psychologist was very effective. The selection process was customized for the specific needs and this has ensured a high job-person fit[49]. Other factors contributing to this have been the EU environmental working conditions, employee benefits and the challenging aspect of the job that is characteristic of the maritime and the blue border areas in particular. Staff are confronted daily with new dangers, and risks which contribute to this challenging environment.

How complex/large was the project?

As stated by a former General Inspector of the Romanian Border Police:

> *'…this project was one of the most ambitious international projects in terms of security and cooperation at the Black Sea level. Through the Complex System of Traffic Observation, Surveillance and Control at the Black Sea (SCOMAR), the Romanian Border Police and Romania gain new insight into the international plan for the fight against criminality by strengthening the security at the Eastern border of the European Union'.*

Another General Inspector stated:

> *'The Romanian border is exposed to numerous challenges, particularly illegal migration, smuggling of counterfeit products, drugs and stolen cars traffic. It is essential to respond to these challenges, which are more numerous and complex, by using the same complexity. Using the SCOMAR system, Romania strengthens its reliable partner status in relation to the European Union and the geo-strategic potential is exploited through the safety that it creates at the Eastern border of the European Union by fighting against trans-border crime specific to the Black Sea'.*

[49]HR and RPB consider they have 99% cases of job-person fit.

Were external stakeholders affected and if yes, in what way?

Interviewees highlighted the impact of SCOMAR in relation to external stakeholders, some of which have already been discussed. In addition to this, public safety has increased by introducing such a high quality surveillance system. Other police forces that the RBP collaborate with can benefit from more accurate, quick and reliable information with regard to the situation on the blue border. Romania has become a resource for knowledge transfer with other European partners who are considering developing similar surveillance systems. There has been an important impact on society as a whole through research projects the system is involved in and through effective collaboration with the local community and public organisations.

What were the enablers that contributed to the realisation and success of the value-adding activity?

One of the main enablers mentioned by our interviewees for this particular project was the '*international and national context'*. On an international level, with Romania being a part of the EU and having a large external EU border there was and still is great interest in the security levels to ensure the borders remain safe. Moreover, efficiency in the surveillance and control of all borders remains a requirement for complying with the Schengen Catalogue and the Schengen Aquis, and it is therefore central to Romania's efforts to become part of the Schengen Area. On a national level, considering all these facts, SCOMAR was given the status of great importance and both the RBP and a number of Ministries agreed that its implementation was a priority. One interviewee mentioned how the implementation of SCOMAR *'was considered a national interest'*. The interviewee goes onto explain how the management at different administrative levels included it in their strategy. This allowed a common focus, from authorities such as the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Transportation to ensure a '*common and coordinated effort'*, which enabled the efficient implementation of the project. The fact there were no significant problems in terms of *financial resources* meant they could implement the SCOMAR system according to plan with no specific delays or unforeseen costs involved. The interviewees confirmed the implementation of the project was delivered on time.

What were the difficulties and barriers that had to be overcome (or that blocked) the realisation and success of the achievement of the value-adding activity and performance improvement?

The main barriers identified by interviewees were related to the system's location. The coast provides a very difficult geographical environment the RPB had to master. The area is very difficult to access and few utilities such as electricity where in place when the project was implemented. The implementation stage occurred during the winter and the weather posed a series of unexpected problems, with storms, strong winds and floods. These events meant, the construction team had to find creative ways to deal with problems in order to meet deadlines.

During the implementation stage problems were identified that needed to be addressed to ensure the system functioned smoothly. For example, along the coastline sensors had to be installed which was difficult to access but once the equipment was installed the operation of these sensors is carried out remotely. Apart from the adverse environmental conditions, the only other issue interviewees mentioned, as a potential barrier was the newness of everything. From the equipment, this was new in the international market as well as in the police, to the system itself. As a result extra tests were carried out to verify the viability of the equipment and the systems across such a large project and with such adverse environmental conditions.

How is the best practice expected to be developed, transferred to others or change in the future?

There was specific interest mentioned by interviewees to develop international transfer of knowledge and experience by conducting visits to the European 'hot zones' where migration poses a significant problem. Whilst the RBP felt they were prepared on a theoretical level for the current migration situation in Romania, they felt more *training* on specific and more critical migration problems would help so they can prepare for the future as they develop further border control systems.

Maintenance of the system was another issue associated with the development of SCOMAR. Whilst the system is very efficient it is also high maintenance. Currently there are one or two companies in Romania who can service the system but the costs associated are extremely high. To reduce some of the costs

the RBP have trained a team, who were involved with the implementation, to deal with technical issues and all components of the system. To ensure effective maintenance, the RBP are developing this team to respond quickly to the systems' demands and deal with all types of issues within a tight timeframe. Through the financial instrument External Borders Fund, the Annual Programme 2011, at the end of 2012, maintenance services for SCOMAR system will be contracted.

Finally further development of SCOMAR, involves integrating *future projects* within the system. One of the main projects involves ships operating systems integrating completely within the SCOMAR system with online data and information transfer between the ship and the system. This would ensure real time data exchange and would allow staff in the Command and Control Centre and the Commander of the ship to have complete sight of the ships location. As well as improving information exchange it would also increase the operational area for SCOMAR. Although there are many solutions for this integration to take place, the challenge the RBP face is finding the most cost effective way to do it. It is estimated that within a year an online connection should be in place. Another important project is developing a green energy supply system that could be used to charge the system throughout the coastline. In considering these future projects, interviewees highlighted the subsequent need for new procedures; new personnel training and new knowledge transfer routines.

With regard to the *transfer of good practices*, this is already happening. As already mentioned there is a series of pilot European programmes for testing different surveillance solutions and the RBP have been asked to share their expertise and knowledge of the SCOMAR system. Interviewees expressed their willingness to offer support to countries like Bulgaria, who are currently developing a surveillance system, in the same way as they received support from European colleagues such as Spain when SCOMAR was being implemented. If the strategic goal is to have similar systems throughout Europe, a system that would secure all European blue borders, then the knowledge and information sharing processes will be crucial for effective implementation and management.

Having the knowledge and experience of the SCOMAR system and its functioning, there are a number of important issues the RBP identify as relevant for any partner that starts such a project. Therefore, in an effort to transfer good practices on such a system, they emphasize the following:

- Training of the employees should start before the end of the implementation stage. An early training programme would allow for better use of these employees and their competencies. It would also generate a more accurate image of the characteristics and competencies of the teams working on the system and the competencies of the employees in general.
- A second Marine Surveillance Vessel (Stefan cel Mare) would be extremely useful, so when one vessel is on international cooperation mission, such as the FRONTEX programme, the other vessel is still available on the national border.
- The existence of a specialised team for equipment maintenance is cost effective and at the same time increases the speed of the operational response in case of an emergency technical issue.
- Collaboration with the local community and local public organisations, including research institutions, can be of great value to ensure a positive impact on society with regard to perceptions of the system and the police.

In conclusion, the police officers interviewed expressed their hope that this project and the collaboration with international partners will give them the opportunity to strengthen their previous partnerships. Their international colleagues were pleasantly surprised to find a reliable and professional partner and the RBP proudly consider themselves '*a different kind of ambassadors*' for Romania and for the Romanian Border Police force.

References

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Appendix 7.1

Representative Case for the Use of the SCOMAR System

A Turkish fishing vessel detained in the Black Sea

On 27th May 2011, border policemen within County Inspectorate of Border Police Constanta detected, through SCOMAR system, the AHMET COMOGLU fishing vessel, Turkish flag, which was about 60 sea miles from shore, in the exclusive economic area of Romania.

As the fishing vessel refused to obey the flashing lights, the radio and acoustic stopping signals and continued to sail, another Border Police vessel was deployed, which carried out manoeuvres to stop the fishing vessel. Because the fishing vessel's commander refused to stop in order to undergo the legal verifications, border policemen fired several warning gunshots. As the vessel continued to disobey the warning signs, the police shot the stern of the ship, the floating line level, and propulsion area system. Still the fishing vessel did not stop and entered the exclusive economic area of Bulgaria. The Romanian Border Police, in keeping with the cooperation protocols concluded with the Black Sea littoral states, notified the Bulgarian Border Police and the Turkish Coast Guard Command continued the pursuit. At 1pm, the fishing vessel stopped and the border policemen saw the crewmembers ignite fumigants aboard the Turkish vessel. The Border Police boarded the ship and ascertained that the motor compartment of the vessel was on fire and one crewmember had a superficial wound to the left leg. He received first aid immediately. The sailor whose health was out of danger and the Turkish crew were transferred to the Border Police vessel.

The Romanian Border Police acted and exercised its prerogatives while strictly observing the national and international legal provisions in force.

Source: http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/
Video source:
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=790

Others video sources using SCOMAR system at the Black Sea:
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=608
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=827

A Bulgarian fishing vessel detected while illegally fishing turbot in the exclusive economic area of Romania

On 13th April 2011, with the aid of the maritime surveillance and control equipment of SCOMAR, a suspect target was identified, as being a possible stationing fishing vessel approximately 19 miles abeam Mangalia, in the exclusive economic area of Romania.

A ship of Mangalia Naval Group intervened to identify the target and found it was a fishing vessel bearing a Bulgarian flag.

The fishing vessel's crew complied with the radio warnings of the border police and the police boarded the vessel. The fishing vessel's commandant with a crew of 10 Bulgarians admitted he knew he was in the exclusive economic area of Romania and that they were fishing turbot. Border police discovered aboard 11 turbots and turbot fishing nets; moreover in the vicinity of the fishing vessel they observed a net, which belonged to the same Bulgarian vessel. The net of approximately 30m was dragged out containing 12 turbots.

Source: http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/

Video source:
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=767

Appendix 7.2

Phases in the Implementation of SCOMAR System

No.	Company	Title	Aim	ƀBudget
1.	IBM Belgium	SCOMAR feasibility study		194.650,00
2.	Guardia Civil Spain French Maritime Gendarmerie (Associate)	Twinning Institutional Convention – The improvement of Romanian Border Police for SCOMAR implementation (RO/2003/IB-JH-02)	The increase of the capacity of Romanian Border Police personnel to operate with the SCOMAR system through the providence of training, technical assistance and design of the management of technical means (18 months).	869.999,00
3.	SELEX Italy	SCOMAR implementation – Communication infrastructure - **Phase 1** (RO/2003/005-551.04.12.05)	Development of the integrated system of surveillance and observation at the Black Sea.	4.097.711,61
4.	ISDEFE Spain	The elaboration of the technical documentation and auction to SCOMAR contract - **Phase 2**		1.442.135,76
5.	INDRA SISTEMAS S.A. Spain	SCOMAR implementation – radar and optoelectronic equipment – **Phase 3**	Development, Implementation and functional accomplishment of the system that will ensure the observation, surveillance and control of the Romanian Border	17,999,999.98

			at the Black Sea. This is in order to ensure a perfect system adapted to Black Sea shore necessities and characteristics. All the activities were conducted in perfect coordination and in common with the Spanish, French and Romanian experts and specialists.	
6.	DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem – Holland	The acquisition of "Stefan cel Mare" maritime surveillance vessel (Project OPV 6610)	To ensure the maritime surveillance at the Black Sea.	27.500.000,00
7.	Israel Shipyards	The acquisition of MAI 2110 and MAI 2111 maritime patrol vessels (Project SHALDAG MK IV)	To ensure the maritime patrol at the Black Sea.	26.914.000,00
TOTAL				**79.018.496,35**

Appendix 7.3

Copy of the Romanian Border Police Electronic Press Release Related to the Maritime Surveillance, Patrol and Intervention Vessels

THREE STATE-OF-THE-ART MARITIME VESSELS ENTER THE ENDOWMENT OF THE ROMANIAN BORDER POLICE

Today, 22.09.2010, in Constanta Harbour, in the presence of the minister of administration and interior Mr. Vasile BLAGA, the general inspector of Romanian Border Police, police principal quaestor Mr. Ioan BUDA, and several officials within Phare Payments and Contracting Unit, DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem - the Netherlands and ISRAEL Shipyard; the ceremony of the baptism and handing over of the flag of the offshore patrol vessel "Stefan cel Mare", built in Damen Shipyard – Galati, took place.

Within the same ceremony, another two patrolling and intervention vessels, MAI 2110 and MAI 2111, which will enter the endowment of the Romanian Border Police, received their flags. These maritime vessels were purchased through two contracts financed from European funds Schengen Facility, RO FSCH 18.1.1 - Offshore Patrol Vessel and RO FSCH 18.1.2. - Patrolling and intervention vessels. This is carried out within RO FSCH 18 project: "Reinforcement of external border control through the increase of naval and land mobility".

Offshore patrol vessel "Stefan cel Mare" MAI 1105 was built by DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem - the Netherlands, in Galati Shipyard, amounting to 24,750,000 EURO, and it started on 12.01.2009. The vessel is able to navigate annually for at least 4000 hours, it can operate on a sea state 6, perform missions a minimum of 7 days, the radius of action is a minimum of 1,800 nautical miles at cruise speed, it has interoperability capacity with other surveillance, communication, data transmission systems and is part of SCOMAR. The offshore patrol vessel has the capacity to carry out search-rescue activities, as well as prevention and countering pollution at sea and can extinguish fires on the vessels in danger at sea.

Technical characteristics:

- Length: 66 m

- Breadth: 10 m
- Crew: 19 sailors
- Transport capacity: maximum 100 persons, including crew
- Operation autonomy: 1,800 miles at cruise speed of 17 knots
- Engine type: 2 engines MTU type, type 16V4000M73
- Maximum speed: 21 knots
- Patrol speed: 12 knots

Patrolling vessels MAI 2110 and MAI 2111 were built by Israel Shipyards; the total amount of the contract is 26,914,000 EURO - for 3 vessels - their construction began on 18.02.2009 and has 15.11.2010 as due date. Within the same contract, another similar vessel is due to be delivered 15.11.2010.
The patrolling and intervention vessels will perform specific missions of the Romanian Border Police: intervention, interception, pursuit in the inland maritime waters, territorial sea, contiguous area and exclusive economic area of Romania.

Technical characteristics:

- Length: 26.7 m
- Weight: 60 tons
- Maximum speed: 44 Knots
- Autonomy: 700 nautical miles
- Engines: 2 x MTU 2000
- Crew: 13 sailors

These vessels will have an important role in the surveillance of the E.U. border, future border of Schengen area, having at the same time the necessary capacities to execute long term missions, at long distances from the shore, in the contiguous area and exclusive economic area of Romania and to receive / transmit data and information to the surveillance and control system. They will also be part of the European Patrol Network within the joint European operations organised under FRONTEX aegis - European Agency for Surveillance and Control of E.U. external borders.

The maritime vessels will complete the offshore extension of observation radius of existing surveillance and control system, SCOMAR, realised by the

Romanian Border Police in a project financed previously through European funds, being one of the most performing maritime border surveillance systems in Europe.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

SCOMAR is an operational surveillance system, based on state-of-the-art technology allowing early detection, pursuit, recognition and identification of vessels carrying out illegal trafficking activities at the Black Sea. The complex integrated system for observation, surveillance and control of traffic at the Black Sea (SCOMAR) main objectives are the observation, surveillance and control of the Romanian border at the Black Sea.

The structure of the Complex System for Observation, Surveillance and Control of Traffic at the Black Sea allows:

Improvement of surveillance process of the state border in the maritime area;

Improvement of navigation security in the operational area of the system;

Decrease of illegal activities in the territorial sea and in the contiguous area;

Rendering continuous surveillance in the covered area;

Creating a database regarding the maritime activity in the sea area;

Decrease the number of patrol vessels, surveillance missions and, thus an important economy of fuel and resources.

SCOMAR is prepared for surveillance and monitoring, permanently (24hours/day, 7days/week), providing a tactical image of the water surface in the maritime territorial area, contiguous area and exclusive economic area (up to 100 nautical miles offshore), of the air activity and the land situation.

In order to achieve this purpose, the proposed system was designed to guarantee early detection of vessels and boats so that they are localized before nearing the coast shore and thus, ensuring the essential reaction time for the Border Police in order to undertake the necessary measures.

Appendix 7.4

SCOMAR System Technical Supply

The SCOMAR physical resources (sub-systems) are:

1. **Sensors Station Sub-System** that includes Sensors Stations (SS) equipped with radar station and opsonic sensors. It permits the detection, identification and surveillance of the suspected vessels using the functions of the radar and sensors by sending the video images or signals to the Command and Control Centre.

2. **Operative Intervention Units:**

   - Naval resources: patrol maritime ships (maritime ships project P157, maritime ships project 0111C), port control boats (project R-1120), towing and rescue boats (project 405), and approach and control boats (project SLP5400).

   - The maritime surveillance vessel “"Ştefan cel Mare" (MAI 1105) build by DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem (Holland) cost 27,500,000 Euros (project OPV 6610; 12.01.2009 – 22.09.2010). This type of ship is able to annually navigate at least 4000 hours, to operate on a six-level sea, to execute missions having a minimum of 7 days, having an action beam of 1,800 marine miles, at the cruise speed, having an inter-operability capacity with other surveillance, communication and data transmissions. It has also the capacity to execute search and rescue activities and to prevent and combat the sea pollution and fires started on the ships in dangerous seas.

   - Vessels represented by maritime patrol vessels. These vessels are involved in specific missions of the Romanian Border Police including intervention, interception and surveillance in the interior maritime waters, territorial sea, contigua area and exclusive Romanian economic area. They have the essential qualities to execute long-term missions, long far away from shore and to receive and transmit data and information to the surveillance and control system. They will complement the extension to the sea of the observation beam of SCOMAR system. Also, these patrol and

intervention vessels are involved in the European Patrol Network in the common European actions organised by FRONTEX.

- Terrestrial resources: cars, special cars and microbuses, ATV motorbikes, thermo-vision car, forensic self-labs.

- Air helicopters from the supply of Aviation Special Units.

3. **Communication Sub-System** that permits the data exchange (images, voice and data transmission) in real time between the Sensor Station Sub-system and Command and Control Centre. Also, these communication links are available for superior Command and Control Centres and other external agencies and organisations. This sub-system includes:

   - Data: PHD and SDH microwaves radio equipment, multiprotocol ATM switches, modern VHF radio on ships, CDMA2000 and 65m 3G on ships.

   - Voice: TETRA network of the Ministry of Administration and Interior, fixed phone private network of the Ministry of Administration and Interior, fixed phone public network, VHF and HF encrypted communications through mobile radiophones, CDMA2000/GSM mobile phone, SATCOM, IRIDIUM.

4. **Command and Control Centre (CCC)** that centralises and analyses all the information provided by the Sensor Station Sub-system and other inter-connected systems. It includes: equipment and software applications including local network LAN; applications, databases, and video storing servers; operation point with multi-monitor system; video-wall; video-conferences subsystem; VHF/HF radio and TETRA terminals; CDMA2000/GSM mobile phone.

Appendix 7.5

Copy of the Romanian Border Police Electronic Release on SCOMAR and Bilateral Projects and Partnerships

International Mission on the Black Sea

Romanian Border Police officers participated in an international search and rescue drill on the Black Sea, in the territorial waters of the Republic of Turkey. During the period 05th Sept to 08th Sept 2011, a Romanian Border Police delegation participated, with Stefan cel Mare Border Police maritime surveillance O.P.V. (Offshore Patrol Vessel) vessel, in Sea Search and Rescue Drill, activity carried out in the territorial waters of the Republic of Turkey. The activity was carried out in accordance to the provisions of Romanian (General Inspectorate of Border Police) - Turkish (Coast Guard) Implementation Plan for 2011. The objective was to exchange good practice in the maritime field and the development of interoperability between Romanian Border Police and Turkish Coast Guard, as a support for the coordination of operational units and for taking the effective measures for countering illegal activities in the responsibility area, and also for searching and rescuing on the sea. In the joint drill, the vessel belonging to Romanian Border Police and also vessels belonging to the Turkish Coast Guard were involved. During the drill, the vessel belonging to Romanian Border Police had to intercept and question a suspicious vessel, involved in illegal activities and acted in order to inspect this suspicious vessel with the help of the collision and control group. Using the communication systems, the MAI 1105 vessel had to give information on the activities carried out and fulfil the existing tasks for search and rescue on the sea. Participation in this activity was a new opportunity for strengthening the bilateral relations with the Turkish authorities and the Romanian Border Police.

Appendix 7.6

SCOMAR and Frontex Missions

Active Presence of Romanian Border Police Vessels within Frontex Missions

Romanian Border Police will participate within "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation - organized by FRONTEX European Agency in the maritime area of Greece - with the second patrol and intervention vessel - C.P.B. Shaldag type. Also, on 03rd August 2011, the patrol and intervention Romanian Border Police Vessel - C.P.B. Shaldag type, will return to Romania with the entire crew, after successfully participating in "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation - organized by FRONTEX European Agency in the Mediterranean Sea, in Lesvos island area, Greece.

- In August, at the sea border between Greece and Turkey, there will be a new phase of "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation, organized at the external sea borders of European Union under the management of FRONTEX, within E.P.N. (European Patrol Network) project, mission in which Romanian Border Police is going to participate, in accordance with Romania's commitment as a Member State. The, Romanian Border Police will participate in this operation, from 01st August to 31st August 2011, with a patrol and intervention vessel - P157 / C.P.V. type and its crew of 15 Border Police officers, in order to individually patrol, explore, search and rescue, as other European Member States involved in this mission, at the Mediterranean Sea. Also, within the same joint operation, Romanian Border Police will deploy an officer within the International Coordination Centre - I.C.C. from Piraeus, in order to permanently ensure the connection between the deployed Romanian Border Police vessel in Greece and Operational Coordination Centre within General Inspectorate of Romanian Border Police as well as the representatives of Sea Borders Sectors within FRONTEX Agency.

  Taking common measures in regards to counter the illegal migration phenomenon at the sea borders of the European area, increasing the operative exchange of data and information between law enforcement of these countries and an effective experience exchange between European

Border Police officers is going to be taken into consideration. The main objective of "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation is to counter the illegal migration phenomenon at the external borders of E.U.

- From 01st July to 31st July 2011, a patrol and intervention vessel - C.P.B. Shaldag type - belonging to Romanian Border Police, and its crew of 15 Border Police officers, conducted specific activities at the external sea border of E.U. within the same joint operation. During this period, the vessel was involved in 20 patrol missions with a total of 155 patrolling hours and 2 search and rescue missions.
- In order to reach the objectives, Romanian Border Police officers cooperated with the Greek Coast Guard and the Finish one.

The joint operation was fully financed by FRONTEX Agency.

This activity is a continuation of the operations organized by FRONTEX Agency for countering illegal migration, to which Romanian Border Police significantly contributed with regard to technical means, number, profiles and professionalism of the deployed officers. Appreciation has come from the Greek authorities and FRONTEX Agency.



Source: http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/

Video source:
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=805
Video source:
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=826

Other videos sources on SCOMAR in international exercises:
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=533

Appendix 7.7

Copy of the Romanian Border Police Electronic Press Release on SCOMAR and its International Mission on the Black Sea

International Mission on the Black Sea

Romanian Border Police (RBP) participates in an international operation for preventing and countering illegal migration.
In the period 05th July to 09th July 2011, Romanian Border Police flagship "Stefan cel Mare" (Offshore Patrol Vessel), participated in the international operation Black Sea Hawk 2011, which took place in Novorossiysk - The Russian Federation. The activity was performed in agreement with the Memorandum signed by the Heads of the Border/Coast Guards of the Black Sea Littoral States within the 11th Annual Meeting, which took place in Soci in the period 19th October to 22nd October 2010. It aims to improve the information exchange and the interoperability with the Border/Coast Guard of the Black Sea Littoral States and to support the coordination of the operational unit and the adoption of effective measures to counter illegal activities in the area. Vessels of the Border/Coast Guards and from five States (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania) participated in the joint operation. Within the operation, the RBP vessel had to intercept, stop and inspect, with the aid of the team for boarding and control, a suspect ship involved in illegal migration activities. After carrying out this operation, the suspect ship was escorted to the harbour and the RBP vessel crew gave an update on the activities by using the communications system on board. At the same time, Romanian officers within the International Coordination Centre communicated with the other Border/Coast Guards, belonging to the States participating in the operation, through the integrated system, so as to fulfil all the operation phases. Participating in this operation represents an opportunity to strengthen the relations with the authorities and organisations of other countries involved in the fight against illegal migration, and aims to ensure operative exchange of data and information.

8

Tutoring Programme for Minors
Servicio de Agentes Tutores
POLICÍA MUNICIPAL DE MADRID, SPAIN

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Acknowledgements
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Introduction
This report aims to present the analysis of a best practice project within the Policía Municipal de Madrid (the local police of the city of Madrid) in Spain. In particular, the tutoring program for minors is described and analysed. Not only has this been an awarded initiative by UNICEF (October 2010) but it has also proved an innovative project that has been transferred and adapted to other (mostly local) police forces, chiefly within the Autonomous Community of Madrid. In this respect, we believe this case is of genuine interest and provides insights that others could find helpful.

In order to write this report, a lot of documentation was reviewed, coming from two different types of sources: the organisation itself (internal documents and presentations were studied) and several newspapers. This is a programme with a high impact on the media, not only because of the UNICEF award but, also because it has a lot of political support, directly from the Mayor himself, who takes any opportunity to speak about it.

Several interviews were also conducted. In particular, nine semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in the Policía Municipal de Madrid headquarters during the month of November 2011. All of them were very relevant and the sample was well chosen. Thus, one interview was conducted with the "father" of the programme (that is, the one who had the idea, obtained political and police support and started to implement it back in 2001), four were with the Heads of the programme in different moments in time, and two were with tutors. These eight interviewees were police officers within the police force and had different levels of experience regarding the programme. The last in-depth interview was conducted with one of the police partners regarding the tutoring programme: the Minor Ombudsman. All the interviews lasted between one hour and a half and two hours and a half. The interviewer was not allowed to record them, but they were well documented.

The Tutoring Programme for Minors

Background

The tutoring programme for minors ("Servicio de Agentes Tutores") was the idea of a police officer, Mr. Óskar de Santos, who currently is the head of the Planning and Coordination Section. He was studying for a competitive exam in order to gain promotion and had to prepare a project to be evaluated and graded. He was particularly aware of the difficult issues with minors and the difficulties for the Policía Municipal de Madrid to address them since they did not have a specialized unit. Also, he knew that the performance of the Minors Group (GRUME – Grupo del Menor in Spanish) within the National Police Force could be improved.

Mr. de Santos detected there was a need for a particular service addressed to minors, that could take advantage of the territorial structure of the police force (the districts), and could approach the problems related to minors from a specialized and global point of view. He therefore started to design a new

service focused on the management of minors' issues from a preventive point of view, although reactive actions were also considered. He passed his competitive exam and a few days later the town Councillor responsible for security called him. The Councillor had particularly liked the project and wanted to implement it. That was the beginning of the programme.

During 2001, Mr. de Santos's project was completed and refined. It was decided that the programme would focus on the education community. Doing that would allow the preventive nature of the new service to be made clearer. In April 2002, a new unit, the "Servicio de Agentes Tutores", was officially set up. It had (and still has) the following principles (Fernández Ruiz, 2011 & 2005):

- Specialised intervention: specific dedication
- Proactivity: getting ahead of risk situations
- Proximity: decentralized service which is in continuous touch with its "clients"
- Effectiveness and efficiency: autonomy in order to give more efficient solutions to the minors' problems.
- Coordination with other social actors focused on minor issues (social, education, and health services) and with other police forces.

The responsibilities of the police officers (of the tutors) fall within two areas:

- School: for example, issues such as school absenteeism, bullying, alcohol/drugs, and illegal possession of arms/dangerous tools, mistreatment, or control of illegal nurseries.
- Out of School: for example, interventions related to minors who are in a risk situation or abandoned, the prevention and eradication of children's begging, inspections of popular businesses among minors, the control of drugs and alcohol consumption in public spaces, the finding of minors that have run away from home or from children's centres, girls' prostitution, and the labour exploitation of children.

As highlighted, the tutoring programme allows for two types of police actions: preventive and reactive. The former include talks at schools, inspections, or monitoring of cases, while the latter relate to the interventions that are needed in the presence of criminal and administrative infractions (interventions as a

judicial police force). Despite this statement, the program aims to be more preventive than reactive. In fact, according to our interviewees, what gives value to this service is, precisely, the preventive perspective. Prevention is what makes this an innovative and, more important, a useful initiative**.**

Resources and Capabilities

Generally speaking, two kinds of resources have been identified as key by our interviewees: human and material resources.

Regarding ***human resources***, the first group of tutors was directly chosen (and later coordinated) by Mr de Santos after a workshop and a test conducted in March 2002. Around 50 people applied and 30 were finally accepted. The profile was not homogeneous. As a matter of fact, it never has been. After almost 10 years, there are a lot of differences among the police officers that work for this programme in terms of education, age, police experience, or tenure. Probably, the only common feature they share is their willingness to work with children.

Nowadays, there are 177 tutors distributed in 22 districts working on two shifts of morning and afternoon (on average, there are 4-6 tutors on each shift). There are not any tutors during the night or weekends. The coordination of these police officers has changed over time. At the beginning, Mr de Santos informally coordinated the tutors from the district of Tetuán, where he used to work. In 2004, a formal Coordination Unit, managed by Óskar de Santos was set up and four police officers joined it, two for the morning shift and two for the afternoon shift. This change, which marked the beginning of the consolidation of the programme, was important since the number of police officers participating in it had almost doubled (De Santos, 2007). It had gone from 36 in 2003 to 67 in 2004 and there was a need to start having common guidelines and sharing procedures.

The programme grew and, in 2006, a Service Charter for the Minor was approved by the Madrid City Council. The new service charter gave rise to new responsibilities and 25 police officers became new tutors. As a result, there was a need to increase the staff in the Coordination Unit and four more people joined each of the shifts with a police officer becoming a member of the Coordination Unit to assist Mr. de Santos.

In 2010, the whole Coordination Unit was transformed into a judicial police unit. Mr. Javier Fernández Ruiz coordinated this unit. But, since the tutoring program was a preventive program, having a judicial police unit in charge of the coordination of the tutors did not make much sense. That is why, in September 2011, taking advantage of an organisational restructuration process undertaken by the Policía Municipal de Madrid, a new Prevention and Coexistence Unit was created. This new section is in charge of coordinating the social and preventive aspects of the tutors' work[50]. Simultaneously, all the issues related to criminal and administrative offences are now in the new Central Investigations Unit's hands. In sum, it can be said that the coordination of the programme has split into two different units.

Regarding the selection process, police officers that join the service do so on a voluntary basis. As explained, the 30 first tutors were selected by Óskar de Santos among a pool of more than 50 volunteers. But after this, police officers interested in the programme have applied to join it. Also, sometimes, command leaders have proposed police officers to become tutors due to their special awareness of children's issues.

Finally, with reference to human resources, something has to be said on the subject of training. Due to the high heterogeneity among the police officers, a basic workshop on police work with minors was designed with the help of external agencies, such as the Minor Ombudsman, Social Services, or the Minor Public Prosecutors' Office. This compulsory workshop, which has been updated over time, lasts for two weeks and it constitutes the basic training any tutor has to have before starting to work for the programme. Other than that, there are several specialized seminars that are extra but there is no obligation to participate in them. In this respect, a tutor gets more or less training depending on his/her willingness to learn.

Material resources are also very important for the correct implementation of this programme although, according to our interviewees, they are somewhat poor. In this respect, generally speaking, the material resources the tutors have are the material resources of the force. However, each district has a separate office for them (and for the Citizen Care Office) as well as a computer that is not shared. Also, one part of the Intranet is exclusively accessible to them.

[50]But not only that. Minors are only one of the issues that are addressed by this unit.

More important (because it makes a difference regarding the rest of the police force) is the fact that they can work in plain clothes. Also, in each district, they are issued with a cell phone and a PDA and a covered up car. However, these resources are shared with the Citizen Care Office, and may be inadequate at times to carry out all the necessary tasks, particularly when there is a need for different individuals to go from one place to another in a short period of time to address different situations.

Technically, no extra ***financial resources*** were assigned to the programme because it started to work with police officers that were already in the force. This has always been the case. Tutors have always come from the Policía Municipal de Madrid and no additional money has been needed to hire new police officers. Also, despite being a specialized service, police officers are not paid extra. Finally, the covered up car and the few extra material resources that the tutors use have been bought with the existing budget.

External Stakeholders/Partners

As outlined, the tutoring programme for minors has a very important preventive component. For most of our interviewees, prevention is what really matters when dealing with children. Particularly in this field, police forces are not alone. In fact, there are several institutions that have been working for children from different perspectives. As one of our interviewees stated:

> '*…we are successful because we are part of a network that addresses minors' problems from a global point of view and taking into account the expertise of different types of organisations. Our work only makes sense within this network*'.

There are several partners in this network. Some of the more relevant are:

- ***Schools*****:** Despite the surprised reactions after the first contacts by the tutors (schools did not understand what the role of the tutors really was) schools have become a chief supporter of the programme, specifically public schools. The relationship works very well. On the one hand, schools were overwhelmed by taking care of problematic issues that, often, they did not know how to address. In this respect, tutors are a very valuable and useful resource. On the other hand, schools have a lot of

information about the children; for that reason, they can identify risk situations faster and easier than police officers themselves.

- ***Other Police Forces*:** Frequently, children live in one town but study in the city of Madrid. Thus, it is not unusual to have to interact with other local police forces in order to get information about a minor and be able to solve his/her problem. Also, until a few months ago, when a minor was caught regarding a criminal offence, they had to be taken to a National Police Force station so as to investigate the case[51]. As a result, cooperation with this police force has always been relevant although the National Police Force does not have a preventive perspective when they work with minors[52].
- ***Social Services*:** Joint work is particularly needed with the district's social services. In this respect, it is social services that lead the preventive work with minors in the district. They are the ones that call the meetings with the rest of the organisations. However, work with social services has not always been easy. The beginnings were pretty rough since social services saw police officers as intruders. Also, both institutions had a different view about how to address social problems. This gave rise to several conflicts. Currently, cooperation has improved a lot, although some tensions remain particularly concerning the limits of social and police work[53].
- ***Families and Mothers and Fathers Associations (AMPA – Asociaciones de Madres y Padres in Spanish).*** Along with schools, families also demand the presence of tutors. AMPA is particularly interested in preventive work and therefore in talks or similar projects, such as 'Safe Way to School' (Camino Escolar Seguro). Police officers need families and Mothers and Fathers Associations as well. They are a significant source of information but, more importantly, they are a key ally when specific situations involving minors have to be addressed although the contrary may also be true: parents may hinder both preventive and reactive police work with the child.

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[51] An agreement between the Policía Municipal de Madrid and the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (in charge of the National Police Force) has recently been signed. It allows the Madrid police force to also investigate cases related to minors.

[52] The National Police Force's Minors Group (GRUME – Grupo del Menor in Spanish) is a judicial police group focused on minors. Therefore, they have a reactive point of view.

[53] One of the police officers provided the following interesting example: "*it is not always clear when one has to stop approaching abuse as a social problem and start tackling it as a criminal offence*".

- ***The Minor Public Prosecutor's Office*:** Obviously, the Public Prosecutor's Office has also a lot to say when it comes to minors' issues. Many conflicts end up in the Public Prosecutor's hands. Therefore, communication between him/her and the Policía Municipal de Madrid is essential. Coordination, and having a similar view on the problems, is important too. Otherwise the police might feel they are working for nothing[54].
- ***Other Agencies***: Several other organisations are part of the network, which deals with minors. For example, the Minors Ombudsman (who, in fact, proposed the Policía Municipal de Madrid for the UNICEF award), judges, civic associations, or organisations from both the Madrid City Council (such as the Social SAMUR, which takes care of social emergencies) and the Autonomous Community of Madrid (such as the Anti-Drug Agency).

Enablers and Barriers

There are several aspects that have enabled the work of the tutors and therefore the success of the tutoring program for minors.

- ***Voluntary Work*:** This is a very special programme because working with children is not always easy. Often, police officers have to address difficult issues, such as girls' prostitution, abuse or homicides. Volunteers are very motivated police officers who might feel stronger in the presence of these tough situations. Actually, as stated by our respondents, staff turnover is very low. Over the years, only a few police officers have left the programme. Volunteerism is also relevant in terms of commitment. As already explained, tutors are not paid extra for this specialised service while other police forces with a minors programme, such as the National Police Force or the Civil Guard, recompense their officers. Additionally, despite the shifts, risk situations can take place at any time and, on several occasions tutors give their personal phone

[54] That was the case when the police focused on eradicating Romanian children's begging. For a long period of time, despite the fact that they were arresting the same children twice or three times a week, the minor public prosecutor did not think custody had to be withdrawn. When he realized it was important to have a shared strategy and parents started to lose custody of children, within a few months, Romanian minors were no longer found begging on the streets.

numbers to schools and families. In sum, volunteerism allows for a higher level of motivation and commitment.

- ***Autonomy*:** Tutors are very independent when it comes to planning and organising their tasks and taking decisions. This gives them a lot of flexibility to address the different problems related to minors and, better, it allows them to act faster, which is very important in the specific situations they may encounter. Although sometimes tutors feel isolated, autonomy is one of the attributes of their work they value the most.
- ***External Networks*:** As has already been explained, due to the nature of their tasks, tutors need to work in cooperation with other partners that also address minors' issues. Children's problems cannot only be approached from a police perspective. Education, health, and family are also important when helping a minor from the preventive point of view. Understanding this has helped the Policía Municipal de Madrid to overcome some of the initial resistance from other partners (see below) and to gain a global and more integrated perspective of the field, which has given rise to more efficient work with minors. In sum, combining resources, knowledge and experience have proved useful to offer a better service.
- ***Leadership:*** All the interviewees referred to the leadership of Mr. Óskar de Santos. All of them recognized he was an '*artist*' transforming a written idea into a real project. For a number of years they felt Mr. de Santos '*was the programme'*. One of the respondents stated:

  '*…slowly, the program started to consolidate with a formalised Coordination Unit and the Minor Service Charter but, still, Óskar* (Mr. de Santos) *was behind it all*'.

  His motivation and commitment has, without a doubt, set an example for the rest of the tutors. He was promoted in 2010 and left the programme. Yet, he is required several times for advice. Also, most of the speeches regarding the programme are still prepared and delivered by him, particularly in the framework of international events.

At the same time, the following issues have been identified as important *barriers* to overcome:

- ***Unclear Hierarchy:*** Tutors have always had a double dependency. From a functional point of view, they have had to report to the Coordination Unit; whilst from an organisational perspective, they belong to the district. In addition the last structural change implemented in September 2011 has divided the Coordination Unit into a Prevention and Coexistence Unit and a Central Intelligence Unit, introducing a third head to report to. This situation has been a source of uncertainty and conflict, particularly because tutors are supposed to exclusively work for the programme. However, and in spite of the top instructions, as they also belong to the district, their command leaders might use them for other tasks. Thus, tutors have theoretical but not real exclusivity.
- ***Lack of Internal Support and Understanding:*** Regardless of the high level of support the programme has received, both from politicians and the heads of the police force, tutors are not popular among their colleagues and command leaders. Their autonomy and the fact that they can work in plain clothes have given rise to the feeling that these police officers do not work hard. Also, still, for many people, preventive work is not real police work. Many command leaders are also uncertain about their responsibilities toward tutors, as although they are a valuable resource it is difficult to manage them as expected or needed.
- ***Difficult Beginnings with External Partners****:* It has already been mentioned that no matter how committed the first group of tutors were with the programme, contact with external partners was difficult, particularly with those who were used to working with minors from a social point of view. Since there was an explicit need to work with them in order to be really successful, social services and other agencies resilience to the new programme was a key barrier to overcome. It can now be said that external agencies trust the tutors more than they used to, which makes their work easier, but still stronger and bilateral relationships are needed as well as improved cooperation.

Achievements

It is easier to assess the achievements from a qualitative point of view than from a quantitative perspective, which would involve analysing if crime ratios have

decreased as a consequence of the tutors' work. Whilst preventive work is very difficult to measure the work carried out with children each day will bear fruit in the future.

> *'...how can I know what the real impact of my talk has been on the students?'* (Tutor)

This said, there are some indicators regarding the number and type of interventions that can be taken into account in order to value the results of the programme (see Table 8.1). They show that tutors' activity has increased throughout the years; the total number of interventions has more than doubled in five years. However, these numbers do not tell much about the real impact of the programme. Also, the observed patterns are not clear and cause-effect relationships are not easy to identify. For example, if the indicator 'offences by minors between 14 and 18' is used, is that evaluation good or bad? Do more offences mean that the programme is not performing well because minors commit more crimes or does it mean tutors have been able to solve more cases? Table 1 does not give an answer to this kind of question and therefore does not shed light on real achievements and impacts.

Interviewees confirmed that, currently, there is not a useful assessment/evaluation tool. However, all of them thought that, generally speaking, the programme was performing really well. They gave two reasons for this positive evaluation. First, they referred to schools' satisfaction. They felt that schools are very happy with tutors and with the programme. Satisfaction leads to a higher demand, which means that, year on year, the number of interventions increases. This makes sense. However, paradoxically, this perspective is not totally corroborated by the numbers shown in Table 8.1 (see last indicator). In this respect, from a more objective point of view, it could be said that schools' satisfaction is not that high. The interviewees also referred to the inclusion of the tutoring programme in the election manifestos of all the political parties that took part in the local elections in May 2011. For them, this was a sign that the programme is important and it is because it is working well and, therefore, making a difference that it had been recognised in this way.

Table 8.1 Indicators Regarding Number and Type of Interventions 2005-2011

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011[55]
Number of interventions	24.590	39.001	51.941	57.622	64.535	73.485	68.849
Number of interventions regarding drugs possession and consumption	300	436	555	479	636	990	853
Number of businesses reported by selling alcohol to minors	41	44	39	26	53	76	35
Number of weapons seizures	28	81	57	62	44	65	85
Number of offences by minors under 14	77	107	127	164	83	28	24
Number of offences by minors between 14 and 18	378	458	394	418	311	424	514
Number of minors taken to children's shelters	259	602	541	788	710	364	388
Detected cases of absenteeism	569	503	508	521	480	348	295
Number of talks in schools	233	242	316	365	355	360	563
Schools' satisfaction with the programme	5,4	5,5	5,4	5,7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Policía Municipal de Madrid (2009, 2010 and 2011)

[55]From January to October 2011.

Future Developments

Nobody in the Policía Municipal de Madrid thinks the programme will be cancelled. Furthermore, as stated, it is getting more and more political support. As an example the Mayor of Madrid, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, in June 2011, transferred 85 police officers that were escorting politicians to the Citizen Care Offices and the tutoring programme.

The high-ranking senior officers within the Policía Municipal de Madrid also sponsor the programme. So, despite some reticence within the force, the hierarchy continue to work towards its consolidation, even though in terms of the total amount of human resources involved as the tutoring programme develops is not yet clear.

Probably, more important than the long-term development of the programme is the impact the last structural change, that occurred a couple of months ago, is going to have. Although it was proposed in order to put more emphasis on the preventive part of the programme, tutors do not seem happy with it. In the first place, they argue that they were never consulted about the change but, also, they are doubtful about how useful the change is going to be regarding their daily work. The new structure means a third head to report to and this can cause problems. The managing police officers that work in the new units are more positive about the change. The real impact remains to be seen.

Conclusion

This report has aimed to describe and analyse the Servicio de Agentes Tutores of the Policía Municipal de Madrid, a programme that can be considered a best practice. It is probably the philosophy and operation of the programme, more than its results, which make it a good practice. The emphasis on prevention and the global consideration of minors' issues have proved invaluable, and explicit recognition from different agencies, such as politicians or UNICEF, has highlighted this. The fact that many local police forces, in Spain but also abroad, have required the Policía Municipal de Madrid to advise them in the implementation of similar projects also shows the leadership of the Madrid police force in this field and, consequently, its innovative nature. This does not mean that the programme is perfect, far from it; there are several challenges that need to be addressed. These include the status of tutors and the value of their work both internally and externally, and the management and coordination of the programme.

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9

Project Gulf

Fighting Organised Crime through Effective Partnership and Disruption Strategies

SALFORD DIVISION, GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE, THE UNITED KINGDOM

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Organised Crime Policy in England and Wales

Organised crime is a serious issue in the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2009). The overall cost to the United Kingdom economy is estimated to be between £20 billion to £40 billion a year (Home Office, 2004). It can also be considered to

pose significant threats to national security (Home Office, 2009). In 2009, it was estimated that approximately 2,800 organised crime groups were operating across England and Wales (HMIC, 2009). Organised crime group (OCG) operations include drug and people trafficking, fraud (VAT and excise), counterfeiting, supply of illegal firearms, computer-enabled crime, metal theft, the illegal trade of wildlife and waste trafficking. Activities are underpinned by highly developed money laundering operations, which create substantial profit from the proceeds of crime for organised crime groups. Despite the fact that the public are generally unaware of the activities and impacts, individuals, communities, businesses and the economy feel the effects of organised crime on a daily basis. In particular, organised crime group operations create a downward spiral of fear, intimidation and economic decline, which tend to harm vulnerable and deprived communities.

In 2004, the then Labour Government launched a programme of research to review policing organisational structure and methods for tackling organised crime (Home Office, 2004). The strategy proposed was to adopt a *harm reduction approach*. The main proposals were to reduce profit opportunities for criminal enterprises through disruption of their businesses and markets and increase levels of personal risk for key criminals through targeted prosecution activity (Home Office, 2004). This was a significant shift in the Government's logic on policing (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). *Intelligence-led policing*[56] methods had been found to be more effective than traditional approaches in terms of arrests, convictions and crime reduction (Maguire and John, 1995, cited in Maguire, 2000). The harm reduction approach proposed that intelligence-led methods were used and aimed to disrupt organised crime activities through police strategies and tactics designed to prevent organised crime from occurring or to reduce its impact where it did occur. This new approach was labelled a *'disruption-directed mode'* (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). Disruption, whether viewed as preventative (Levi, 2008) or as a strategy of intervention (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004), is essentially based on the idea that law enforcement agencies

[56]The Audit Commission report (Audit Commission, 1993 cited in Maguire, 2000), to 'target the criminal, not just the crime', contributed to the policebelieving the way forward was in 'proactive' or 'intelligence-led' policing (Maguire, 2000). Intelligence-led policing has since evolved into a management philosophy where intelligence is acquired through the extensive use of confidential informants, offender interviews, surveillance of suspects, and exchanges of data and information from community and other sources (Maguire, 2000), subjected to analysis, problems identified, risks managed and subsequent operations targeted to ensure effective deployment of resources (Ratcliffe, 2008).

can engage in actions that make it difficult for individuals participating in a criminal network or market to continue with their illegal activities.

In 2009, despite substantial investment in a new Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), created to achieve better generation, dissemination and use of intelligence material, it was considered that the harm reduction approach and proposed strategies were not fully effective (HMIC, 2009). The Government responded with a comprehensive review and an innovative strategy to fight serious and organised crime. Whilst disruption tools such as criminal proceedings involving prosecution remained, new tools in the form of non-criminal proceedings, such as administrative, regulatory or tax approaches to disrupt the activities of those involved in serious and organised crime, were added. This was to be achieved through collaboration of key local government agencies, the police and international partners (Home Office, 2009).

Project Gulf

In early 2006, a new Chief Superintendent was appointed in Salford Division[57], Greater Manchester Police. His initial assessment suggested that organised crime groups (OCGs) in Salford were causing significant issues. The police response, at that time, was largely reactive and high levels of resources were dedicated to deal with the outcomes of organised crime group activities. For example, in March 2006, two young males who had attempted to kill members of a Salford OCG, on a Sunday afternoon in a pub, were themselves killed[58]. It was later discovered that the two victims were members of a Manchester OCG, and had been commissioned by another Salford OCG; to carry out the original attempted killings. In response to this situation *Operation Thermopylae* was introduced to map and target members of OCGs in Salford. While initially successful, the Chief Superintendent felt that the impact on OCGs and their activities was not as significant as originally hoped. This was as a result of the limitations of a traditional policing methodology, the use of a one-dimensional source of intelligence[59] and due to policy and performance incompatibility, the reluctance

[57]Salford Division is a Basic Command Unit (BCU). Chief Superintendents are fully responsible for the activities of a BCU.

[58]The investigation of a single murder costs an estimated £1.6 million to the agencies involved.

[59]A one-dimensional source of intelligence is considered as that available to the Police from their own activities and sources rather than a multi-dimensional approach which would include intelligence available from external agencies.

of other agencies to get involved and contribute to Operation Thermopylae. Following the new Government policy issued in 2009, (see above), in February 2010, the Home Office invited Salford Community Safety Partnership[60] (CSP) to be one of thirteen national pilots to use the new tools and techniques to tackle organised crime. The reasons for this invitation were: the recognised strength of operations and competence of Salford CSP, it was felt that the knowledge and expertise of Operation Thermopylae could be built upon and the high need to tackle OCG activity in Salford. In line with the Government's approach and strategy to tackle organised crime through increased collaboration, harm reduction, enforcement activities and disruption tactics; Salford CSP was tasked with disrupting criminals' wider operations and lifestyles. The aim of the partnership was to attack the businesses central to the operations of OCG members. For the first time, the administrative powers of key agencies were to be invoked in a co-ordinated way to create a hostile environment for serious organised crime (Salford City Council, 2011). Over thirty agencies became partners in Project Gulf[61]. Whilst monies have been recovered through the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA)[62] and retained in a financial pool within Salford Division, (with a percentage distributed to relevant participating agencies), no additional funding was provided by the Government and each partner had to fund the activities from existing budgets and funding streams.

One of the common misconceptions held by the partner agencies in the early days of Project Gulf was that legislation made it difficult to share sensitive personal data. This was further compounded by the belief that partner agencies could not be trusted with sensitive information (Salford City Council, 2011). Initial meetings were held to enable partners to establish roles and relationships, to understand the powers and policies to be operated under and how each partner could contribute, without jeopardising their operational independence or incurring risk. A *'Partnership Intervention Toolkit[63]'* was developed to provide a clear understanding of the regulatory powers of each agency and how these could be used for tactical interventions against OCGs (Salford CSP, 2010). Clear

[60]Salford Community Safety Partnership (CSP) is a multiagency group of local partners (see Appendix 9.1).
[61]See Appendix 9.2 for details of the partners involved in Project Gulf in 2011.
[62]The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) was introduced in 2002. It provides for the confiscation of assets from individuals who benefit from criminal conduct and for restraint orders to be put in place to restrict dealings in property to allow for recovery of property which was obtained through unlawful conduct.
[63]This was reported as being the only one produced in the country and was considered to be of high value to partners in determining their ability to contribute.

objectives were identified, agreed and published. Initial results of the collaborations and actions taken were encouraging. The Assistant Director of Environment and Community Safety, Salford City Council commented:

> *'…at first we didn't know what all our powers were so we organised a day where all the agencies came together and we worked through various case studies… …an example of how quickly we started to see results was there had been a garage under surveillance for 5 years and involved in various police operations during that time, within 6 weeks of us all coming together it was closed...'*

A Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) representative commented (Salford City Council, 2011):

> *'The pooling of our resources and intelligence has uncovered fraud that would otherwise have gone undetected. We are learning about each other's job roles and how we can help each other – it is a different way of investigating.'*

The leadership and management structure of Project Gulf operates at three different levels. The Gold Strategic Group is chaired jointly by the Divisional Commander of Salford and the Director of Environment and Community Safety within Salford City Council. They, with other key senior leaders drive the strategic action plan and provide direction and support to the tactical and operational groups within the partnership. The Chief Superintendent felt it was imperative that the Local Authority rather than the police took the lead on many matters. He stated that:

> *'…a key issue in my view was it had to be local authority led because if the police led on it then all the time we'd be hearing…oh the police are pushing us into doing this sort of stuff…'*

The Silver Operational Command Group is also jointly chaired. This is by a Superintendent from Salford Division and the Assistant Director of Salford City Council. This group invites agencies to participate, plans intelligence gathering and determines OCG targets and tactical interventions. Different agencies have led identified operations. To ensure local ownership of operations and the aftermath, police neighbourhood Inspectors usually chair the Bronze Tactical operation groups.

Two examples of operations led by partner agencies are Operation Vertebra and Operation Foxglove. Each is briefly described below.

Operation Vertebra
Lead Agency: Security Industry Authority (SIA)

Operation Vertebra is one of a number of operations within Project Gulf. The Security Industry Authority (SIA) was the lead agency for this operation and worked with the UK Borders Agency, Salford Local Authority, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and Salford Police. From consideration of intelligence, it was identified that nearly every OCG within Salford, of which there are approximately 15, has links to the security industry. The security industry is highly competitive and features low margins in business operations. A number of OCGs run '*front'* business security companies. As part of their money laundering and business operations, these *front* businesses are often able to undercut legitimate companies in bids to obtain public contracts. Sharing of information between agencies allowed the SIA to make informed decisions concerning the awards of ACS[64] and so to prevent OCG *front* companies being able to bid for public contracts. A number of companies have been targeted and identified as being involved in a range of criminal activities including the employment of illegal immigrants and will face significant fines. Operation Vertebra is seen as a key example of how a collaborative approach, with the sharing of resources, information and intelligence, combined with joint targeted actions is fundamentally important and can provide significant benefit in the fighting of OCG activities and their impact on society. As previously mentioned, organised crime is a serious issue in the United Kingdom and is considered to be a threat to the United Kingdom's national security (Home Office, 2009). As highlighted by the Assistant Director of Environment and Community Safety, Salford City Council:

> '*... you are allowing criminals to have plans about your infrastructure on a core function within the City ...whether it be a headquarters or whatever so they are a security risk. We have to get away from the idea that these are people are rehabilitating themselves. They're not. They are involved in criminality; they are invariably involved in money laundering and all the other bits that go with it...'*

[64]To bid for public funded contracts Approved Contractor Status (ACS) is a pre-requisite for invitation to tender.

Operation Foxglove

Lead Agency: Environmental Crime Agency and Department of Work and Pensions

Sharing of data and intelligence between the Environmental Crime Agency and Department of Work and Pensions, supported by Salford Police, allowed the identification of a local tyre disposal depot which, having collected scrap tyres, was illegally exporting them in large volumes under-cutting licensed operators. This organisation has also been found to be fraudulently claiming employee benefits. A number of people were arrested and there is an on-going POCA investigation aiming to confiscate £400,000 (Salford City Council, 2011).

Achievements of Project Gulf (to date)

Project Gulf is considered to have successfully fulfilled the requirements presented by the Home Office in 2010 (Salford City Council, 2011). It is recognised as a best practice achievement by the Government who commend it and seek to promote similar activities throughout the United Kingdom. It has received a National award for best Public-to-Public Partnership Working (2011), by the Association for Public Sector Excellence (APSE) and has been nominated for the Jane's Police Review Excellence Award. It has been achieved through partner organisations existing budgets and funding streams with no additional funding provided by the Government.

A total figure of £9 million has been recovered through Project Gulf. Achievements include:

- Customs and Excise recovery of £500,000 in unpaid taxes
- Seizure of £90,000 of class 'A' drugs (by Salford Police)
- Seizure and recovery of £172,000 of cash and property from criminals under the Proceeds of Crime Act (by Salford Police)
- Benefits recovery of £78,000 (by the DWP)
- Confiscation of counterfeit goods to the total value of £300,000 (by Salford Council Trading Standards)

- The tracing of fugitives living in the Netherlands and Spain and recovery of £92,000 of cash and goods (by Salford Police, working with SOCA)

In addition to these achievements, it is felt that Project Gulf has led to a significant increase in capability to disrupt OCG activities and allow targeted individuals to be dealt with through mainstream policing. For example, an individual stated:

> *'If you disrupt them you push them out into mainstream criminality where you get the chance to catch them anyway…..you start to identify some really interesting prisonable tax offence... ...it all starts to unravel for them.'*

It was also suggested that benefits and savings had been achieved through a reduction in criminality. For example, one individual commented:

> '*…you could also actually say that we have prevented another 4 murders at a cost of £1.6 million each…'*

Key Success Factors and Enablers

Key success factors and enablers identified that contributed to the success of Project Gulf are listed below.

- The knowledge, expertise and capabilities acquired and developed by Salford Division Police through participation in Operation Thermopylae provided a strong resource base for the project.
- The key capabilities and knowledge of partnership working with external agencies and the high credibility and respect that Greater Manchester Police have from their partners were key resources for the achievement of the project.
- The Government policy of granting local personnel and agencies high levels of autonomy allowed the local leadership team to develop the strategies for intelligence gathering and tactical interventions adapted to the local context and conditions.
- The high acceptance of the need for action to tackle the significant number of OCGs in the Salford area, coupled with the strong political

support for the project provided, from the outset, by the Chief Executive of Salford City Council.

- The fact that Salford already had a strong, well-established Community Safety partnership in place and the positive relationships that existed between key individuals in Salford Police Division and Salford City Council ensured high levels of communication and trust between these partners.
- The decision for the lead agency of the project not to be the police, but to establish joint leadership, and to allow partners to lead identified operations acted as a positive in terms of building strong relationships between the agencies and encouraged commitment to deeper engagement in the partnership working arrangements.
- The joint development of the *'Partnership Intervention Toolkit'* provided clear understanding of the regulatory powers each agency held and how these could be utilised for tactical interventions.
- The identification of champions, in key partner agencies who were tasked with identifying benefits for these agencies, was useful in achieving awareness, knowledge and commitment and for the development of plans and interventions.
- The clear leadership structure adopted of gold, silver and bronze.

Limiting Factors and Barriers that had to be Overcome

- As Project Gulf rolled out it became apparent that the strategic buy-in and support from national agencies was not as available as initially expected.
- A main barrier identified was the lack of awareness by the public of the dangers organised crime pose to society. Organised crime underlies a large number of businesses that the public deal with on a regular basis ranging from car washes, tanning salons, nail parlours to garages, tyre depots, cafes, childcare nurseries and care homes and the public do not realise who or what they are dealing with. Because of this some agencies may regard the fighting of OCG as a lower priority. As the Chief Superintendent of Salford suggested:

'I don't think people realise… …they think it's not a problem in this country, when it is... …even in quiet little hamlets and shire towns, organised crime is there…'

- The sharing of information, although having improved, is still an area where difficulties can and do occur.
- A potential scarcity of resources in some agencies is also a potential barrier to the successful continuation of collaboration and partnership working. With recent Government cuts this could potentially become a serious issue. As identified by the Chief Superintendent of Salford:

'...people will retreat into their own areas once again...which is a big mistake'.

Future Developments

The Government seeks to roll out Project Gulf countrywide. Within Greater Manchester Police, the *Partnership Toolkit* had been disseminated to every Division and a number of these are seeking to establish similar programmes. For example, in Oldham Division *Operation Caminada* was established on 21st November, 2011 (See YouTube, 2011) and is expected to be in place for at least six years.

There are approximately 9 OCGs in Oldham. Organised crime activities are a significant issue affecting a large proportion of communities living within some of the most deprived economic areas of the UK. In certain areas, organised criminals are clearly visible through '*…individuals driving round with money and the visible trappings of wealth with no apparent legitimate source of income.*' (Chief Superintendent, Oldham). Historically, there has been considerable work within Oldham to tackle serious and organised crime using traditional police tactics. As the Oldham Chief Superintendent commented:

'We have had some successes…we've had a significant number of convictions for supplying drugs, some really significant seizures…over £1 million worth of cannabis recovered recently. In terms of the divisional response for the proceeds of crime act and actually seizing money off criminals, we are as good as any division in the force……but in terms of that traditional approach I still feel that we are just scratching the surface.'

The Chief Superintendent felt that when considering the level of resources required tackling organised crime, against other demands and the current economic climate, with the current reduction of police resources, there is a clear need to do things differently:

'We cannot hope to do all that and achieve all that by doing less of the same. We have to think and do things differently.'

To establish Operation Caminada, the Oldham Senior Leadership Team attended workshops on Project Gulf and spent time in understanding the lessons that could be learnt from the project. After significant planning and preparation the strategy was identified and specified, and an Operational Team established. This comprised 9 individuals who were assigned to work full time on Operation Caminada. The next stage was to achieve stakeholder involvement and 'buy-in.' The Chief Executive of the Local Authority has agreed to support the Operation and Oldham Community Safety Partnership, the Local Strategic Partnership and other key agencies have been briefed and agreed to participate. Unlike Salford, Oldham has a high number of different ethnic communities. To guard against a negative response from communities to disruption activities and to ensure that these are not misinterpreted, it is felt in Oldham that a key partner for Operation Caminada is the Local Authority Inclusion team, which is responsible for the reduction of community tensions.

Briefing meetings on the extent of organised crime in Oldham, its impact on Oldham citizens, the strategy and how police officer roles may need to change for success of Operation Caminada have been held with Oldham Division staff. As the Superintendent in charge of Partnerships suggested, success in policing may need to be rethought:

'It's also around what do we define as success? Our own mind set in the police is that success is putting people in prison and that's right, we still want to do that, but we also have to look at success being taking the business off an organised criminal so they can't launder money through it. That will be a success, they might not end up in prison for it but we've damaged that group to the point of we're making Oldham a hostile place for them to operate.'

Reflections

Although there is low public awareness of organised crime and associated activities, OCGs should be considered a serious issue in the United Kingdom and a threat to national security. Two principal kinds of disruption can be

identified in tackling organised crime. The first involves entrepreneurial use of legal powers to affect criminal networks and markets. Through an intelligence-led mode of operating, individuals are targeted and the police powers of arrest are used to extract key players from the market or network. This has the disadvantage that it is resource intensive and individuals are quickly replaced. The second involves a more extra-legal form of disruption where agents do not attempt to affect an arrest or submit the suspect to due process. Rather, actions are designed and intended to prevent or make it more difficult for the organised criminal(s) to continue to engage in unlawful activity (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). Project Gulf appears to be an excellent example of this. The collaboration of key local government agencies, the police and international partners in the adoption of a *harm reduction approach* to disrupt organised crime activities has proven successful. The ability to utilise non-criminal proceedings such as administrative, regulatory or tax approaches to disrupt the activities of those involved in serious and organised crime, as well as disruption tools such as criminal proceedings involving prosecution has proven highly effective.

Project Gulf can be considered a best practice achievement. Additional funding was not provided to external partners and agencies to participate in the project. The leadership structures and organisational arrangements established have been crucial in establishing commitment and participation by partner agencies. The level of autonomy granted allowed these factors and strategies to be developed to meet local context requirements. Key resources and capabilities such as the prior knowledge of operations through Operation Thermopylae and the strength of relationships and capabilities of the key partner agencies were essential resource factors.

It has been suggested that a disruption-directed model of crime control for removal or destabilisation of criminal networks is cost-effective, compared to the costs involved in preparing full criminal trials (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). As such, given the current reductions in police resources it may be that this approach is a way that police organisations can tackle OCGs and their impact on society, particularly when facing resource reductions. However, it may also be that resource reductions in partner agencies will become a significant barrier to their future commitment and participation.

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Appendix 9.1
Partners Involved in Salford Community Safety Partnership (CSP)

City West Housing Trust
Council for Voluntary Services
Criminal Justice Board
Crown Prosecution Service
Drug and Alcohol Action Team
Greater Manchester Ambulance Service
Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce
Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
Greater Manchester Police – Salford Division
Greater Manchester Police Authority
HM Prison Service
Primary Care Trust
Registered Social Landlords
Salford City Council
Salford Magistrates Court
Salford Probation Service
Salix Homes Limited
Transport for Greater Manchester
University of Salford
Victim Support and Witness Service
Youth Offending Service

Appendix 9.2
Partners Involved in Project Gulf

City West Housing Trust
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency(DVLA)
Environment Agency
Gambling Commission
Greater Manchester Against Crime (GMAC)
Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS)
Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive (GMPTE)
Greater Manchester Police Authority (GMPA)
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB)
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) Senior Crime
Health Service
Her Majesty's Prison Service (HMPS)
Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
Home Office
Probation Service
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)
Salford City Council (SCC)
Salix Homes
Security Industry Authority (SIA)
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)

Discussion and Conclusions

The nine best practice achievements examined and documented in the case studies presented in the previous sections cover a diverse range of projects and activities. Depending on the nature of the project and of the organisation of the police force involved, some projects or activities address local issues while others are national or international in nature. As such, there is a great deal of variance in terms of the size, complexity, scope and the level of resources involved in each of the best practice achievements. In the discussion below, similarities and differences between the cases are examined in terms of evidence that they are best practices, whether they arose from the need to meet environmental changes or internal improvements, whether the knowledge and capabilities already existed within the police force or whether it was necessary to acquire new thinking and capabilities from external sources, the key factors that may have contributed to the success of the project or activity and how they will be adopted by others or further developed. In each case we present relevant, but by no means exhaustive, examples from the cases to illustrate the argument or point made.

A key factor in deciding whether each of the cases can be considered as a *"best practice"* is determined in part from consideration of the level of recognition of success of the project or activity from key external stakeholders. For example, in the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case (West-Coast Police, Belgium) external individuals such as the Mayor of Koksijde and the Public Prosecutor indicated their positive assessment of the project and its achievements. For the modular training programme in international crisis management case, *EUPFT 2009,* (Arma dei Carabinieri, Italy) applications by police officers to the programme was over-subscribed and senior officers who attended provided very positive feedback. The Council of the European Union, who in the framework of the 2974th External Relations Council meeting, held in Brussels on 17th November 2009, in acknowledging the relevance for civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions recognised the positive impact of the

Instrument for Stability project EUPFT2009. In the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* case (Policía Municipal de Madrid, Spain) external stakeholders such as schools expressed high satisfaction while other external individuals demonstrated their positive opinion for the project by providing additional resources to expand the programme. For instance, the Mayor of Madrid, in June 2011, transferred 85 police officers that were previously assigned to escorting politicians, to the tutoring programme. The *Safety Houses* project (Rotterdam-Rijnmond and Gelderland-Zuid Police, the Netherlands) is also widely regarded as successful. Similar to a number of the other local projects (see discussion on future developments below) the success of the *Safety House* model is clearly evidenced by the decision to extend this model throughout the country. In a letter to parliament, the former Minister of Justice outlined the expected benefits of the programme's extension in terms of crime reduction and recidivism.

In terms of external recognition, in a number of instances this is further evidenced by the receipt of awards. For example, the *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project (The Municipal Police of Brno, Czech Republic), was awarded the "Urban Security Award" 2011 by Safe City EURO – MED, the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* received a UNICEF award (October, 2010) and *Project Gulf: Fighting Organised Crime Through Effective Partnership and Disruption Strategies* (Salford Division, Greater Manchester Police, the United Kingdom) received a National award for best Public-to-Public Partnership Working (2011) by the Association for Public Sector Excellence (APSE) and has been nominated for the Jane's Police Review Excellence Award.

While in some instances, such as the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* case (Biro Central Police Services, Public Security: National Police, The Republic of Macedonia), a review will take place in the near-term future, a number of the projects have been assessed by external stakeholders or have operational data available to support the benefits and value-added for citizens achieved. The *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR*, a blue border surveillance system, (Romanian Border Police) is considered as best practice because it shows how, in a few years, a country can move from having no integrated maritime surveillance system to having one of the best systems in operation in the European Union (EU). The *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR* was extensively reviewed by the Schengen evaluation commission experts in terms of its technical capabilities and appropriateness of associated

legislation. For both aspects, a positive result was achieved. The final report stated that Romania had achieved compliance with the Schengen Aquis requirements and mentioned, in particular, the high level of training and competence of the Romanian Border Police personnel working in the Command and Control Centre, at border crossing points, at the surveillance points and on the ships that are part of the SCOMAR system. In addition to the review by the Schengen experts, the SCOMAR system has received positive feedback from partner countries that interact with it in joint operations conducted through the FRONTEX Agency or in cooperation with neighbouring countries at the Black Sea.

The following cases have evidence of best practice achievement from consideration of operational data. In the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case, objective data indicates that crime rates in the West-Coast Police zone have decreased at a greater rate than the national figures. For the *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project, data reveals that the number of interventions by police officers to events at Koniklecová Street has declined dramatically in a one year period. For the *Project ZENTRAB*, *Central Criminal Case Processing* case (Criminal Police of the Land Brandenburg, Germany) the commission in charge of the structural reform of the police of Brandenburg called "Brandenburg 2020" is identified as considering *ZENTRAB* as a valuable instrument for the achievement of an increase of efficiency and quality of case management. An increase in performance in levels of investigative success, even with a reduction in the number of staff utilised, is evident from the statistics. There is also documented evidence of improvements in employee morale and a reduction in absenteeism. After several evaluation studies on precursor *Safety House* initiatives, the former Minister of Justice evaluated that *Safety Houses* had contributed to the overall goal of reducing criminality and harassment by 25% and the number of re-offenses by 10%. *Project Gulf* has led to a significant increase in capability to disrupt organised crime group activities and allowed targeted individuals to be dealt with through mainstream policing. The published data suggests that a total figure of £9 million has been recovered. Examples include Customs and Excise recovery of £500,000 in unpaid taxes, seizure of £90,000 of class 'A' drugs, seizure and recovery of £172,000 of cash and property from criminals under the Proceeds of Crime Act, benefits recovery of £78,000 and confiscation of counterfeit goods to the total value of £300,000.

In summary, the best practices examined and documented can be considered to be best practice achievements.

From examination of the cases presented it is clear that the need for the projects or activities can be driven by internal factors or to meet external opportunities and threats. For example, the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* to meet the commitment of the Republic of Macedonia to build a system of border control compatible with the standards of the Schengen legal system, which is a key factor required for the Republic of Macedonia to be eligible for membership of the EU, is driven by a key opportunity and has large international impact. The *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR* blue border surveillance system by the Romanian Border Police to control traffic in the Black Sea area is also a very large project of both national and international importance. It is considered as one of the most ambitious international projects in terms of security and cooperation in this region. The project was initiated by the EU who recommended the implementation of SCOMAR to maintain border security. Moreover, efficiency in the surveillance and control of all of its national borders remains a requirement for compliance with the Schengen Catalogue and the Schengen Aquis and is therefore central to Romania's efforts to become part of the Schengen Area. A third project that arose from external factors and has international importance is that of *institutional cooperation with examples of skill sharing and optimisation* of the Arma dei Carabinieri. In response to the European Commission decision to undertake a series of initiatives relating to the Peace Building Partnership policy aimed, firstly, at the prevention of conflicts, the Arma dei Carabinieri developed a modular training project including simulation exercises, aimed at training approximately six hundred European police experts in the field of international crisis management. The other which relates to international projects is the project of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato to develop national synergies for the prevention and control of forest fires in Italy.

The other six cases describe projects that are bounded and were initiated in the main to address local concerns. The West-Coast Police force, in Belgium, is relatively small (around 171 officers) and, as there is a large transient population movement across national borders, has specific issues for the tackling of crime, where the criminals may be anonymous to the local police. To tackle specific safety and security issues, the leadership of West-Coast Police initiated a project

to adopt a *Nodal Orientation*. Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and other technological resources were installed and utilised to monitor vehicle flows to detect the entry of potential criminals into the police zone. Once criminals were identified they could be intercepted on a priority basis. The *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project was initiated locally by the Crime Prevention Department of the Municipal Police of Brno, in the Czech Republic, to increase the quality of life for citizens living in a large apartment block and in the immediate vicinity, by increasing their personal and property safety and security. The main drivers for the project were the key findings from a sociological survey which indicated that fear of theft within the home was one of the four greatest risks perceived by the public within the City, 70% of respondents did not feel completely safe in their own home (both at night and during the day) and respondents felt most threatened in the entrance halls, stairs and lift. While difficult to identify the exact origin of the *Safety Houses* initiative in the Netherlands, it appears this idea also arose as a response to fears surrounding neighbourhood safety. The pilot *Project ZENTRAB* in the Barnim police district, Land Brandenburg, Germany was established locally by the Criminal Police to assess the effectiveness of centralization of criminal cases classified as minor crime, which do not require an investigative procedure, with the aim of improving efficiency and morale in policing activities in the Brandenburg police force. The *Tutoring Programme for Minors* in the Policía Municipal de Madrid, in Spain, was proposed by an individual police officer who was aware of the difficulties the Policía Municipal de Madrid faced to address issues with minors. Finally, while *Project Gulf* in Salford Division, Greater Manchester Police, in the United Kingdom, can be considered local in terms of the issue to be tackled and its implementation; it was initiated by central government. In summary, the nine best practices examined and documented can be concluded to arise from clearly identified issues and requirements from both external and internal factors.

Although very different in size, scope and complexity a common feature of the cases is that the achievement of an increase in level of proactivity appears to be a major driver. Clearly for the large, complex nationally important projects such as the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* and the *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR,* where failure would have serious consequences for the countries involved and the European Union this is a clear requirement. But, it also seems to be true for the cases where the projects were initiated locally, that

there is a drive to achieve a more proactive state and achieve the ability to engage in preventative actions rather than to just continue in a reactive state. For example, in the *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project the Municipal Police of Brno can be seen to adopt a proactive approach in that they attempt to address the causes of specific problems and crimes in relation to personal and property safety and security, rather than just continuing with the previous reactive approach of making repeated interventions to address problems or crimes. In addition it is clear in *Project Gulf* the intent and final achievement was to move from a reactive response to issues arising from organised crime group activities to a more proactive approach through the disruption and minimization of criminal activities. *Project ZENTRAB* and the project of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato, to develop national synergies for the prevention and control of forest fires, can also both be considered to be proactive in nature in that they attempt to make improvements in resource utilization and effectiveness. The *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* at West-Coast Police clearly involves a change from a purely reactive approach to one that is both proactive and reactive in nature. From the monitoring of the vehicles entering the police zone, potential criminals can now be identified and intercepted before they commit crimes. This information advantage allows the police to be proactive in terms of how they deal with the potential criminal though interception and making the criminal aware of being monitored (the increase in criminal's awareness of their explicit identification and presence significantly reduces the likelihood of their committing a crime) and also improves the efficiency of reactive actions and investigation of crimes committed. Similarly, in the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* two types of police actions can be identified: preventative (proactive) and reactive. The former include talks at schools, inspections, or monitoring of cases, while the latter relates to the interventions that are needed in the presence of criminal and administrative infractions (interventions as a judicial police force). Despite this statement, the programme aims to be more preventive than reactive. In fact, according to the interviewees, what gives value to this service is, precisely, the preventive (proactive) perspective.

In terms of the levels and sources of financial resources in each of the best practice achievements, examined differences are clearly apparent. In the three cases of the *Tutoring Programme for Minors, Project ZENTRAB* and *Project Gulf* no additional resources were provided and no new additional staff were recruited. Additional material resources had to be covered by existing budgets

and funding streams. In contrast, the *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR* required very high levels of capital investment (the budget allocated for this project was €24.6 million) and additional funding was clearly required. For the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* additional financial resources were mainly from internal sources, however, some external funding was achieved for training and education of the national working teams, exchanging experiences and exploring best practices. For the training initiative *"European Union Police Forces Training 2009"* (EUPFT 2009), the Arma dei Carabinieri obtained funding from the EU. For the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* project additional funding had to be obtained from the three municipalities that make up the West-Coast police zone.

In some of the cases the knowledge and capabilities were already present in the focal police forces. For example, for the development of national synergies in Italy for the prevention and control of forest fires, the Corpo Forestale dello Stato already possessed the key resources of experience, expertise and knowledge in the prevention and control of forest fires and there was no need to bring in resources or capabilities from outside sources. Similarly, for the training initiative in international crisis management, *"European Union Police Forces Training 2009"* (EUPFT 2009), the Arma dei Carabinieri utilised internal expertise through the establishment of a dedicated planning working group of staff from operational units with appropriate expertise.

In other cases however, knowledge creation and acquisition routines to build new thinking and bring in new resources and capabilities from external sources was a defining feature, particularly where the introduction of new technology is part of the project. For example, for the *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR*, as France and Spain were already operating similar systems, Romanian experts visited the Guardia Civil (in Spain) and the Gendarmerie (in France) to study the systems and their operation in the field. The main knowledge transfer was from the Spanish SCOMAR system, used by the Guardia Civil (Spanish Border Police) for several years mainly on the African border, which is considered to be one of the most dangerous European borders. Collaboration with the Spanish and French colleagues was essential as, later on, they helped in training the Romanian SCOMAR personnel. For the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* a number of work visits with both the West-Coast Police and key stakeholders of the project to foreign police forces that had already adopted a nodal orientation

proved to be beneficial. Work visits were undertaken to the United Kingdom (Kent and Edinburgh) and to Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The automatic number plate reading technology (ANPR) was later bought from the United Kingdom. This appears, however, not to have been straight forward. Initial difficulties in applying the technology in Belgium were experienced. The reason for this is that Belgian number plates have red letters and numbers against a white background rather than the black letters on a yellow background of the United Kingdom. This made them difficult to read at night. Furthermore, number plates in Belgium are not tied to the vehicle, but to the individual. Every time a new vehicle is bought the personal plates have to be transferred. This results in many plates having screw holes in different places, which further confused the technology. As a result, in the early phases of the project, a high number of errors occurred that produced faulty hits or no hits at all, in terms of detection of potential criminals entering the police zone.

Other cases that utilised external sources as a source of ideas or to develop knowledge and capabilities are the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan,* where the working group used the experiences and the Schengen Action Plans from Croatia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria, *Safety Houses* in the Netherlands*,* where the programme took some inspiration from France's 'Maison de la Justice' initiative following the visit of two Dutch civil servants at the French ministry and *Project ZENTRAB* where the department of the Cologne police district served as a model. Unlike the problems that were experienced in the transfer of the ANPR technology from the United Kingdom to Belgium, the transfer of the filing and software systems from the Cologne ZENTRAB department to Barnim appears to have been relatively straight forward. This is despite the difference in context between the Cologne and Barnim police districts, of Cologne being urban and Barnim rural.

In the cases studied a number of common enablers contributing to the achievement of the project or activity are evident. In some of the cases examined, particularly the smaller local cases, the capabilities and credibility of the individual leading the project was frequently identified as a key enabler. For example, in the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case the track record of the police chief is noted to have contributed significantly to the successful implementation of the project. In the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* case the leader of the programme was described as an '*artist*' transforming his written idea into a real project. In *Project Gulf* the leadership structures were also

identified as crucial. The decision for the lead agency of the project not to be the police, but to establish joint leadership, and to allow partners to lead identified operations, acted as a positive in terms of building strong relationships between the agencies and encouraged commitment to deeper engagement in the partnership working arrangements. In the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* case the quality of the organisation and coordination activities was identified as essential for the success of the project.

In many of the cases high quality relationships needed to be achieved with key stakeholders. In the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case, for example the establishment of the informal relationship with the Dunkirk Police was essential for the provision of crucial information from outside of the West-Coast police zone. In *Project ZENTRAB* the preparations made in terms of achieving the support of the staff unions and the public prosecution department was a significant positive factor in the project. For the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* project, children's problems cannot only be approached from a police perspective and so due to the nature of the tasks; tutors need to work in cooperation with other partners to address minors' issues. In *Project Gulf* key capabilities and knowledge of partnership working with external agencies and the high credibility and respect that Greater Manchester Police have from their partners were key factors for the achievement of the project. While it is evident that high quality relationships needed to be achieved with key stakeholders, this is clearly not always easy to do. At the start of *Project Gulf* it became apparent that the strategic buy-in and support from national agencies was not as available as initially expected. Similarly, in the *Safety Houses* project professionals of several organisations, with their own perspectives, sense making, values, organizational histories and cultures, disciplinary backgrounds, laws, rules and instructions represent a highly complex collective. The management of these different partners is identified in the case as being inherently difficult and misunderstandings and inefficiencies are mentioned as being a possible outcome.

In a number of the cases the recognised level of importance of the project and close alignment of priorities of key stakeholders is evident as a key factor in the realisation of the best practice achievement. A clear example of this is the case of SCOMAR, where successful installation and operation of the blue water surveillance system was considered to be in the national interest of Romania. The project was given a status of high importance by the Romanian Border

Police and a number of Ministries. This ensured a common focus, from authorities such as the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Transportation who coordinated efforts to enable the efficient implementation of the project. Together with the provision of adequate financial resources, difficulties relating to the challenging geographical environment of the coast, where installation had to occur, and to the winter weather, which posed a series of unexpected problems, with storms, strong winds and floods, were successfully overcome in order to meet required deadlines.

In the four cases of the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation,* the *Safety Houses* project*,* the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* and *Project Gulf*, high levels of support from external stakeholders was crucial to the success of the projects. Without the support of all three municipalities, the West-Coast Police could not have achieved the required level of funding. In the case of the *Safety Houses* project, institutional support from Ministers and the Cabinet and the main offices of separate partner-organisations was very important in terms of initial funding and the legitimacy of the initiative. In the *Tutoring Programme for Minors*, high levels of support for the programme were received from both politicians and the heads of the police force. In *Project Gulf,* the high acceptance of the need for action to tackle the significant number of organised crime groups in the Salford area, coupled with the strong political support for the project provided, from the outset, by the Chief Executive of Salford City Council was an important factor for the success of the project.

Two final interesting factors that can be identified from the cases as important to success in the initiatives relate to the attitudes of the personnel involved. In both the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* and *Project ZENTRAB* the personnel in the projects were volunteers. This appears to have positive outcomes in terms of motivation, commitment and morale. In the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case the importance of early success stories, particularly of high profile cases, is evident as a strong enabler for the success of the project, both for internal staff in overcoming staff resistance to changing routines and for gaining support from wider external stakeholders.

As discussed above, the degree to which each of the cases examined and documented can be considered as a best practice is evidenced by the level of

external recognition achieved. A further measure for those cases where it is appropriate is the degree to which others will adopt the practice in the future or it will be developed further. For example, following the example of West-Coast Police, many other police zones in Belgium are adopting the use of cameras with ANPR to combat safety and security issues. The Government in the Netherlands currently plans to spread the *Safety House* initiative into new regions throughout the country. In addition they aim to further develop and extend the approach. The State Secretary of Justice has launched a knowledge network (a nation wide website) around *Safety Houses,* and research is currently being undertaken to explore the possibility of introducing a nation-wide system of client registration. Based on the success of the pilot project in the Barnim district, the implementation of *ZENTRAB* will be expanded throughout Brandenburg. There are also plans to develop ZENTRAB II which will deal with all minor crime offences, rather than just those that do not require an investigative approach.

Following the success of EUPFT 2009, the Arma dei Carabinieri submitted a proposal for the European Union Police Services Training (EUPST) 2011 – 2013, with the aim of increasing and developing understanding and to spread practices and lessons learned within civilian crisis management. The Romanian Border Police have been requested to share their expertise and knowledge of the SCOMAR system and contribute to a series of pilot European programmes for testing different surveillance solutions. They have also expressed their willingness to provide support to countries such as Bulgaria, who are currently developing a surveillance system. The *Tutoring Programme for Minors* has been transferred and adapted to other local police forces within the Autonomous Community of Madrid. In addition, a high number of local police forces, in Spain but also abroad, have asked the Policía Municipal de Madrid to advise them on the implementation of similar projects. *Project Gulf* is seen as a success by the Government, who now seeks to roll out the activity countrywide. Within Greater Manchester Police, a number of the other police divisions are seeking to establish similar programmes.

The best practice achievements examined and documented in the nine case studies presented are diverse in terms of the size, complexity, scope and the level of resources involved in each of the projects undertaken for their attainment. Whilst they only represent a small number of the best practice achievements of the focal police forces, as can be seen from the above

discussions, a number of interesting common factors are evident. We believe that these cases provide interesting and useful insights that will be helpful to others in the generation of ideas and the attainment of best practice achievements in the future.